Sacred king and warrior chief : the role of the military in Fiji politics by Baledrokadroka, Jone
Sacred King and Warrior Chief:
The Role of the Military in Fijian Politics
Jone Baledrokadroka
October 2012
A thesis submitted for the degree 
of
Doctor of Philosophy
of the
Australian National University
Statement
I, Jone Raiova Baledrokadroka, certify that the enclosed thesis on, Sacred 
King and Warrior Chief: the Role o f the Military in Fijian Politics, 
represents fully work undertaken by myself during the course of my 
research.
■ ^ 5
In n n  ß  Ralor l r iJone R Baledrokadroka 
12 October 2012
if ' \
LIBRARY j)W, A / J
Acknowledgements
I am privileged to be able to undertake PhD studies given all the turmoil at the 
late stage of my military career that drove me to ‘take up the pen in place of the 
sword’.
I owe this God-given opportunity to my supervisors and mentors, Professors Jon 
Fraenkel and Stewart Firth for making it all possible in the first place.
Their patience, guidance and unwavering support have shaped my little 
contribution to academia as a student of politics. The opportunity to study under 
prominent Fiji historian Professor Brij Lai at ANU, has given me immense 
political insight and a balanced perspective on our motherland.
To my beloved wife Deborah and my children, Dila, Tubuna, Tamana, Dikoro 
and Disila, this thesis is dedicated to you. It has been achieved amidst all the 
trials and tribulations of four years of political separation between us.
I would also like to acknowledge the support of the staff and acaderhics of 
SSGM and numerous other people who have the same aspirations as me for a 
peaceful, prosperous Fiji. They are all mentioned at the end of this dissertation. 
Lastly, it is hoped this thesis will make a contribution to the better future, and 
the political stability of Fiji, and all its people.
3
Table of Contents Page
1. Abstract 15
2. Introduction 16
Turaga-Bati Relationship 19
Military Intervention Theory- Disposition and Opportunity 22
3. Chapter 1 -Sacred King Warrior Chief 27
Introduction 27
Fijian Traditional Hierarchy 28
Neo-traditional Colonial Construct 31
Methodist Church -Chief -Military Nexus 32
Chief-warrior relationship 37
Origins of the Military 39
UN Peacekeeping Duties 42
1987 Coup 46
2000 Coup 49
2006 Coup 52
Conclusion 53
4. Chapters 2-The Role o f the Military in Post-Colonial Fiji 61
Fijian Pre-history 62
Colonial Rule 64
World War I 66
World War II 67
Malayan Emergency Campaign 68
Post-independence Military 70
International Peacekeeping 71
Unintended Consequence of Peacekeeping 73
Lebanon battleground of the Middle East 75
4
Military Organization 2000 78
Defence White Papers 1997 and 2004 80
Ethnie Politics and Military Intervention 81
Towards Independence-Fijian Paramountcy 84
1977 Constitutional Crisis 85
Conclusion 87
5. Chapter 3 -The 1987 Coup. 94
Post-Election Agitation and Coup Coalition 95
The Military Coup d’etat 99
The Great Council of Chiefs and the Military 104
The Fiji Methodist Church-Chiefs-Military Relations 106 
The September Political Takeover 108
The Military’s Emerging Political Role 110
The Politics of the 1990s 112
Conclusion 115
6. Chapter 4- The 2000 George Speight Coup: Origins of the Reshaping
of the Military 122
The Coup and Aftermath 124
Key Military Officers 126
29 May Military Takeover 134
Qarase and Military Interim Government 137
Speight’s Group Destabilizing Activities 140
Conclusion 143
7. Chapter 5-Why Speight & His Group Became a Threat 149
Military Response 150
Muanikau Accord-An Uneasy Truce 150
Bose ni Turaga and Matanitu Vanua 151
George Speight’s Political Campaign 153
The RFMF’s Force Reserve Unit 153
Speight’s Arrest and the Kalabu Raid 155
5
Military Nation Wide Clampdown 156
Conclusion 161
8. Chapter 6-The 02 November 2000 Mutiny. 165
The CRW Unit -1st Meridian Squadron 166
Grievance or Conspiracy? 168
Mutiny-Five Hours on the Brink 170
Battle Preparation 178
Conclusion 185
9. Chapter 7- The Emerging Antagonism 191
Modes of Intervention 193
Normal Constitutional Channels 194
The Chandrikha Prasad Case 194
Collusion with Key Political Actors 196
Intimidation of Government 199
Threats to Government 201
Commander’s Contract 202
Suspension of Five Senior Officers 203
Fijian Blueprint-Affirmative Action Programme 207
Agriculture Scam 208
Withdrawal of support 209
Military Coup d’etat 211
Conclusion 216
10. Chapter 8-The Acceleration of Military Power 224
Military hold over President 225
Establishing of Strategic Headquarters 230
Military for Life Concept 231
Telsat Funds 232
Logistics build up to 2006 coup 233
Job Evaluation Review (JER) 234
Influence of Military Chaplaincy 234
Influence of Directorate of Army Legal Service
6
On Military Politicization 236
Conclusion 239
11. Chapter 9-An Analysis of Military/Chiefly Relations in 2006 Coup 243
The Case for the Coup 245
Attempts to Avert the Coup 251
The Seizure of Power 252
Coup Coalition 254
Coup Opponents 261
Resistance to Coup by Chiefs and Methodist Church 263
Conclusion 266
12. Conclusion 272
13. Epilogue 279
Militarization of Government 279
The Future of the Turaga-Bati Relationship 285
14. Bibliography 290
7
Glossary of Fijian Words and Phrase
Ba- province of western Viti Levu Island, largest province in Fiji.
Balenabelo- a military exercise area in upper Sigatoka valley.
Bau- leading pre-colonial island kingdom.
Bati -  warrior, border district.
Bati leka- a high chiefs close protection also responsible for chiefdoms internal 
security.
Bati balavu- border warriors responsible for chiefdoms external security.
Bete- priest.
Bose ko Viti- Methodist Church annual conference.
Bose levu vaka turaga- also known as the Great Council of Chiefs established 
inl876.
Bose ni turaga- council first convened after 1987 coup of more than 200 lesser 
chiefs.
Bua- province on Vanua Levu Island.
Buli- district chief under the old Fijian administration.
Burebasaga- one of Fiji’s three traditional confederacies.
Cakaudrove- pre-colonial state and largest province of Vanua Levu Island.
Colo- the inland country, 
i Taukei-an indigenous Fijian.
Kai Colo- the inland people.
Kalou vu- progenitor, originating spirit and god.
Komai Naua- senior Bauan chief of Tui Kaba clan, presently Ratu Jope Seniloli. 
Komunisi- Fijianized word for ‘Communist’.
Kubuna- one of the three traditional confederacies.
Labasa- northern-most town on Vanua Levu Island.
Lakeba- island in eastern maritime province of Lau.
Lasakau- fishermen/ sea warriors’ clan and village on Bau Island 
Lau-Eastem maritime province of Fiji.
Lotu- the Christian religion or to practice Christianity.
Macuata- pre-colonial state and province of Vanua Levu Island.
Mana- sacred substance attributed to chiefs.
Masi- native cloth made from the paper mulberry tree bark.
Matailobau- pre-colonial state and district of Naitasiri province.
Matanigasau- an offering of reconciliation.
Matanitu- the central government a political federation of Vanuas or kingdoms. 
Matanitu ni kaukauwa- kingdom of force.
Matanitu Vanua- native traditional government based on chiefs and the church. 
Mataweilagi- the residence of the Vunivalu on Bau Island.
Nadroga- western province of Viti Levu Island.
Naitasiri- pre-colonial state and province of central Viti Levu Island. 
Nakauvadra- mountain ranges in Ra mythological home of the god Degei. 
Nakelo- border district between chiefdoms of Bau and Rewa.
Namosi- province of south-central Viti Levu Island.
Navosa- inland province of Viti Levu Island.
Nayatena- title origins or ai cavuti of Roko Tui Kiuva.
Qaqa- a gallant warrior known fro his battle prowess.
Qaranivalu- paramount chief of the pre-colonial state and province of Naitasiri. 
Ra- province of northern Viti Levu Island.
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Ratu mai Verata- sacred king of Verata, a pre-colonial state of eastern Viti Levu. 
Rewa- pre-colonial state and province of southern Viti Levu.
Roko Tui- title used for head of Fijian provincial administrator.
Roko Tui Bau- sacred king of Bau.
Roko Tui Kiuva- sacred king of Kiuva District in Bau Kingdom.
Seaqaqa- southern district of Macuata Province.
Serea- chief village of Waimaro (Soloira Division).
Sigatoka- main river town of Nadroga Province.
Soli vaka misinari-Methodist church missionary levy.
Soloira- a chiefdom of the Waimaro pre-colonial state.
Somosomo- chief village on Taveuni Island, home of Tui Cakaudrove.
Sugu- to overthrow by force.
Suguturaga- to overthrow a chief by force.
Suguvanua- to overthrow chiefdom by force.
Sulu- to clothe or dress with wrap around or tailored skirt.
Tabua- whales tooth, of special value amongst iTaukei Fijians.
Tailevu- province of eastern Viti Levu Island.
Taukei- a native, an owner or possessor of a thing.
Tikina- a district, sub-division of a province.
Tovata- one of the three traditional confederacies.
Tubou- chief village of Lakeba Island in Lau Province, seat of Tui Nayau.
Tui- sacred king that ruled with his warlord the Vunivalu.
Tui Bua- sacred king of Bua, a pre-colonial state and province of Vanua Levu 
Island.
Tui Cakau- paramount chief of Cakaudrove and head of Tovata Confederacy.
Tui Kaba- chiefly clan of Vunivalu of Bau.
Tui Nayau- sacred king of Nayau, the leading chief of Lau Province.
Tui Macuata-sacred king of Macuata, a pre-colonial state and province of Vanua 
Levu.
Tui Tunuloa- sacred king of Tunuloa District, Cakaudrove Province Vanua 
Levu.
Tui Viti- king of Fiji, Ratu Cakobau was also styled with this title by Europeans. 
Tui Vuda- sacred king of Vuda, Ratu Josefa Iloilo, the late President held the 
title.
Tui Waikalou- sacred king of Waimaro (Soloira Division).
Tuka- a late nineteenth century native movement based on religion and culture. 
Turaga- chief.
Turaga bale- high chief, i.e. head of the confederacies, Kubuna, Burebasaga, 
Tovata.
Turaga ni koro- village headman now paid by government.
Tu vaka tikitiki- to step or stand aside.
Vanua- a traditional grouping of large kinship divisions of yavusas.
Vanua Balavu- an island in northern maritime province of Lau.
Vanua qali- a village or chiefdom that pays tribute to another chiefdom.
Vanua Levu- second largest island of Fiji.
Vanua tako lavo- the traditional principle of alternate generation relationships. 
Vanua vei batiki- a village or chiefdom that is obligated to protect another 
chiefdom.
Veibatiki- traditional relationship where certain foods are prohibited.
Veiuto- once residence of Prime Minister and present seat of Parliament.
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Verata- pre-colonial state of eastern Viti Levu and district of Tailevu Province. 
Vere vaka bau- Machiavellian politics the Bauan way.
Viti Kabani- a popular native commercial enterprise from 1913-1917 by Apolosi 
Nawai.
Viti Levu- largest island in Fiji archipelago.
Vulagi- a visitor, a stranger, a guest.
Vunivalu- warlord.
Waimaro- pre-colonial state in Naitasiri Province.
Wakaya- an island in central maritime Lomaiviti Province.
Yaca ni ravu- a name bestowed on a warrior to valorize his battle deeds. 
Yasayasa vaka Ra- the collective western provinces of Nadroga, Ba and Ra 
Yavusa Ratu- the chiefly clan of the Roko Tui Bau also shortened as Vusaratu.
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Abbreviations
ABC- Australian Broadcasting Corporation 
ACCF-Assembly of Christian Churches 
ALTA- Agriculture Land Tenants Act
AMAL- Afwaj Al-Mugamah Al-lubnaniyya Lebanese Shiite political group
ANC- Armed Native Constabulary
APC- Armoured Personnel Carrier
ATG- Army Training Group
BLV -  Bose Levu Vakaturaga
BOI- Board of Inquiry
CAMV- Conservative Alliance Matanitu Vanua
CANZ- Canada Australia New Zealand bloc of Nations
CAP- Counter-Assault Plan
CCF- Citizens’ Constitutional Forum
CEO- Chief Executive Officer
CISO- Consecutive Internal Security Operation
CLFC- Commander Land Force Command
C03FIR- Commanding Officer Third Fiji Infantry Regiment
COSLFC- Chief of Staff Land Forces Command
CRWU- Couter-Revolutionary Warfare Unit
CRFMF- Commander Republic of Fiji Military Forces
CSO LOG- Chief Staff Officer Logistics
CSO PLANS- Chief Staff Officer Plans
CSO OPS- Chief Staff Officer Operation
CSO INTS- Chief Staff Officer Intelligence
CSR- Colonia Sugar Refinery
CWMH-Colonial War Memorial Hospital
DALS- Director of Army Legal Service
DPP-Director Public Prosecution
DWP- Defence White Paper
EMICOL-Equity Management Investment Company Limited
EEZ- Exclusive Economic Zone
EPG-Eminent Persons Group
FCA- Fiji Court of Appeal
FCC- Fiji Council of Churches
FDB- Fiji Development Bank
FDF- Fiji Defence Forces
FHL- Fijian Holding Limited
FHRC-Fiji Human Rights Commission
FIS-Fiji Intelligence Service
FLP- Fiji Labour Party
FLP/NFP- Fiji Labour Party/National Federation Party Coalition 
FMF- Fiji Military Forces (as from November 1942)
FRU- Force Reserve Unit 
GCC- Great Council of Chiefs 
GDP- Gross Domestic Product 
IDF- Israeli Defence Forces 
JER- Job Evaluation Review
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LFC- Land Force Command
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LSU- Logistic Support Unit
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MFO- Multi-National Forces Observers
MHA- Ministry of Home Affairs
MISO- Multiple Internal Security Operation
NAP- National Alliance Party
NCBBF- National Council for Building a Better Fiji
NGO- Non- Government Organization
NLTB- Native Land Trust Board
NOC- National Operation Centre
OPORD- Operation Order
OTS- Officer Training School
PAFCO- Pacific Fish and Cannery Company
PANU- Party of National Unity
PLO- Palestinian Liberation Organization
PM- Prime Minister
PNG- Papua New Guinea
PTSD- Post Traumatic Syndrome Disorder
QEB- Queen Elizabeth Barracks
QVS- Queen Victoria School
RFMF- Republic of Fiji Military Forces
SAS- Special Air Service
SDL- Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua or People’s United Party
SDWP- Security Defence White Paper
SNCO- Senior Non-Commissioned Officer
SOP-Standing Operational Procedure
SVT- Soqosoqo Vakavulewa ni Taukei Party
TELSAT- Telecommunications Satellite
UN- United Nations
UNDPKO- United Nations Department of Peacekeeping 
UNIFIL- United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon 
UNSC -United Nations Security Council 
VC- Victoria Cross
VLV- Veitokani Lewenivanua Vakarisito Party 
1st Meridian Sqn- First Meridian Squadron
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Abstract
The role of the Fiji military in politics characterized by the 1987, 2000 and 2006 
coups has been interpreted through the broad lenses of ethnic tensions and civil- 
military relations models. This thesis argues that those coups are best 
understood through an analysis of the interplay between Fijian traditional 
politics and the predominantly indigenous Fijian military. Like the usurpation of 
the traditional Sacred King by the Warrior Chief in Fiji’s leading pre-colonial 
state of Bau, the military’s role in politics today is an inversion of the neo- 
traditional political order, and the military has now moved from a mediator role 
to play a more enduring function in the governance of Fiji.
Given the influence of vanua politics in modem Fiji, and the importance of the 
neo-traditional Turaga-Bati relationship, models of coups and military-civilian 
relationships drawn from the literature are of variable usefulness. Finer’s 
Opportunity and Disposition calculus, which emphasizes the coalescence of 
civilian and military elites in coup making, certainly applies to Fiji and is used 
in this thesis. On the other hand, Fiji’s military professionalism must be seen as 
differing from Samuel Huntington’s civil supremacy model.
An additional consideration examined in this thesis is the influence of 
international peacekeeping operations on the domestic politics of the countries 
from which peacekeepers are drawn. In Fiji’s case, it is argued; experience in 
peacekeeping operations has influenced the military’s self image as political 
mediator and encouraged it to adopt a role that encompasses security. This has 
correspondingly led to the militarization of government by a largely ethnic 
Fijian military.
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Introduction
This thesis, Sacred King and Warrior Chief: The role o f the Military in Fijian
Politics,! is an attempt to understand the military’s interventions in Fiji’s politics
as typified by the coup d’etats of 1987, 2000 and 2006. I bring to bear on the
analysis my experiences as a former senior Fiji military officer, and one well
integrated into and knowledgeable about modern Fijian society. On the 13th of
January of 2006, as Acting Land Forces Commander of the Republic of Fiji
Military Forces (RFMF), I was suspended and later charged for alleged
insubordination and conspiracy to mutiny against the authority of the
Commander of the RFMF, Commodore Voreqe Bainimarama. I was adamant
that my action as widely reported in the media was because of my conviction
that the Fiji military should be apolitical according to the 1997 Fiji Constitution
and Cap 81, the law that governed the military. I was convinced that the
Commander was plotting a coup against government. In a meeting with senior
officers of Land Forces Command held at the RFMF Officers Mess a day
earlier, I had warned them of the repercussions of a coup, using well known
coup author Samuel Finer as my authority. Finer wrote:
By any world standards military regimes have shown less than average capacity for 
statesmanship or economics. And yet, even if it could be shown without doubt that the 
military intervention had indeed brought material wellbeing and political stability to a 
country, it is necessary to ask one final, because transcendently important, question: 
whether the short term political and economic gain is not likely to be overbalanced by a 
longer-term catastrophe? For in most cases, military intervention has put a stop to 
constitutional evolution.1
thThe coup happened on the 5 of December 2006. As recalled by Hunter and Lai 
in the New Zealand Herald:
The 2006 coup was the commodore's fourth attempt. In 2000 during the negotiations 
that ended the Speight hostage crisis he suggested that the military should run the 
country for up to 50 years but Speight - and the president - would have none of it. In 
2004 and again in 2005 he planned to take over the Government but his senior officers 
refused to commit treason. All were sacked.2
My case was never heard in a Military Court Martial and I was granted an 
honorable discharge in August 2007, after my lawyer agreed to the terms that I 
would not lay claims against the military. After serving 26 years in the military,
1 The terminology ‘Fijian Politics’ in this title is taken to mean ‘Itaukei Politics’ and the use of
the word ‘Fijian’ in this dissertation interchangeably means ‘Itaukei’.
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it is this career changing event -  with the invaluable support of ANU academics 
-  that spurred me to research the enigma as posed in the title of the thesis.
I had served on the Great Council of Chiefs (GCC) for the Province of Naitasiri 
and witnessed the workings of neo-traditional politics at the elite level. My 
family links to Bau and my upbringing on that island, the pre-colonial center of 
power in Fiji, have rekindled my interest in researching and writing on Fiji’s 
traditional political history. With my military background and education the 
association that I have had with Fijian neo-traditional society has obviously 
aided this research immensely. As a former commanding officer of the RFMF 
Engineers, I have spent more than twenty years in national rural development 
for both Indo-Fijian and iTaukei communities. I have also done multiple 
peacekeeping tours of the Middle East culminating in my appointment as 
commanding officer of the MFO Fijian Battalion in Sinai Egypt in 1998. My 
first attempt at writing about my understanding of the intervention of the 
military in Fiji’s politics appeared in a Fiji Daily Post opinion editorial, 
‘Cracking the Coup Code.’I *4 It is these intimate acquaintances and life 
experiences, including my intimate knowledge of coup events that I bring to 
academia in furthering the literature. It must be clarified at the outset that Indo- 
Fijian politics, which has its own dynamic narrative, is outside the scope of this 
thesis, although a full understanding of Fijian politics as a whole demands an 
engagement with Indo-Fijian and indeed colonial political perspectives. This 
thesis is centrally about the Fiji military’s relationship with iTaukei politics.
I should point to the advantages and disadvantages of being a participant in as 
well as an observer of many of the events I describe, especially those in the coup 
year of 2000. On the one hand the participant knows many things that are
completely unknown to others, who must instead depend on second-hand
accounts. As a participant, I possess an intimate knowledge of the Fiji military
forces that have played so central a role in the political evolution of Fiji in the 
last quarter century, and, as a former member of the Great Council of Chiefs, I 
know the workings of indigenous Fijian or iTaukei politics from the inside -  the 
connections, the relationships, the loyalties, the long-harboured grievances, the 
ambitions and also the back-stabbing that can lie behind the outward and formal 
performances of respect in Fijian culture. On key occasions in Fiji’s recent
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history, I found myself responsible for taking action to restore national stability 
when it was sorely tested, as happened for example when I led soldiers against 
the Speight rebels in mid-2000 and, later in that year, when I led loyal soldiers 
against mutineers in the Queen Elizabeth Barracks and averted a military split 
that would have been disastrous for Fiji. My direct experience on those 
occasions constitutes the central research material from which I draw in my 
chapters on those events.
At the same time, and unavoidably, the participant in events possesses deeply 
felt views which influence his or her interpretation of them. Such is the case 
with me. My suspension from the military in early 2006 was not only the 
consequence of my beliefs about the proper role of the Fiji military forces in a 
democracy but has also, naturally, coloured my view of the military 
commander’s seizure of power at the end of that year. I opposed the coup then 
and I oppose it now, and nothing that has happened in between has persuaded 
me otherwise. This thesis, then, is written openly and unapologetically from the 
point of view of a coup critic who believes Fiji would be in a better state now if 
democracy had remained, and who does not believe that military rule since 2006 
has been beneficial. An artificial neutrality of view, if 1 had attempted to adopt 
it, would have weakened and confused my argument without adding to our 
understanding of Fiji politics.
Fiji gained Independence from Britain in 1970 with high chief Ratu Mara as 
Prime Minister and leader of the Alliance Party. The new Fiji Constitution 
guaranteed communal representation from across the iTaukei, Indo-Fijian and 
European communities. In the 1977 elections ethnic outbidding brought a split 
in the iTaukei vote. This was caused by growing support for iTaukei 
nationalism as opposed to Mara’s multiracialism policy. Controversially Mara 
went on to form a minority government. The Indo-Fijian dominated National 
Federation Party that had won elections had failed to form government. In the 
1987 general elections, after seventeen years of elite iTaukei political rule, the 
Indo-Fijian dominated FLP/NFP Coalition toppled Mara’s Alliance government. 
This generated Fiji’s first coup led by Lieutenant Colonel Rabuka who claimed 
to be reinstalling iTaukei paramountcy over the threat of Indo-Fijian political
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hegemony. Why did Rabuka’s coup and subsequent coups happen? Why has the 
military intervened in modem Fiji politics? These are the central questions of 
contemporary Fiji history.
According to Cyril Belshaw, “Fijian society, in theory as well as by 
administrative reference, became the society of Bau.” 5 In Chapter One, I set the 
foundation for my thesis within the Fijian traditional diarchy of the Sacred King 
and Warrior Chief centered on the kingdom of Bau. The chapter seeks to 
establish a conceptual framework for the current pattern of military-iTaukei 
political relationship. Oscar Spate had stated that Fijian traditional society, like 
all tightly organized hierarchical societies, had its own tensions.6 Foremost 
twentieth century chief, Ratu Sukuna had drawn attention to these tensions 
within neo-traditional Fijian society. In a 1944 memorandum Sukuna stated, 
“The oldest of these forces and the most powerful as a disintegrating factor is 
latent jealousy between the principal members of leading tribal families.” 7 I 
argue that the inversion of the role of the Bauan (Roko Tui Bau) Sacred King by 
the Warrior Chief (Vunivalu) as described by Marshall Sahlins is a recurrent 
issue in iTaukei political history.8 I also make the case that the present military’s 
relationship with the office of the President is a modem day inversion of the 
traditional construct. Chapter Two analyses the modem role of the military in 
iTaukei politics and its impact on Fijian politics as a whole. It discusses the role 
of the bati (warrior) from pre-historic times, and the role of the military forces 
from colonial to post-colonial times.
Turaga-Bati Relationship
The coups in Fiji, I argue, have been underpinned by the traditional relationship 
between the turaga (chief) and the bati where the latter is theoretically supposed 
to be loyal and subordinate to the former. Bainimarama in his 2006 coup, 
however, has inverted this neo-traditional orthodoxy. What was the origin of this 
relationship? It has its roots in tribal wars. Asesela Ravuvu states:
War had meaning and purpose to the early Fijians. It was part of their way of life, and it 
provided them with a sense of solidarity and a means of social interaction and cohesion. 
According to Commodore Wilkes in discerning the psychology of native Fijians, ‘it was 
the principal employment of males’, and to Reverend Lawry, ‘the noble employment of 
men’ .9
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Ravuvu argues that Fijians were traditionally a fighting people, a martial race. 
This is evident in the title, status and role of the Vunivalu or war chief who was 
the effective leader of a large tribe or vanua. Unity was paramount for the 
survival of the tribe. Ratu Tanoa, the war chief of Bau, killed one of his sons 
rather than have disunity on the island.10 The Turaga-Bati relationship, one of 
loyalty and respect for the tribal social order in the person of the chief, therefore 
became the cornerstone of traditional society. It was the bati that ensured this 
social order was maintained and the vanua protected from outside attack. World 
War II marked a rite of passage for the iTaukei. Battlefield service alongside 
American and Commonwealth troops brought them respect from their colonial 
master.11 With further service in Malaya in the 1950s, the Fijian military 
acquired an honoured, modernizing and unifying place in iTaukei contemporary 
history.
Chapter Three analyses Fiji’s first military coup by Lieutenant Colonel Sitiveni 
Rabuka. The putsch was justified as reinstalling indigenous paramountcy given 
the alleged Indo-Fijian domination of the government elected in 1987 and their 
quest for political parity. During this era the manipulation by both Rabuka and 
the chiefly elite of the Turaga-Bati relationship was the enduring feature of 
iTaukei politics. Arguably this gave rise to intra-ethnic intrigues and further 
coups.
In Chapter Four, I show how the events of the 2000 Speight coup reshaped the 
RFMF, which changed from being an agent to the nemesis of ethno-nationalism, 
and which now challenged the entrenched Turaga-Bati ethos. In the first days 
after the takeover of Parliament Bainimarama seems to have been unsure which 
way to jump, whether towards Speight’s ethno-nationalism or away from it, and 
there still is conjecture as to where his real sympathy lay. Initially the 
military’s stand towards Speight’s group was ambivalent in the view of many, 
including the international community, but the national crisis that followed over 
the next two months proved to be the crucible in role transformation where the 
military began to assert itself over its former political masters, the chiefly elite 
and their associates. The quelling of nationalist aspirations arose from the stand
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and determination of a group of senior officers rather than through the 
leadership of the Commander Commodore Bainimarama. Yet the military could 
not re-install the ousted Chaudhry government because it feared an iTaukei 
backlash.
Chapter Five adds detail and context to the argument that the military is now the 
nemesis of Speight’s nationalist political agenda. This chapter gives an in-depth 
analysis of military operations that influenced the course of subsequent 
political events in 2000. It describes in some detail the internal security 
operations conducted and shows the extent to which nationalist aspirations and 
propaganda were present nationwide amongst iTaukei Fijians. With the backing 
of many chiefs, nationalist sentiments that were obviously racist rose to the fore. 
The outcry was rife amongst Viti Levu provinces given the seemingly 
unfulfilled iTaukei agendas of the Mara and Rabuka governments. More 
importantly, Speight’s nationalist sympathisers within the military had to be 
suppressed. This process of suppression, it has to be said, took place with some 
angst among senior officers because the military was practically an indigenous 
institution where the Turaga-Bati relationship remained sacrosanct.
Chapter Six analyses the military mutiny of November 2000. On this harrowing 
day, I argue that the forces sympathetic to nationalist and chiefly elites were put 
down by military professionalism allied to the rule of law. This dark event in 
Fiji's military history still reverberates within the institution and is engrained in 
the national psyche. Bainimarama has often harked back to this dark event to 
shore up his justification for intervening in politics, the mantra being, 
"Bainimarama or the ethno-nationalist abyss". The narrative describes in detail 
how individuals and units struggled to wrest control of the military headquarters 
at Queen Elizabeth Barracks. The outcome would shape the political future of 
the nation.
In Chapter Seven I argue that the antagonism between Qarase and Bainimarama 
stems from the unfinished business of the Speight coup of 2000. The public 
slanging matches all throughout 2002-6 had their roots in the military 
challenging the iTaukei elite’s status quo. I analyse the various tensions and
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military tactics used to intervene in the lead up to the 2006 coup. The military’s 
political watchdog role in society continued against pro-nationalist policies 
drawn up by Qarase's government such as the Promotion of Reconciliation, 
Truth and Unity Bill, the Qoliqoli Bill and the Indigenous Claims Tribunal Bill.
In Chapter Eight I discuss the hold that the military has over the office of the 
President and the inversion of power, and I examine the way in which the 
military was able to manipulate what was essentially a non-political high office 
for its political agendas against the Qarase government. Futhermore since the 
Rabuka coup the creation of various units within the military underscores this 
role expansion into politics where even the chaplaincy department is not spared.
Chapter Nine analyses the main actors and events leading up to and immediately 
after the 2006 ‘clean up’coup. The coup from a military point of view 
purportedly marks the rejection of its nationalist sympathies and Rabuka’s 
doctrine of indigenous political paramountcy in favour of an all-inclusive multi­
racial society. I argue not only that Bainimarama and the military have inverted 
the power structure of the Turaga-Bati relationship and the iTaukei political 
status quo, but that he and his military elite see themselves playing an enduring 
role in future Fiji politics.
Military Intervention Theory- Disposition and Opportunity
Samuel Finer in his seminal book Man on Horseback; the Role o f the Military in 
Politics and Eric Nordlinger in his Soldiers in Politics: military coups and 
governments spearheaded the military interventional discourses throughout the 
nineteen sixties and seventies. In his disposition and opportunity calculus, Finer 
identifies the disposition of the military elite -  which is bound to its corporate 
and individual interests - as the push factor. The pull factor is the military’s 
opportunity to intervene where the weakening of public support for government 
has occurred. The political ‘crisis’ offers a key condition for military political 
intervention. The prompting by the iTaukei Movement of Rabuka and the 
support of political leaders Chaudhry and Ganilau for Bainimarama prior to the 
coups of 1987 and 2006 respectively are cited as evidence which will be 
discussed in chapters 3 and 9.
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According to Finer’s calculus of intervention, the military disposition factor and 
the military’s opportunity factor acting in unison trigger the likelihood of a 
coup. By ‘disposition’ Finer means a combination of conscious motive and a 
will or desire to act. One without the other will lead to failure. Finer further 
posits that the “military’s opportunity- and its public welcome- both derive from 
the level of political culture”. The less mature the political culture the more 
numerous the opportunities, and the greater the likelihood of public support for 
military intervention. Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka, the leader of Fiji’s first coup in 
fact pointed to this less mature political culture when queried in 2012. Fie said 
that those who told him to carry out the 1987 coup misled him and he realized 
this later.13
If one were to compare the main traits of the 1987, 2000 and 2006 Fiji coups 
into a theoretical causal framework, then four constants emerge as a working 
hypothesis. The first is that Fiji’s coups are generated as a consequence of 
election results and a change in government. The military on the three occasions 
has intervened to veto election results within a year. The second is that in each 
case the party that came to power in the eyes of the military threatened its 
corporate interest and judgement of the national interest. The military’s 
corporate interest is foremost in a military elite’s calculus for intervention. The 
third is that perceived ethnic issues are raised and heightened by political 
outbidders during electioneering and post-elections. The fourth constant has 
been the Turaga-Bati relationship which has either reinstated or inverted the 
traditional status quo in Fijian culture, leading to coups. This is the central 
argument of this thesis. In a sense the military’s role in politics is encoded in its 
historical and traditional origins as a force for coercion.
This thesis endeavours to explain why the military forces have intervened in 
Fiji’s politics so consistently since 1987, the extent to which Fiji exemplifies 
wider patterns of intervention found elsewhere, the form which intervention has 
taken at different stages of this story, and the reason for the absolutist character 
of the intervention that began with the 2006 coup. The following are the leading 
questions posed in researching the thesis:
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• What has driven military interventions in civilian politics as shown in the 
coups of 1987, 2000 and 2006? While some argue that there have been 
4, 5 or 6 coups, depending upon how they define ‘coup’, I contend that 
there have been three major breaks in political continuity that deserve to 
be called coups -  in 1987, 2000 and 2006. At the same time the Fiji 
coups have all unfolded in two phases -  the physical takeover, and the 
legal overthrow sometime later. In 1987, after the takeover of 
government in May, the military suspended the constitution and removed 
the Governor General in September and declared a Republic in October. 
In 2000 Speight overthrew the FLP government on the 19 of May 
though the military removed the President and abrogated the constitution 
10 days later. In 2006 the military takeover was in December and the 
constitution was abrogated in April 2009.
In order to address this central question, I pose a set of subsidiary questions
in this thesis:
• What has been the influence of Fiji’s traditional chiefly elite and what 
has been the attitude of the military’s top command to the chiefly elite? 
Ever since the establishment of Ratu Cakobau’s Royal Army in 1871, 
there has been a close relationship in the Turaga-Bati tradition between 
the chiefs and the military.
• What has been the influence of the Christian religion through the Fiji 
Methodist Church on Fiji’s politics since the mid- nineteenth century?
• What has been the enduring influence of prominent Fijian statesman and 
high chief Ratu Sir Lala Sukuna on the Fijian polity? Ratu Sukuna was 
the product of both the English and Fijian high cultures. Sukuna’s 
protege, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, was groomed for political leadership 
and was of enormous influence in post-Independence Fiji. Sons of Fiji’s 
high chiefs, Ratu Epeli Nailatikau and Ratu Epeli Ganilau, served as 
Commanders of Fiji’s military reinforcing the aristocratic-liberal 
democratic relationship between the ruling elites and the military. 
Voreqe Bainimarama, on the other hand, called for the reform of the 
Great Council of Chiefs as it was allegedly perpetrating political 
corruption in collusion with the ruling SDL government.
24
• What has changed the Fiji military’s professional behaviour and how has 
participation in UN peacekeeping missions influenced military 
intervention in politics? I examine the colonial role and role 
transformation of the military after it was allotted nation-building and 
UN peacekeeping functions. These roles, I contend have led the officer 
corps to see itself as a mediator of political tensions.
• How have the actual events that constitute military intervention in 
politics unfolded in Fiji?
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Chapter 1
Sacred King and Warrior Chief
Introduction
Understanding military intervention in politics, as Samuel Fitch has argued, 
“requires a ‘historical view,’ that is, a focus on the processes by which a 
political system changes over time”.1 This chapter offers an overview of the 
processes by which the political system in Fiji changed over time, in particular 
from independence in 1970 to the coup in 2006. Subsequent chapters will 
examine those processes in detail.
The expansion of the military’s political role was underpinned, in several ways, 
by participation in international peacekeeping missions, but the trigger in each 
case was a changing relationship between the military top command and Fiji’s 
neo-traditional politics. The coup in 1987 reflected the traditional Turaga-Bati 
(chief-warrior) role, and was aimed at protecting Fijian political supremacy, as 
demonstrated by the adoption of an ethnically skewed constitution in 1990 under 
the influence of the Great Council of Chiefs.
The second coup, in 2000, proved a turning point, with the military uncertain 
about whether to side with the forces of chiefly elitism and ethno-nationalism or 
adopt a new political role in defiance of paramount chiefs. Fiji’s President, Tui 
Nayau Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, was removed from office by the military top 
command and, once order was restored, the military’s emerging antagonism 
towards the government of Laisenia Qarase centered on the latter’s association 
with prominent Kubuna and Tovata chiefs who had sided with 2000 coup leader 
George Speight.
Fiji’s third coup, in 2006, was aimed at destroying the influence of at least one 
section of Fiji’s chiefly elite and the associated ‘old order’, supposedly in the 
interests of modernization. This most recent coup continues to reverberate in the 
politics of Fiji because it represented a power inversion in the neo-traditional
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relationship between the elite symbolized by the Great Council of Chiefs and the 
military.
This thesis argues that Commodore Bainimarama’s 2006 coup -  in its relation to 
the Presidency - mimics the ancient hierarchical power inversion of the Bauan 
Sacred King (Roko Tui Bau) by his Warrior Chief (Vunivalu), as discussed by 
anthropologist Marshall Sahlins in his treatment of the contrast between Bau and 
Rewa as pre-colonial states. So there is a causal nexus between the traditional 
Turaga-Bati relationship and Fiji’s coup ‘culture’ more compelling than the 
inter-ethnic conflict thesis advanced by scholars such as Lai, Scarr and Norton.
Lai, for example, contends that the power of ethnic emotions was the main
2
dynamic that has underpinned the coups.
Bauan traditional rule in the mid-nineteenth century was an inverted form of 
dual kingship that subordinated the sacred ruler to the war lord as opposed to the 
stable Rewa polity.3 In researching the contemporary role of the Fiji military in 
politics I argue that the present is rooted in history and the traditional epoch. 
This approach places the contemporary phenomenon of coups in Fiji in the 
context of Fiji’s past politics, and it emphasizes the persistence of tradition in 
modem political events.
Fijian Traditional Hierarchy
The foregoing discussion raises a series of important issues in the traditional 
Turaga-Bati relationship. Arthur Capell made the point that, “the history of Fiji 
is the history of chiefly families.”4 The phrase emphasized the hierarchical 
nature of Fijian traditional society where chiefly power was held sacred. Arthur 
Hocart and Marshall Sahlins in studying Fiji’s chiefly system explained the 
dualistic relationship of the two chiefs at the apex of Fijian social order, the 
sacred king or Roko Tui and his warrior chief or Vunivalu. Sahlins looked at the 
two leading pre-colonial states of Bau and Rewa. Basil Thomson, Fiji’s native 
lands commissioner of the 1890s, considered Rewa “the most perfect example 
of a Fijian state known to us.” 5 Apart from Rewa and Bau, the sacred king -  
warrior chief diarchy was prevalent in other pre-colonial states. In the state of 
Waimaro Colo East, the practice of chiefly dualism was also witnessed by
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Brewster in the 1880s stating, “The head chief at Serea was Ro Ra Angatha. He 
was the Vunivalu or fighting chief of his clan. Associated with him was Tui 
Waikalou or the Lord of Waikalou.”6
As described by early missionaries the Fijian chief of old was perceived to be 
the embodiment of the Kalou-vu or progenitor and God. Hocart puts it 
succinctly, “If reverence and devotion are required, including belief in the 
supernatural, to make up religion, then the true religion of the Fijians is the 
service of the chiefs”.7
The custom of respect for the authority and person of the chief was what 
underpinned the traditional order. In the state of Bau, the dualistic relationship 
was inverted by the Vunivalu clan through Ratu Naulivou, his brother Ratu 
Tanoa and his son Ratu Cakobau who overthrew the sacred king the Roko Tui 
Bau in a rebellion. This was a break in tradition of grand proportions. Sahlins 
argues that, “The second great transformation of the Bauan polity was the 
inversion of the diarchy, the overthrow of the sacred kings (Roko Tui Bau) by 
the war kings (Vunivalu), who thus became in all but ritual respects the supreme 
power”.8
Sahlins’s work in outlining the significance of this traditional coup to the 
development of a nascent traditional polity establishes a thematic base which 
has allowed the author to weave the thesis narrative in these terms. As rightfully 
indicated by Sahlins:
This great transformation in the Fijian cultural order should not be considered in 
isolation, as independent developments. This indeed is the sense of history encoded in 
the high Fijian genealogy that accompanies the founding dynasties of the major 
kingdoms.9
This traditional transgression by the Bauan polity became notoriously known as 
the ‘kingdom of force’ or matanitu ni kaukauwa. 10 Scarr in his Fiji: A Short 
History explained, “There was endemic competition for leadership. It provided 
the chance to display kaukauwa, innate capacity and strength, and resulted in a 
[traditional] state economy”. 11
Indeed, there is a correlation between the rise of the kingdom of force of Bau 
and the incursion of Western material and ideas in the early nineteenth century. 
After the reinstating of Tanoa as Vunivalu in 1837, in what was an internal
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palace coup, it was widely recognized that his son Cakobau was the power 
behind the throne. The missionary Joseph Waterhouse verified this by revealing:
Tanoa being infirm, his ambitious son Thakombau now usurped the chiefly authority, 
allowing the old man to retain the name and dignity, whilst he himself exercised the 
power of Vunivalu, and secretly directed the actions of his father in all important 
business. With crafty policy, he claimed all popular measures and renowned deeds as 
his own, while the opposite were artfully imputed to the parent chieftain. 12
Therefore, for some fifteen years till 1852, when he was finally installed 
Vunivalu after the death of Tanoa, Cakobau was in fact the supreme ruler of 
Bau. Bainimarama’s relationships with President Ratu Josefa Iloilo and the 
incumbent President Ratu Epeli Nailatikau are reminiscent of Cakobau’s 
Machiavellian mores.
Kaplan in studying Fijian ritual politics also traces this cultural phenomenon 
even further back to the Nakauvadra Mountains, home of the Fijian Gods’ 
mythology.13 According to legend a war had started when the God Degei’s twin 
grandsons, Nacirikaumoli and Nakausabaria, defied him by killing his bird 
Turukawa. The Twins were banished on canoes to the coast and beyond and 
were subsequently referred to as the foreigners (Vulagi). Kaplan further 
explains:
The interior people were the descendants of the autochthonous Degei and the coastal 
people were powerful upstarts like the twins. From the point of view of the many 
coastal chiefs their powerful kingdoms are descendants of active superseding lines who 
successfully usurp the rule. As these powerful upstarts, the Twins are the war gods of 
coastal polities. 14
The struggle for and usurpation of power in Fiji’s pre-contact history was quite 
prevalent and witnessed by traders and missionaries in the contact era of the 
nineteenth century. To illustrate, coups were commonly known in the Fijian 
language as suguvanua or suguturaga- the usurpation of traditional or chiefly 
power.15 The Fijian definitions still survive today in Fijian surnames valorizing 
usurpations of past chiefs. The classic case is that of the name Cakobau -  
destroyer of Bau -  bestowed on Ratu Seru to commemorate his act of usurpation 
or suguturaga in 1837.16
Fijians have often drawn parallels between Fiji’s coups and Ratu Cakobau’s 
usurpation and reinstating of his father Ratu Tanoa as Vunivalu of Bau in 
attempting to explain the present military’s intervention in politics. It is argued
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that the Fiji coups and the contemporary phenomenon of military intervention in 
politics are best understood in terms of Fiji’s traditional history. In many ways, 
this approach also casts light on Commodore Bainimarama’s feud with chiefs 
over the last decade. Indeed, his relationship with the office of the President 
resonates with Fijian politics of old. Timothy Earle in his seminal book, How 
Chiefs Come to Power argues military might is one of the sources of political 
power. Earle states:
While leaders depend on their warriors to extend political power; they must always be on 
the lookout for treachery. Ultimately warrior might is a destabilizing and divisive power 
in institutions of leadership; it is only effective as long as it can be reined in and directed 
strategically. 17
In a sense, Bainimarama and the military’s role in politics can similarly be 
understood as acting out Fijian classical strategic culture founded on the Bauan 
kingdom of force.
Earle further argues that “The fundamental dynamics of chiefdoms are 
essentially the same as those of states, and ... the origin of states is to be 
understood in the emergence and development of chiefdoms.” Earl asserted 
that understanding the dynamics of chiefly society, offers an essential view into 
the historical background of the modem world. 19 The history of chiefdoms 
documents the evolutionary trajectories that resulted, in some situations, in the 
institutionalization of broad-scale, politically centralized societies and, in others, 
in highly fragmented and unstable regions of competitive polities. Likewise, 
in Fiji’s contemporary politics, the military that was used by chiefs for political 
consolidation of a colonial centralized society has turned on their masters to 
acquire their power and sphere of influence.
Neo -Traditional Colonial Construct
9 1The theoretical discussion of tradition has become trite." It is now held that a 
salient characteristic of tradition is its changing identity. Indeed Handler and 
Linnekin argued that, “There is no essential, bounded tradition; tradition is a 
model of the past and is inseparable from the interpretation of tradition in the 
present”. Moreover, Inglehart and Baker reasserted Max Weber and Samuel 
Huntington’s claim that ‘cultural values are an enduring and autonomous 
influence on society’. Peter France in his seminal work The Charter o f the 
Land traces precisely the founding of a Fijian orthodoxy and how Fijian
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“immemorial tradition” was amended by Governor Gordon in colonial Fiji.24 
The Fijian post-colonial traditional polity was created by Governor Sir Arthur 
Gordon in 1876 based largely on the mixed character of the earlier Cakobau 
government. Gordon had placed himself at the apex of the Fijian social structure 
made up of a Great Council of Chiefs (GCC). Twelve of the foremost tribal 
chiefs were chosen to indirectly rule as government native administrators 
(Rokos) over subject tribes in newly delineated provinces. The first Roko Tui 
for Tailevu and Naitasiri Provinces, for example, was Ratu Epeli Nailatikau, the 
son of Cakobau. Each province had a Scribe and two or three Stipendiary 
Magistrates. Gordon further subdivided the colony into 84 districts, each under a 
Buli, and placed a turaga ni koro or village headman in charge of each village.
The use of traditional authority to legitimize colonial political control was seen 
by the British as the correct way to govern native subjects. A chiefs position 
was legitimated through the enforcement of a Fijian code of Laws and use of 
courts to exact fines and services. In addition, the division of land into 
mataqali-owned holdings was codified into customary law by Gordon in his
97professed wish to preserve Fijian traditions and Fijian ownership of land. 
Timothy Macnaught in his book The Fijian Colonial Experience continued this 
traditional evolution narrative by coining the phrase ‘neo-traditional’ to describe 
the Fijian order under British colonial rule prior to World War II. The Roko 
Tuis met each year in the GCC, thus consolidating the link between the neo- 
traditional Vanua and colonial order headed by the governor. The military’s 
present intervention in politics can therefore be described as both a 
contemporary phenomenon and also the legacy of the authoritarian colonial 
chieftaincy system of the past.
Methodist Church -Chief -Military Relationship
Adolf Brewster in his nineteenth century account on the Hill Tribes o f Fiji wrote 
that, “The Wesleyans like to call themselves Methodists, and so good is their 
organization that they well deserve the appellation”.“ Since its establishment in 
Fiji in 1835, the Methodist Church has had a strong bond with chiefs and the 
military, and its form of organization had deeply influenced the governing of 
Fiji. After the conversion of Ratu Seru Cakobau in 1854, the relationship
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between chiefs and missionaries took on an eminence of its own akin to a 
chiefs relationship to his priest or bete of old. In fact Reverend Frederick 
Langham stationed on Bau was nicknamed “the Cardinal” by Governor Sir John 
Thurston for his renown as a close advisor to Cakobau. He believed himself the 
champion of the Fijians and encouraged annexation by Britain. By 1884 
Brewster the Commissioner of the remote hill province of Colo East proclaimed, 
“Wesleyanism, owing to its dominant numbers has come to be tacitly 
acknowledged as the state religion, although it has no official recognition as 
such”.30
Methodist religious practices such as the annual conference or Bose ko Viti held 
since 1838 and the Soli Vaka Misinari (Missionary levy) have become more 
than church meetings but national and district gatherings of great ceremonial 
pomp signifying native unity.
Photo 1. Methodist “Vaka Missionary” at Nakorovatu Village in Colo East 1881 featuring 
also Europeans. Image: Alexander Turnbull Library NZ.
Captain Wilkes in 1840 gives the names of what he considered the seven ruling 
districts in Fiji as: 1st, Bau; 2nd Rewa; 3ld, Verata; 4th, Macuata; 5lh, Somosomo; 
6th Natasiri; and 7th, Bua.31 Conversion to Christianity of the chiefs of these 
nascent tribal states greatly enhanced the spread of the gospel. The missionaries 
later delineated the country into church circuits roughly along these powerful
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districts providing Western administrative order under leading chiefs. The 
mapping of these circuits was also to inhibit competition from Roman Catholic 
proselytisation. These Methodist circuits forged a national identity that later 
became the basis for provinces of the Cakobau and British Colonial 
governments. (See Methodist Circuit Map boundaries).
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Map 1.
Since 1963, with independence from its parent body the Australian Methodist 
Church, the Fiji Methodist Church has become a localized institution of identity 
for Fijians. In addition, as Brewster stated, “In my time it was the only 
denomination whose members were employed and paid as chaplains by the 
government”.33
The Church has also had a close relationship with the military. The relationship 
was entrenched during World Wars I and II and the Malayan Campaign of the 
1950s given that the indigenous makeup of the army was predominantly 
Methodist. The wish of high chiefs contained in the 1963 Wakaya Letter prior to
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Independence to constitutionalize a ‘Christian State’ clause reflects the close 
political ties with the Church.34 This call was resurrected in the GCC meeting at 
the Civic Auditorium after the 1987 coup.
Photo 2. Fijian Provincial Administrators or Rokos in 1887.35
Gordon had built on the work of early missionaries who had laboured building a 
national Methodist Christian orthodoxy according to tribal boundaries.
These tribal boundaries were later developed into provinces by the Cakobau and 
colonial governments. These provinces were traditionally grouped into the three 
confederacies of Kubuna, Burebasaga and Tovata centered on the leading
T Achiefdoms of Bau Island, Lomanikoro Rewa and Somosomo Cakaudrove. 
(See Map 2)
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Map 2 - Neo-Traditional Fiji Provincial and Confederacies Boundaries
The confederacies were a political construct of the Methodist missionaries in the 
mid-nineteenth century to support the administration of its growing converts 
through the efficacy of traditional chiefly power. These three confederacies 
embodied the apotheosis of traditional power. The three head chiefs of the 
confederacies were elevated to paramount status known as Turaga Bale over 
other provincial chiefs. The legacy of this neo-traditional construct is that in all 
Fijian social functions the ‘standardized’ formal salutation for the presentation 
of tabua or yaqona (kava), pays respect to the three confederacies’ Turaga Bale 
thereby reinforcing the chiefly orthodoxy. This innovation also aided converts 
to traditionally conceptualize the Trinitarian Christian doctrine of the divinity in 
order to facilitate the missionaries’ proselytisation work in creating order and
t o
unity. The traditional confederacies later became a convenient neo-traditional 
edifice for colonial native administration. In creating a colonial native 
administration, Governors Gordon and Thurston were in fact supplanting a 
Fijian chiefly orthodoxy originally codified by the Methodist Church. It also 
created a sense of identity of a Fijian nascent nation as missionization became 
overlaid with colonialization.40 All was not plain sailing though. Despite 
Gordon’s and Thurston’s benevolent efforts, outbreaks of Fijian resistance
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persisted under colonial rule. Robert Nicole in his book, Disturbing History: 
Resistance in Early Colonial Fiji, gives a detailed account of the major conflicts 
of Fijians against the colonial establishment such as the Colo Wars, 
Navosavakadua and the Tuka Movement, the Movement for Federation and 
Apolosi Nawai’s Viti Kabani. These disturbances were quelled by the isolation 
of rebel leaders through the use of chiefs and the native administration.
The paramount chiefs in the three confederacies have continued to promote 
chiefly political authority in post-independence Fiji. Attempts to create a 
Yasayasa vaka Ra, or Western Provinces Confederacy, after the coups of 1987 
and 2000 failed because of the objections from the Great Council of Chiefs 
(GCC). The fear of the resource rich Western Provinces chiefs undermining the 
neo-traditional status quo may perhaps be a reason.
The attempt to silence and charge certain elites of the Methodist Church by the 
Bainimarama regime is underpinned by the age old power play between the 
military and religious ideology centred on chiefs. Earle states the three sources 
of power in pre-historic societies were economic, military and ideological. 
Economic power is based on the ability to restrict key productive resources or 
consumptive goods. At the same time, economic power depends on the other 
two sources of power -  military might to defend resources and ideology to 
institute rights of unequal access. In modem times, however, religion has 
become a powerful political mobilizer for social justice issues. In 2012, the head 
of the New Zealand Methodist Church, Reverend John Roberts, made a 
solidarity visit to the Methodist Church in Fiji and concluded that it was being 
oppressed because it had opposed the coup.41 Moreover, certain senior pastors of 
the Fiji Methodist Church since the coup of 1987 have used the influence of the 
pulpit in linking Christianity with ethno-nationalist agendas. Reverend Roberts 
revealed there have also been 20 pre-court trial conferences involving charges 
laid against Methodist Church leaders, which have been costly for its members.
Chief -Warrior Relationship
Chiefdoms are characterised by endemic warfare and the rise to power of a chief 
is always military at its roots.42 Fijian traditional society was based on the chief
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and his ability to maintain unity within his tribes. Hence, in a tribal kingdom 
there were warrior tribes who were assigned as bati leka for internal protection 
and those as bati balavu for external protection. According to Ravuvu, “By 
emphasizing internal security and defence from outside attack, the chief and his 
warriors maintained unity within the tribe.”43
The bati leka ’s role equates to that of the praetorian guards of the Roman 
Emperor. In the kingdom of Bau the Vusaradave clan was the bati leka 44 In 
Bauan pre-colonial history the bati leka has become synonymous with intrigue, 
conspiracy, disloyalty and assassination. The contemporary analogy of the bati 
'leka was Rabuka’s “elite 60” soldiers that executed the first coup.4:1 The Counter 
Revolutionary Warfare Unit that was formed as Rabuka’s private army after the 
1987 coup had a similar purpose. The Force Reserve Unit formed after the 2000 
coup and the present Third Battalion’s Zulu Company can also be said to be cast 
in the bati leka role. The bati balavu ’s role on the other hand was as guardians 
of a kingdom’s borders. The classic example is that of the hill kingdom of 
Matailobau which was bati balavu to several pre-colonial kingdoms o f : Verata, 
Waimaro, Namosi and Bau. As borderers, their allegiance was contingent on the 
ever changing political tides of the times. As proof of this status, the 
Matailobau people have the traditional veibatiki relationship with those four 
states. According to tradition, certain foods are prohibited in the presence of 
the people of the four states to which Matailobau are bati. The bati balavu as 
borders were quite independent vassals and have been known to switch sides. 
Reverend Waterhouse records that during the Bau-Rewa wars the Nakelo and 
Naitasiri borderers were lured to switch sides by both these contending 
kingdoms.46 The bati balavu’s role in the nascent Cakobau’s Royal Army was 
also prominent in the spread of Bauan political hegemony. In April 1868 Sir 
John Thurston, then British Consul, was part of a force to seek culpability for 
the massacre of Rev Baker and his party in the highlands of Navosa. The bati 
balavu’s of Waimaro (Soloira) and Matailobau were recruited by Ratu Cakobau 
and played lead roles in this hill campaign.47 Today the Fiji military role as a 
whole as guardians of the nation can be said to be playing the role of the bati- 
balavu.
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Through Governors Gordon and Thurston this principle of Fijian societal 
security based on the Turaga-Bati relationship was also incorporated into 
colonial orthodoxy. Service in the ANC was initially by conscription quotas 
from the established Provinces as allotted to Native Provincial Administrators or 
Roko Tuis. As a result, the military became the national marker of identity for 
the Fijian people and her chiefs.The uniform still used today -  including serrated 
sulu (skirt) worn and the lack of a head dress - indicate symbolic traditional 
linkages and an implicit veneration of the country’s chiefly hierarchy. As Deane 
explains:
The masi was used as a turban, and so became the symbol of chieftainship. No ordinary 
man dare wear a masi-turban in the presence of a chief. The chiefs themselves wore it 
with studious dignity; they never, for instance, doffed it to anyone except to the 
representative of the British Crown.48
For the military to adopt head wear as part of its uniform might therefore have 
seemed a sign of disrespect, a factor which helps to explain why Fiji is unique 
amongst Commonwealth forces in having no head wear as part of its ceremonial 
dress unifonn. The core identity of the modem Fiji military, therefore, has from 
its inception been crafted around subordination to the institution of 
chieftainship.
To illustrate the contemporary practice during the 1987 coup, the Turaga-Bati 
relationship was promoted within the newly fonned territorial battalion in 
Labasa given that Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau and Rabuka were from Vanua Levu. 
Territorial officer Lieutenant Colonel Ratu Tomasi Korovakaturaga, the natural 
eldest son of the Ratu Penaia, was the Commanding Officer and General 
Manager of the Fiji Sugar Corporation Mill in Labasa. There were officers from 
the other chiefly families of the Tovata Confederacy that also held appointments 
such as second-in-command Major Ratu Viliame Tagivetaua of the Tui Bua clan 
and even Malayan veteran Captain Ratu Etuate Toronibau of the Tui Tunuloa, 
Cakaudrove was a company commander. Ratu Aisea Katonivere, who later was 
installed Tui Macuata and an ardent supporter of the Bainimarama military 
regime, was also a territorial officer of the Labasa 7th Battalion.
Origins of the Fiji Military
Fiji’s first Governor Sir Arthur Gordon, in establishing a new colony, was faced 
with many pressing issues, of which internal security was of primary
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importance. Because of distance and its underlying costs, he had to rely on 
native manpower instead of colonial troops.49 Gordon was also reluctant to bring 
in troops from outside of Fiji because he figured it could further inflame 
relations with the still belligerent hill tribes.50 There was one force already in 
existence that had experience with the local security challenges confronting the 
new colonial government. In 1871 leading Fijian chief Ratu Seru Cakobau in 
establishing his native government, had formed an armed militia. The ‘army’ 
was drawn from Cakobau’s feudal chiefs and warriors, and European settlers 
acting as officers. These armed auxiliaries were to protect coastal settlers against 
marauding hill tribes. Under the tutelage of the European officers, the troops 
became a well-disciplined unit trained in tactics and the use of fire arms. In 
1867, after Reverend Thomas Baker and his party were massacred in the 
highlands of Navosa, there was pressure on Cakobau to bring those responsible 
to justice. In 1868, Cakobau accompanied by the British Consul John Thurston, 
conducted a campaign to subjugate the belligerent hill tribes known to coastal 
dwellers disparagingly and fearfully as the Kai Colo.
By 1873, during the Ba pacification campaigns Cakobau’s feudal troops had 
grown to 1400 men. At cession to Great Britain in 1874, a detachment of the 
Royal Army was part of the flag raising ceremony in Levuka. By 1875, when 
the men were paid, the numbers were reduced to an affordable 400.51 From 
1875-76 in what became known as the Tittle war’ in the highlands of Viti Levu, 
the ANC was quite successful in quelling the rebellious hill tribes. On 28th 
October 1876, Gordon issued a proclamation pardoning all in the mountain 
villages in order that no lingering resentment was felt by the defeated Kai 
Colo. There were several other smaller rebellions which the ANC was called 
upon to suppress as in 1882 at Seaqaqa on Vanua Levu Island. The use of 
locally armed troops to quell internal insurrection, however, has had an indelible 
effect on the psyche of indigenous Fijians. The legacy of the colonial 
pacification campaigns persists as there is enduring respect for the military. On 
the other hand parochialism inevitably exists in any institution that is 
overwhelmingly made up of one ethnicity such as the ANC and Fiji Defence 
Force -  the forerunner of the Fiji military.
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The Turaga-Bati relationship was further entrenched in Fijian orthodoxy by 
Ratu Sir Lala Sukuna. Bom on the island of Bau in 1888, he was the son of Ratu 
Jone Madraiwiwi of the mataqali Tuikaba, and was to become the most famous 
Fijian of his generation. He was educated in New Zealand and at Oxford, was 
awarded the Croix de Guerre and the Medaille Militaire from the French 
Foreign Legion in World War I and returned to Fiji to become Native Lands 
Commissioner. He played a key role in forming the Native Land Trust Board 
and in articulating a uniquely Fijian philosophy of government and development 
in Fiji. His “philosophy was that the Fijian ethos was built around obedience and 
respect for authority”. Sukuna was the classic example of the blending of two 
cultures and used his chiefly authority to become an agent for British 
benevolence.
Ratu Sukuna was instrumental in sending Fijian soldiers overseas during World 
Wars I and II. He believed that Fijians had to be blooded in battle to be 
recognized as a people and a nation.54The nexus between militarism, 
nationalism and modernity was promoted by Sukuna as an agent of British 
benevolence. This patriotic and nationalist ethos probably was further engrained 
in the high chief through his Oxford education and service with the French 
Foreign legion. Ratu Sukuna’s belief, echoed in modem Fiji, is an expression of 
the underlying view of the military that it is the last bastion of Fijian 
nationalism. This traditional order was further consolidated with high chiefs 
Ratu Penaia Ganilau and Ratu Edward Cakobau commanding Fijians during the 
Malayan Communist insurgency campaign in the 1950’s. Many Fijian military 
officers of this campaign became communal leaders and politicians in the 1960s 
and 70s. The Turaga-Bati relationship forged during the Malayan campaign was 
maintained during the Alliance government of the 1970s-80s. For instance Ratu 
Edward and Ratu Penaia were Deputy Prime Ministers and senior members of 
Ratu Mara’s cabinet while junior officers and non-commissioned officers such 
as: William Toganivalu, Livai Nasilivata, Solomone Momoivalu and Apisai 
Tora held other ministerial posts.
After independence, Fiji’s civil-military relations pattern was a hybrid between 
Nordlinger’s traditional aristocratic and liberal democratic models.55 The 
traditional aristocratic model of civilian control is generalized from the
41
European monarchies of the 17th and 18Ul centuries when autocracies were the 
norm. The liberal democratic model entails the depoliticization and 
subordination of a deferential military to an elected civilian government where 
democracy is the norm. This hybrid pattern cohered well with the ruling Fijian 
chiefly elite in the form of the Alliance government of Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara 
which was embedded with high chiefs from the three traditional confederacies 
of Kubuna, Burebasaga and Tovata. 56
The traditional linkages of the Fiji military, in particular its senior command 
with Fiji’s paramount chiefs was critical to the planning, execution and 
aftermath of the first coup in 1987. Colonel Rabuka, as the bad to his 
Cakaudrove high chief, Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau the Governor General and later 
first President of Fiji, often emphasized his traditional role in the vernacular as 
coup leader. Moreover, two former military Commanders Ratu Epeli Nailatikau 
and Ratu Epeli Ganilau were sons of paramount chiefs closely linked to then 
Prime Minister Ratu Mara through marriage.
United Nations Peacekeeping Duties
Just as World War II marked a rite of passage for the predominantly Fijian 
military fighting shoulder-to-shoulder with Europeans, United Nations 
Peacekeeping duties in particular in Lebanon, have crystallized its modem 
political mediator role. I argue that the military’s expanded peacekeeping 
role and its intervention in politics are inextricably associated as the 
unintended consequence of national policy. The sense of self confidence 
imbued in the officer corps from international peacekeeping in Lebanon and 
various other missions reverberates throughout Fiji politics today.
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Photo 3. UN secretary general Ban Ki-moon inspecting Fijian peacekeepers in Iraq in 
2008 accompanied by Colonel Jonasio Mara to his left the Contingent Commander. 
Image: Coup 4.5.
On the eve of the December 2006 Fiji coup, the then United Nations Secretary 
General Kofi Annan warned of consequences for Fiji’s military should it go 
ahead with a coup. Annan’s spokesperson said Fiji soldiers who took part in the 
coup d’etat would be unwelcome in UN missions . The United Nations 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations has, however, softened its stance 
despite the United Nations strongly condemning Fiji’s coup and calling for a 
return to democratic rule and protests from Australia and New Zealand. In May 
2007, a spokesperson for New Zealand’s then foreign minister, Winston Peters, 
said: “New Zealand believes it is inappropriate for troops from Fiji to take part 
in UN operations at a time when the Fiji military has overthrown a 
democratically-elected government. We are also aware of the financial value of
C O
peacekeeping duties for Fiji’s military.” A spokesperson for the Secretary 
General office, however, admitted, “The United Nations also struggles to recruit 
professional and well-trained troops for peacekeeping duties in areas where 
those soldiers are potentially preventing civilian deaths from conflict. As a result 
they have often been forced to accept deployments from nations whose domestic 
human rights records are questionable.”59 The intended outcomes of UN 
peacekeeping commitment to the new nation in 1978 were invariably
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recognition as a ‘good international citizen’, foreign exchange earnings and 
employment for youths. The decision of the Alliance government to commit 
troops to UNIFIL Lebanon however was not debated in parliament. 60 Ratu 
Penaia Ganilau was then the Minister of Home Affairs under whose portfolio 
the military was. Two of his junior officers in Malaya, Mosese Buadromo and 
Paul Manueli, were Permanent Secretary and Commander of the military 
respectively. The Turaga-Bati relationship without a doubt was at play in this 
monumental foreign policy decision.
The decision to commit to peacekeeping has contributed to political instability 
ever since. With the Fiji military’s present politicized internal security role, 
there is a contradiction between conforming to international peacekeeping 
norms and protecting human rights. Confidence in serving with larger nation’s 
militaries in international peacekeeping missions has given the Fiji military an 
inflated corporate self-image. For Fiji, the transition to independence was 
peacefully negotiated and not the outcome of a conflict with colonial masters. 
How has a guardian role developed? Even though coercive force was used as 
an instrument for suppression as in the Colo pacification campaigns and the 
suppression of strike action against both indigenous and Indo-Fijians during 
colonial times, the military has been largely apolitical. In addition the Fiji 
military in seizing political power is unlike those of other developing nations 
militaries such as in Thailand and Indonesia that have never regarded 
themselves as apolitical.
The ideology of political intervention that now pervades the military senior 
command is the unintended consequence of the military experience in 
peacekeeping and the legacy of its neo-traditional role. From the Colo 
campaigns, the World Wars, and the Malayan campaign, the idea of patriotic 
continuity through international peacekeeping remains embedded in the 
collective psyche of the mainly Fijian military. In a passing out parade of new 
recruits Commodore Bainimarama reiterated:
Remember you are now part of a service renowned all over the world for its gallantry 
[sic] servicemen and women who have graced the battle fields of the past World Wars 
and Peacekeeping Operations in volatile areas of the world including Fiji’s political
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turmoil in recent times. Today, this sacred responsibility is passed on to all of you with 
full blessings and confidence that you will continue to uphold its values and tradition.1’1
To support the unintended consequence argument, a documentary film of the 
1980s, The man in the middle featuring Fiji’s soldiers, captured the dangerous 
and arduous role of UN peacekeepers and raised their international profile. The 
accompanying public relations abstract for the film epitomizes the point being 
made:
Since 1978 a small force of 6,000 United Nations soldiers has tried to keep the peace in 
southern Lebanon. This multinational peacekeeping force acts out its role as a buffer 
between the various factions. The United Nations interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) 
has not yet been able to fulfill entirely the mandate entrusted to it by the Security 
Council. However, by its presence, it maintains a semblance of peace and restricts 
armed conflict that might otherwise envelop the entire Middle East. The film tells the 
story of the effects of war on a land and its people.62
The tragic massacre of 102 Lebanese civilians in 1996 by Israeli shelling after
they had sought refuge inside the Fijian Battalion’s headquarters at Qana, which
made international headlines, is another case in point. Fijian soldiers saw
themselves playing a humanitarian role in sheltering fleeing refugees as a result
of the Israeli Defence Force’s ‘Operation Grapes of Wrath’ against the Lebanese
Hezbollah resistance fighters. The Qana massacre became the tragic symbol of
‘national unity’ for Lebanon and brought global admiration for Fijian
peacekeepers.63 The mediator role enforced as part of peacekeeping in Lebanon
in trying to defuse communal factional conflicts has indelibly affected Fijian
soldiery. There is little doubt that there is a higher premium on the diplomatic
and negotiating skills of the soldier of peace than on his fighting ability.64 The
expanded ‘mediator’ role of Fiji’s military that gave rise to coups, however, is
now inconsistent with the western definition of military professionalism as
adhered to prior to the 1987 coup. Moreover the military has supplanted its bati
role for the turaga role; a process which this thesis shall argue is the inversion of
neo-traditional power. Bainimarama has even objected to the use o f ‘interim’ for
his government after six years in power and according to defector senior officer
Lt Col Tevita Mara, has intimated his vision of fifty years of military rule. In an
investigative article on the Fiji Military’s United Nations Peacekeeping
contribution since the 2006 coup, Selwyn Manning revealed:
Inquiry shows the United Nations’ increased use of Fiji personnel in peacekeeping 
missions is contrary to the foreign policy positions maintained by Australia and New
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Zealand. The inquiry’s findings also show the two CANZ bloc nations, while 
maintaining their respective public hard lines with regard to Fiji, have since mid 2007 
remained silent while the United Nations increased the number of Fiji personnel 
deployed to peacekeeping operations. Meanwhile the United States and China have 
developed closer ties with Fiji’s military regime.65
The Fiji military’s involvement in domestic politics will continue unless a 
harder line is adopted by the UN and the international community at large on 
Fiji’s peacekeeping global contribution. Peacekeeping has had an undeniable 
influence on the military’s past corporate behaviour that has given rise to coups. 
Officers such as Colonels Sitiveni Rabuka in the 1987 coup, Filipo Tarakinikini 
in the 2000 coup, and Pita Driti in the 2006 coup who were prominent in the 
political limelight were all former commanders of Fiji’s UN peacekeeping 
battalion in Lebanon.
The 1987 Coup
Lieutenant Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka’s coup of 1987 thrust onto the political 
centre stage the neo-traditional political linkages that had underpinned the chiefs 
and the Fiji military. Rabuka, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara and Ratu Sir Penaia 
Ganilau became key actors in the crisis and the legacy of their decisions 
reverberates throughout the nation. As opposition to the victorious FLP/NFP 
coalition government led by Timoci Bavadra gathered momentum after his 
swearing in as Prime Minister on 13 April 1987, the Governor General on the 
22nd of April and the Vunivalu of Bau a day later cautioned patience and a multi­
racial national focus for the good of the nation.66 These exhortations by two 
paramount chiefs of Fiji were ignored when on the 24th April some 3000 
protesters marched through Suva with overtly racist slogans such as, “We don’t 
want this Indian Government.” The military takeover of an elected government 
confirmed the long held suspicion by many that the predominantly indigenous 
Fiji military would intervene to protect Fijian political paramountcy. Such 
paramountcy had been boldly articulated in a statement by the Great Council of 
Chiefs in November 1932
That this Council records its strong and unanimous opinion that Fiji, having been ceded 
to Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, Her Heirs and Successors, the 
immigrant Indian population should neither directly nor indirectly have any part in the 
control or direction or matters affecting the interest of the Fijian race.67
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Again in November 1968, two years before Independence, the Council of Chiefs 
in an address of loyalty to Her Majesty the Queen stated:
We find ourselves to be a minority people in our own land. The form of government 
which is being demanded by certain elements in Fiji and overseas, in the name of 
democracy, would result in our being placed under the political control of immigrant 
races... We firmly believe that Fijian interests will continue to be acknowledged as 
paramount in our land by the great power to whom we, in faith and hope, entrusted the 
care of our people.68
As members of the GCC, Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau and deposed Prime Minister 
Ratu Sir Kamisese were party to this address. Colin Newbury argues that the 
quest for Fijian Paramountcy evolved as a result of European and Fijian chiefly 
elite political maneuvering:
From about the 1930s and certainly from the 1940s, a secondary purpose emerged, in 
the context of local politics in a very different multi-racial society. A handful of 
European settlers and Fijian leaders in the legislature, the NLTB and the Council of 
Chiefs enhanced the symbolic status of the Deed [of Cession] as a justification for the 
political primacy of indigenous Fijians in the face of economic and political competition 
from outsiders... By the 1960s, governors and local officials, and officials in the 
Colonial Office and its successor departments of state, came to share the notion of 
paramountcy embodied in those assumptions as a way of overcoming reluctance to 
accept British intentions to decolonize.69
The justification for Fijian paramountcy was, therefore, fundamentally due to 
economic, political and demographic factors during the colonial era and 
primarily against Indians’ call for parity. Also Europeans cooperated with the 
Fijians politically but in a paternalistic fashion.
As doyens of Fiji’s chiefly elite, Ratu Mara and Ratu Penaia became political 
beneficiaries of the coup. Coup leader Rabuka was often quoted in the 
vernacular during the initial days of the 1987 coup as acting the role of bati to 
his Cakaudrove chief Ratu Sir Penaia and to the Fijian orthodoxy as a whole. 
Rabuka’s actions saw him elevated as the first commoner to have a permanent 
seat on the GCC in recognition of his bati role in protecting the chiefly order. 
Rabuka’s coup, although military-led, had been condoned by the Taukei 
Movement which was formed by many ministers of the defeated Alliance party 
and prominent pastors of the Methodist Church. The initial interpretation of the 
coup was that of an inter-ethnic conflict with Fijians asserting their power 
against a coalition FLP/NFP government which were essentially Indo-Fijian 
dominated parties. What was stirred up by the Taukei Movement were 
unfounded fears within the Fijian population of an erosion of their rights due to
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Indian political dominance. Given the Indo-Fijians’ economic lead and
7Qdemographic majority, ethnic tensions were easily whipped up.
The 1987 coup triggered a major expansion in the RFMF’s role in internal 
security and indeed Fiji politics. The size of the military reached 5,600 in 
December 1988 from a pre-coup strength of 2,600. Apart from an across the 
board increase in numbers to standing units, a special forces unit, a commercial 
auxiliary unit, ports security, youth training and a mechanical engineering unit 
were also formed. By the end of the year in what Deryck Scarr saw as the 
‘inevitable reality of Fijian political hegemony’, Lieutenant Colonel Rabuka was
72promoted by a pliant President and Commander-in-Chief to Major General. 
Qualitatively the standard of soldiering in general dropped overnight due to 
rapid organisational growth. The coup also redefined military professionalism 
because of the consequence of its civilian role expansion. Senior Officers such 
as Colonels Ilaisa Kacisolomone and Apolosi Biuvakaloloma became interim 
government Ministers and others later headed government departments.
Most importantly, the 1987 coup left at least two permanent political legacies. 
First on the part of Fiji Indians, there was bitter opposition to the political order. 
Secondly, for many indigenous Fijians, military seizure of power had become an 
accepted avenue of political action for the military to take. This legacy may be 
said to be reflected in the ethnically skewed 1990 Constitution as sanctioned by 
the GCC. According to this constitution, the military from time to time had the 
power (at least co-equal of parliament or the president) to intervene when it 
chose.
Another significant aspect of the neo-traditional warrior-chief relationship, 
however, were the ongoing tensions between Mara and Rabuka. The 
relationship began to sour during the 1990s after Rabuka wrested the position of 
Presidency of the GCC-sponsored SVT party from Adi Lady Lala Mara, the 
paramount chief of Burebasaga and wife of President Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara. 
The fact that the SVT was led by Rabuka rather than Lala Mara shows the 
commencement of the military supplanting chiefly authority. Arguably Rabuka 
in leading the SVT was beginning to wean himself off the status quo, and 
initiate the process of inverting the chiefs’ leadership role, much to the 
indignation of Ratu Mara, the doyen of Fijian politics and elder statesman.
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In 1992 Rabuka was selected PM under this racially unbalanced constitution 
though ironically he needed the Indo-Fijian dominated FLP to fonn government. 
Cracks were already appearing in Fijian political unity. Mara thought Rabuka 
was unworthy of replacing him. Rabuka responded publically by likening Ratu 
Mara to a Banyan tree as “nothing grew underneath it.” The 1997 racially 
inclusive constitution crafted by Rabuka and Jai Ram Reddy, the Opposition 
Leader, led to both leaders’ undoing in the 1999 elections. This allowed the FLP 
Coalition led by Mahendra Chaudhry into power under the new alternative vote 
system.
The 2000 Coup
The May 2000 coup differed in many ways from the May 1987 coup. Although 
the RFMF ultimately arrested and imprisoned the coup leader, George Speight, 
there was little sympathy for the ousted government of Mahendra Chaudhry, the 
country’s first ever Prime Minister of Indian descent. Most importantly, the 
military did not back the insurrection and was divided, though not along the 
provincial lines identified by some commentators.74 The schisms were regional, 
and reflected a split within and outside the anny. Support for the George Speight 
coup came particularly from soldiers and villagers from the island of Vanua 
Levu and dissidents from Naitasiri, Ra, Northern Tailevu and other provinces 
with strong links to the Bau chiefs and the Kubuna and Tovata confederacy. So 
was this coup driven by the desire to protect the ascendancy of ethnic Fijian 
chiefs and keep the minority Fiji Indians out of power?
The military responded in an ambivalent manner to George Speight’s coup. 
Certainly after the hostage taking, military rations were supplied to the CRW 
hostage takers and personnel were rotated in ‘protecting the hostages’. The 
common refrain ‘we support the goals (of George Speight’s coup) but not the 
method’ was echoed not only by many indigenous politicians but also by the 
RFMF senior command.
While many soldiers and senior commanders backed the overthrow of 
Chaudhry’s government, the core leadership was not prepared to support George 
Speight who was seen as a front man. During the prime ministership of Rabuka, 
a section of the ethnic Fijian middle class and their associates within the Fijian
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chiefly class had benefited. Speight was seen by the military to represent these 
interests.
Furthermore Bainimarama’s suspension of the President Ratu Sir Kamisese 
Mara debunked the belief that the military was always to be subservient to 
chiefs. As later recalled by Mara of the military, “I thought they know that I was 
the Commander in Chief.. and they should behave; know how to behave to the 
Commander in Chief.”76
The entire political crisis of 2000, especially the 2nd November 2000 mutiny, 
was the turning point in the warrior-chief relationship. It was the parting of the 
ways of Vanua politics and military professionalism that led to a nuanced 
political mediator role. What had caused it? In the 1990s a transformation 
towards apolitical thinking was happening within the military with the re­
professionalization training of officers. The 2000 coup, however, was also the 
advent of the military’s perception of itself as playing a ‘guardian’ role, both 
against Speight and his traditional-nationalist supporters and as regards placing 
Laisenia Qarase’s SDL party in power. Speight as Bati and vasu had strong 
maternal links to Bau and the Kubuna confederacy. This was signified by his 
choice of Bau chief, Ratu Jope Seniloli as then interim vice President through 
the backing of the former Vunivalu’s Mataweilagi household, and his demand 
that Adi Samanunu be made prime minister.
To recall the Machiavellian aspect of Fijian neo- traditional politics and its 
persistence in modem times, we should note that in 2001 the Ratu mai Verata 
and Kubuna high chief, Ratu Ilisoni Ravoka, publically berated his fellow chiefs 
for the first time in GCC history. His criticisms came during the all-important 
GCC meeting to ratify the Supreme Court ruling that the 1997 Constitution 
remained the ultimate law of the land. Ratu Ilisoni’s tongue lashing was 
obviously directed at the power play between chiefly groupings. One group was 
headed by Adi Litia Cakobau and her Kubuna backers on the side of Speight 
against Ratu Epeli Nailatikau as the interim government’s Minister of Fijian 
Affairs and the Military. The old Verata-Bau traditional grievance was also at 
play here. In Fijian history, Verata was the ancient kingdom vanquished by the 
upstart Bauan kingdom ruled by the Vunivalu Tui Kaba clan. The progenitor of
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Bau’s sacred king Vueti of the Roko Tui Bau also was a direct descendant of the 
Ratu mai Verata. Vueti’s descendants Ratu Raiwalui and Ratu Ravulo were 
overthrown by Tanoa and his son Ratu Cakobau of the Vunivalu Tui Kaba clan. 
In the twist of neo-traditional politics Ratu Ilisoni was a close mentor to 
Commodore Bainimarama whose Nayatena clan of Kiuva Bau were subject to 
the Rokotui Bau and the Ratu mai Verata.79 Macnaught who wrote on Fijian 
neotraditional politics explained, “Fijian politics is indeed a familial microcosm 
of historical grievances”.80
Bainimarama and the military elite are fully aware of the nexus between modem
Fijian politics and chiefly rivalry in especially the clans of the paramount chiefs
of the three confederacies and are skilled at manipulating these differences.
Pioneering Methodist missionary Reverend John Hunt is even more colourful in
his description, “Fijian politics is as mysterious as the black art and indeed bears
81some resemblance to it.
Perhaps 1840 US Exploring Expedition linguist Horatio Hales’s summary of 
the Fijian attainments in politics that he found is apposite:
To stir up one clan in society against another, in order to take advantage of their 
dissensions, to make an advantageous treaty with a powerful foe , by sacrificing a 
weak ally, to corrupt the fidelity of adherents, by bribing them with the anticipated 
spoil of their own mother , to gain a battle before it is fought by tampering with
leaders of the opposing force. All these and many more other tricks of the
82Machiavellian School they are perfectly familiar with.
The Bauan chiefs throughout the nineteenth century at least were infamous 
throughout Fiji and especially amongst the Kai Colos as practitioners and 
masters of this ‘black art’ named vere vaka Bau- politics Bauan style. Bauan 
distrust was captured by an eye-witness account of Cakobau’s Christianization 
war campaign in the Ba highlands as reported in The Fiji Times of 23 July 1870:
The mountaineers from Navosa came down to Nalotu, an inland district, hitherto subject 
to Ba and the advanced fortress, or Bai-ni-mua of the Ba people. They put up a war 
fence, and then Wawabalavu, the Navosa chief, called out and said, ‘You Nalotu 
people, I am Wawabalavu. It was I who ate Mr Baker, and the Bau men. Do you trust 
the Lasakau men (fishermen and sea warriors of Bau)? Don't, their trade is fishing. ’83
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In the 2000 Speight Crisis, it was known that the military had used the high 
chief Ratu Ilisoni as mouthpiece in formally voicing a change in the reverent 
attitude towards the chiefly institution. Jon Fraenkel also discussed the opposing 
forces of Fiji’s neo-traditional politics during Speight’s putsch. This 
indigenous dimension has been identified as underpinning much of modem 
politics.
In 2000 the military stabilized the security threat as posed by Speight and his 
supporters. Commodore Bainimarama and the military council during its 37 day 
rule isolated Speight and his supporters, removed President Ratu Mara from 
office, and formulated an indigenous affirmative action policy before handing 
over to the military installed Laisenia Qarase interim civilian government in July
o c
2000. Bainimarama however had tasted absolute power -  ominously- the 
precursor of things to come for the nation. The 2000 coup proved the turning 
point in the military guardian role as Bainimarama and the military became 
antagonistic to a nationalist government they saw as being influenced by chiefly 
and nationalist political agendas. The military’s public criticism of government 
policies continued even to the overt stage of launching a ‘truth and justice 
campaign’ against government prior to the 2006 elections which Qarase’s SDL 
party won with a clear majority.
The 2006 Coup
o z .
Fiji’s third coup, in 2006, was a fully-fledged military coup. The stated aim of 
such a coup is usually improving public order and efficiency, and ending 
corruption. Unlike 1987 and 2000, however, it was not an attempt to dislodge a 
largely Indian-backed government. According to Commodore Bainimarama, it 
was a clean-up campaign against systemic corruption propagated by a 
nationalist, mainly ethnic Fijian, government. The 2006 takeover was legally 
justified under the doctrine of necessity and the 1990 Constitution’s clause that 
was claimed to have been imported into the amended Section 112 of the 1997 
Constitution.
Before the 2006 coup, Bainimarama rejected the GCC‘s call to the military for a 
delegation of chiefs to mediate and solve the impasse with the Qarase 
government. In defiance of the chiefs Bainimarama uttered the now infamous
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phrase, ‘they (Chiefs) should go and drink homebrew under a mango tree.’ This 
was the height of insolence in traditional Fijian society. In April 2007, the GCC 
along with its chairman Ratu Ovini Bokini was suspended by the military 
regime after the chiefs passed a resolution upholding the 1997 Constitution and 
to the displeasure of Bainimarama failed to ratify Ratu Epeli Nailatikau as vice 
president, the military regime’s nominee for the post. With the deposed Qarase 
government’s symbol of chiefly rule, the newly built $40 million GCC 
secretariat building complex completed, Bainimarama converted the premises 
into a general meeting hall for government functions to further rile the 
suspended chiefly council.
There is also the nexus between the role of the chiefs, the Methodist church and 
the military in politics. The unity of the Vanua (chief and people), Lotu (the 
Christian religion) and the Matanitu (the Fijian administration), took on an 
almost Trinitarian solemnity in the inner life of Fijians. The text "Fear God, 
honour the king" (1 Peter 2.1) has become part of the heraldic apparatus of Fiji; 
it stands for a freely honoured union of chiefs and people within the Christian 
faith.87
The political and social linkages between the three institutions are very much 
part of the neo-traditional political orthodoxy. The Methodist church was 
influential in the forming of the Fijian orthodoxy in the mid-nineteenth century 
and is now seen as a hybridized Fijian institution. After the 1987 coup a 
confidential military officers’ report was presented to the President and Prime 
Minister which called for a Christian state echoing past Fijian political
o o
sentiments of the 1960s. Additionally, there was a definite link between coup 
leader and lay pastor Rabuka and certain influential church men before the 
military takeover in 1987. Similarly George Speight and Sergeant Bill Tikotani, 
the two main instigators of the 2000 coup, were Seventh day Adventists who
OQ
had formed a strong bond at church. The linkages between the Vanua, Lotu 
and the Matanitu will be discussed in Chapter three.
Conclusion
The Sacred King-Warrior Chief thesis posits that a political strategic culture 
links the past to the present in explaining Fiji’s coups. The usurpation of power
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has been the story of Fijian mythology that stretches back to Nakauvadra and the 
rise of the prominent Bauan traditional hegemony with the inversion of the 
status and authority of the Roko Tui Bau by the Vunivalu. In that light, the 1987 
coup was, in part, an attempt to restore the power and authority of the old 
chiefly-dominated Fijian order. But the trigger of the coups, the iTaukei 
Movement, represented a new kind of urban mass-based politics of non-chiefly 
Fijians which also represented a challenge to the primacy of the chiefs, even 
though its self-declared aims were to defend traditional structures. The coups 
were led not by a chief, but by a commoner who had an uneasy relationship with 
the traditional power-brokers of Fijian politics. In fact, Rabuka's second coup of 
1987 was a strike against a compromise formulated by the traditional Fijian 
leadership.
In 2000 the military had increasingly assumed a ‘guardian role’ and came to see 
itself as protecting the nation from Speight’s ethno nationalism. When the 
Qarase-led government was installed, his ‘mandate’ was deemed to be the 
military’s as Qarase was part of the Fijian technocratic elite which Bainimarama 
often has reiterated ‘was to do what it was told to do’. This thinking somewhat 
resurrects Rabuka’s military imposed conditions when handing back 
government to Ratu Mara in December 1987. This included regular 
consultations with senior army officers on government policy, and the exclusion 
of the Fiji Labour Party/NFP coalition members from Cabinet.90 
In the 2006 coup the military filled the void left by the decline of the paramount 
chiefs. The military in many ways has seemingly reproduced the long lost order 
and discipline of Fijian village life, which has been heavily eroded by 
urbanization and other pressures. Over the last decade the military has 
publically challenged and inverted the neo-traditional order of the prominent 
paramount chiefs of the three confederacies at the apex of political power. In a 
sense Bainimarama in emasculating the GCC is superimposing a fourth 
confederacy of its own with the military as a national constituent sitting above 
traditional Vanua politics. By 2006 the military senior command had created a 
public standoff against the paramount chiefs. A puppet president was retained as 
a figurehead and a few officers close to the old chiefly order supported 
Bainimarama obviously hoping for better days ahead. The tensions have 
continued as Bainimarama struggles to consolidate his power.
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By March 2012, Bainimarama through his pliant President Nailatikau finally 
decreed the abolition of the GCC as an institution. The main reason, 
Commodore Bainimarama said, “was over the last 20 years, the GCC including 
its secretariat became highly politicised with its members having political 
affiliation and membership in political parties”.91
In a show of solidarity, Reverend Tevita Nawadra, the Methodist Church 
general secretary issued a statement decrying the decision adding that the church 
stood by the GCC and that national consultation should have been held before it 
was abolished. The statement was made after Prime Minister Commodore 
Voreqe Bainimarama announced a new body would be appointed to replace it. 
Nawadra said:
The Great Council of Chiefs has stood the test of time and it was something that all 
Fijians looked to with respect. Ideally, the views of the people should have been taken 
into account instead of just making the decision without consultation92
The nexus between the Methodist Church and traditional politics has existed 
since the dawn of Christianity in Fiji when missionaries such as Williams, 
Waterhouse and Langham made themselves the instruments of political reform. 
Bainimarama keeps a close watch on the links of the church and traditional 
leaders especially the three paramount chiefs and the church through his military 
intelligence and the military chaplaincy network.
Given Prime Minister and Commander of the military Commodore 
Bainimarama’s relationships with Ratu Josefa Iloilo and now with the 
incumbent Ratu Epeli Nailatikau as President and Commander- in- Chief, in 
many ways he behaves like a high chief, mimicking the warrior chief to the 
sacred king relationship of old. However, with Government’s Draft 
Constitution released in April 2013, which states that the Prime Minister will 
also be the Commander-in-Chief of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces, power 
is inverted and monopolized by Bainimarama as Prime Minister and 
Commander of the military.
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Chapter 2
‘Aren’t Politics and Security Tied?’ The Role of the Military in 
Post-Colonial Fiji
Introduction
The military which was established as a colonial force to pacify belligerent hill 
tribes has expanded its defence core role to include governing the country. Since 
the first 1987 coup, two more democratically elected governments have been 
toppled with the involvement of the military. Moreover, the military now sees 
itself continuing in a ‘human security’ role.1 In 2003, Military Commander 
Commodore Bainimarama had signaled a change in military thinking by stating:
Aren’t politics and security tied? Aren't they interwoven? We are of the view that if we 
stay away from politics ...the people who have the 'mandate' to lead and who have a 
private agenda because of the events of 2000, will do what they want, and who is going 
to stop them? 2
Why has the Fiji Military developed such a political role? As discussed in the 
last chapter and indicated by this quotation, ‘revulsion against civilian 
incompetence and corruption’ has often been drawn upon to justify military 
intervention. The Fiji military’s relationship with the past political elite, 
however, was circumspect. Underpinned by the traditional chief-warrior 
relationship, the military was the instrument of coercion for colonial autocratic 
rule and capital. After independence the patron-client relationship continued 
with the military ensuring the political hegemony of the chiefly elite. In the last 
decade the military has become an all-pervasive institution of politics for the 
small Pacific island nation. The transformation of civil-military relations was 
affirmed by the Bainimarama coup of 2006.
This Chapter examines the origins of power inversion in Fiji’s pre-historic past 
that is argued to be the persistence of tradition interwoven in the chief-warrior or 
Turaga-Bati relationship. It then focuses on the roles of the Fiji military from its 
colonial internal security origins to the present ‘human security’ dimension. It 
examines the neo-traditional chief-warrior martial relationship, which was
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embraced and used by the colonial administration. As a result of participation in 
World War II, Fijians gained a sense of national confidence and became 
politically conscious as a group. We examine the expansion of the military 
post-Independence assisted by an Alliance government policy of nation building 
and United Nations Peacekeeping. We also discuss the attempts by governments 
to articulate security and defence policies. We then examine the military’s role 
in post- independence ethnic politics.
Fijian Pre-History
Reverend Thomas Williams’s classic Fiji and the Fijians still provides the best 
single insight into pre-contact Fijian life, politics and war in Eastern Fiji.3 Julie 
Field in more recent archaeological research in Western Fiji found that:
In terms of Fijian prehistory, the results uphold the conclusion made by early 
anthropologists that the ‘patchwork’ quality of Fijian patrilineal descent groups is a 
product of centuries of fission, migration and alliance, and that fortifications and 
competition were essential elements of prehistoric society.4
Fiji was divided into a number of warring chiefdoms when Europeans first saw 
it and the cockpit of Fijian politics lay in the three competing chiefdoms of 
Verata, Bau and Rewa along the coast of eastern Viti Levu, which saw the 
greatest struggle of the nineteenth century. The most significant of these 
struggles was the twelve-year war between the chiefdoms of Bau and Rewa 
from 1843-1855. The rise of the political hegemony of Bau in the mid­
nineteenth century within Fiji’s archipelagic islands hence became central to the 
works of explorers such as Commodore Charles Wilkes and Captain John 
Erskine and missionaries. Bau is a small island, only about 20 acres in extent, 
and outsiders found its centrality in Fijian affairs a mystery. It was through the 
traditional vanua qali and vanua veibatiki systems, one of tribute and obligation 
which gave wealth and power to the chiefs of Bau5. Further, Sahlins made the 
crucial observation that, “The kings of Bau based their rule not on native 
cultivators but on native sailors and fishers-which is to say in Fijian categories, 
as in political strategies, not on the land but on the sea.”6 Sahlins’s assertion 
resonates with geostrategist Alfred Mahan’s concept of “sea power” which was 
based on the idea that countries with greater naval power will have greater 
worldwide impact. This was the great political transformation that catapulted 
Bau to power over other pre-colonial kingdoms.
62
The second great transformation of the traditional polity in Bau according to 
Sahlins “was the inversion of the diarchy, the overthrow of the sacred kings 
(Roko Tui Bau) by the war kings (Vunivalu), who thus became all but in ritual
o
respect, the supreme power.” It is argued that the persistence of tradition in 
Fiji’s modem politics is manifested with a similar inversion by the military of 
the ruling elite. In pre-historic Bau, and similar to other tribal kingdoms such as 
Rewa, the hierarchical nature of Fijian traditional society where political power 
resided at the apex with the king or Roko Tui who was deemed sacred. The 
Bauan title holder was also the leading chief from the Vusaratu clan and 
apparently referred to by some in the 1830s as ‘the old Governor’.9 Next to him, 
was his war lord, the Vunivalu in the chiefly traditional diarchy. The Vunivalu ni 
Bau title loosely translated means Warlord o f Bau or Root of War. The title 
holder was also the leading chief of the Tui Kaba clan. The title was considered 
subordinate to the Roko Tui Bau or sacred king of Bau. The main point is that, 
by the 1830s, the war lords governed Bau. This inversion of the diarchy which 
destabilized and transformed the Bauan polity in the Bau kingdom according to 
Sahlins might even date to the late eighteenth century.10 Otherwise during Ratu 
Naulivou Ramatenikutu’s reign (1803 to 1829) as Vunivalu of Bau, probably 
around 1810, there continued this internal power struggle with the rise of the Tui 
Kaba Vunivalu as the premiere chief in Bau. This led to the banishment of the 
sacred king, the Vuaniivi Roko Tui Bau to Vanua Balavu, Lau. The usurpation 
by the Vunivalu Naulivou and the inversion of the chiefly role led to drawn out 
internal strife on the island. By the end of Naulivou’s reign, Bau had reached the 
zenith of its power, considerably aided by the introduction of Western fire 
arms. Naulivou was succeeded by his brother Ratu Tanoa Visawaqa as 
Vunivalu. The internal struggle continued during the time of Visawaqa. Riven 
with tribal schisms, a faction of the Roko Tui Bau and the Tui Kaba then 
displaced and exiled Visawaqa.
In 1837, Visawaqa’s son, Ratu Seru Cakobau, gained power by subverting the 
Lasakau people to plot and execute the overthrow of the ruling group, led by 
Ratu Ravulo Vakayaliyalo of the Roko Tui Bau. Cakobau re-installed Visawaqa 
as Vunivalu after carrying out reprisals against his father’s enemies. In the ebb
63
and flow of Bauan pre-historic politics, the support of the warrior clan or bati, 
the Vusaradave and the sea warriors/fishermen of Lasakau, were crucial in the 
struggle for power. Their manipulation and crafty enlistment however in staging 
usurpations of the traditional chiefly status quo were common and traditionally 
known as suguturaga. The successful plot by Ratu Seru with the Lasakau clan to 
reinstall his father is the renowned classic example of suguturaga in Fijian 
history. Ratu Seru was given the yaca ni ravu, the valorised warrior name 
‘Cakobau’- the destroyer of Bau, signifying his triumph and final inversion of 
the Roko Tui Bau1'. Cakobau then installed a chief of his own clan as the Roko 
Tui Bau. Cakobau eventually succeeded to the title of Vunivalu himself after 
the death of his father Visawaqa in 1852. He created much of the title’s prestige 
by also styling himself ‘King of Fiji’ and led the process that culminated in 
cession of the islands to the United Kingdom in 1874. This thesis argues that the 
recurring military coups in especially that of 2006 are emblematic of the 
persistence of tradition, as retold in the specific historic events of the inversion 
of the traditional chiefly order, by Cakobau and his forbear Naulivou.
Colonial Rule
Fiji was ceded to Great Britain in 1874 by its prominent chiefs led by Ratu Seru 
Cakobau. In return British protection of native land and customary rights was 
promised. The arrival of the first Governor, Sir Arthur Gordon, in June of 1875,
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just as the Fijians were being decimated by the measles epidemic, gave credence 
to his implementation of an indigenous protectionist policy. France argued 
that Gordon’s policies were the product of his aristocratic background and social 
breeding, “He was fully conscious that by nature and nurture, he was
i o
providentially ordained to a high role in the expanding empire”. France also 
states, Gordon’s policies were also influenced by “an enthusiasm for the 
emergent science of anthropology and its unilinear evolutionary theories in 
which he saw parallels in Fijian culture.’14
Robertson takes a similar view as to why the British government had to initiate 
such a protection policy given its experiences with the Maoris in Aotearoa as, 
“sometimes the actions of settlers and business people forced the hand of 
governments. In 1874 Britain assumed control in Fiji after settlers had so 
destabilized the country that it feared a repeat of New Zealand’s costly land 
wars.”15
Gordon went about setting up a Lands Commission to verify all European land 
alienation and codify all native lands.16 He also interpreted the Deed of Cession 
as the charter to his protection policy which carried the provision that, “[T]he 
rights and interests of the said Tui Viti and other high chiefs the ceding parties 
hereto shall be recognized as far as is and shall be consistent with British
17Sovereignty and Colonial forms of government.”
The policy of protecting indigenous land, labour and co-opting chiefs into 
government by way of indirect rule has become the legacy of Governor Gordon. 
Lai argues this degree of protection of indigenous lands, institutions and 
customs was unparalleled in the colonial world. Through indirect rule, Gordon 
formed a workable colonial state government from embryonic pre-colonial 
states using their chiefs as authority.19 As stated by Thurston in 1878:
The people are protected by the governing power—petty chiefs are made executive 
officers in their own towns-superior ones are Magistrates, Bulis and Rokos and aid in 
controlling the native population while maintaining their hereditary positions, the 
character of which alone has changed.20
In the formation of a coercive arm of government for the new colony, 
Cakobau’s ‘Royal Army’ was merged into the Armed Native Constabulary 
(ANC). Hence the ‘character change’ alluded to by Thurston was also inherent
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in the ANC, the forerunner of Fiji’s military establishment. The strategy was 
consistent with Gordon’s benevolent policy. Imported also into the ANC was 
the traditional chief-warrior ethos of Cakobau’s Army. With the cooperation of 
chiefs, the ANC developed into a fonnidable force available to the colonial 
government. Colonial peace however reigned at the turn of the twentieth 
century, so in 1904 the ANC was amalgamated into the civil police to become 
the Fiji Constabulary.21
World War I
During World War 1, Fiji’s British-European subjects despite the ‘tyranny of 
distance’ contributed to the Empire’s war effort with patriotic zeal. Some 700 of 
Fiji’s male settler residents left for England to join up, mainly with the King’s 
Royal Rifles Regiment. Native Fijian enthusiasm for the war effort though was 
initially denied. There were legitimate British concerns of further reducing a 
Fijian population that was still recovering from the measles epidemic. " Fijian 
high chief Ratu Josefa Lalabalavu Sukuna, who had won acclaim with his heroic 
war service in the French Foreign Legion, in league with the GCC however 
convinced the Colonial Office to compromise. In 1917 a Fiji Labour Corps 
company of 100 men including sixteen chiefs left to work on the war docks of 
Italy and France for the British Imperial Forces. The sacrifices as a whole 
brought great admiration and respect to the small colony and its Defence Force. 
As the Times noted in June 1918:
To Fiji and other islands in the Western Pacific must always be given a high place in the 
Empire list of willing helpers, not because their help was important as decisively to 
affect the issue of war, but because they, the most remote of the British Crown Colonies 
and Protectorates ... did at least as much as any of the others: which means that they did 
a great deal more even than those who knew the islands best thought possible. It has not 
occurred to anyone that the realities of the great issue could have burned so deeply into 
the hearts of these simple islanders.23
After demobilization, military activity was limited to voluntary territorial 
soldier training followed by annual camps. In January 1920, though, an 
industrial strike by Indian workers was a factor that provoked government to 
form a Fiji Defence Force (FDF) for internal security.24 As will be covered 
later in this chapter, the labour strikes also stirred up racial tensions between
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the Indians and Europeans with the Fijian establishment siding with the 
latter.
World War II
In 1939 with the outbreak of World War II, given Fiji’s central Pacific strategic 
location between mainland United States and Australia and New Zealand, the 
FDF came under the military responsibility of New Zealand. In the war effort to 
stem the advancing Imperial Japanese Army threat in the Pacific, Ratu Sukuna, 
through the GCC, was again instrumental in recruiting over 7,000 Fijian men 
into the military. Sukuna was a product and the leading agent of the colonial 
native orthodoxy. With his exceptional educational background and leadership, 
the high chief came to epitomize Fijian patriotism. He rallied the people with his 
recruitment slogan, “Fijians would never be fully recognized until they shed 
blood for the Empire.” This effectively drew thousands of young Fijian men 
from villages to sign up. Macnaught drew attention to the mutual chief -warrior 
relationship and how it was strategically used:
In World War II Ratu Sukuna welcomed the opportunity to show off his people’s 
physical prowess, intelligence and loyalty in stemming the Japanese Pacific threat. A 
tremendous war effort by the Fijians he calculated would achieve several of the goals he 
had espoused for twenty years: an expanded role for traditional leadership, an 
appreciation for Fijian cooperation and community and a secure compact with local 
Europeans to safeguard vital Fijian interests such as Land.26
On the other hand, government policy, backed by the Colonial Sugar Refinery 
Company, stipulated that Indians who worked the sugar cane fields -  the 
lifeblood of the economy -  were reprieved of direct involvement in the war. 
Although an Indian transport platoon was formed as part of the 2nd Battalion in 
Lautoka, members were discharged in 1941 for demanding equal pay wif.h 
European soldiers. There was a socio-political aspect to this demand. With a 
growing population surpassing Fijians in 1943, an economically astute Indian 
community had also demanded political equality. Indian labour, in keeping the 
sugar industry in production during the war years, was however as vital a 
contribution to the war effort as Fijians were on the battlefields.
In November 1940, the 8th Brigade of 3rd New Zealand Division of about 3,000 
men was dispatched to Fiji. Over the coming months, with the assistance of the 
New Zealand Expeditionary Forces, Fiji’s Defence Forces expanded to around
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11,000 men. On November 20th 1942 the name changed to Fiji Military Forces 
(FMF) in recognition of Governor Mitchell’s request for Fiji soldiers to fight 
overseas. The 1st and 2nd Guerrilla Commando units and the 1st and 3rd 
infantry battalions were henceforth deployed to fight the Japanese in the 
Solomon Islands and Bougainville.
The social changes effected by the war on the South Pacific islands in general 
were lasting. For example infrastructure developed as the Nadi and Nausori 
military airfields were later converted into Fiji’s two major airports. The war 
became a marker of time and a rite of passage for Fijians. Serving shoulder- to- 
shoulder with Europeans in the war effort raised their self-image and political 
consciousness. After the war, Sukuna was knighted and elevated to Speaker of 
the Legislative Council, in acknowledgement of the Fijians war services. Indeed, 
colonial rule was relished by the Fijian elite. What was also implied was that 
the interests of the colonial rulers and the chiefs were always to be in 
convergence, with the military subservient. The chief-warrior nexus affirmed 
through Sukuna’s leadership during the war became the cornerstone upon which 
Fijian post-World War II political society was built.
The autocratic aspect of colonial government suited the Fijian establishment, 
who feared decolonization, seeing it as favouring Indian political and economic 
aspirations and hence destabilizing Fijian society. For the Indians, though, 
decolonization meant independence and democratic equality. These two 
divergent views underpinned the Independence debate for the two main races. 
Between their leaders though, political self-interest gave rise to ethnic stereo­
typing and myth making as de-colonization became inevitable. The perception 
of past Indian unpatriotic behaviour during the War was often embellished in 
countering the Indians’ call for common roll elections. This ‘past behaviour’ 
coupled with the perception of being a ‘non-martial race’ discouraged future 
Indian recruitment into the military.
The Malayan Emergency Campaign- Influence on Fijians
In the years following World War II, Fiji soldiers were again called to arms with 
volunteers not in short supply. From 1948-57, in what became the Malayan 
communist emergency campaign, Britain and Commonwealth forces combated
68
guerrillas led by Chen Peng of the Malayan Communist Party. The 1st Battalion 
Fiji Infantry Regiment arrived in January 1952 and served with distinction till 
1956.
The Malayan emergency further exposed Fijians to modem day theatres of 
conflict. Fijian soldiers became attuned to internal security operations on a 
national scale. They witnessed firsthand the various workings between the 
people, the security forces and government agencies that led to a successful 
political outcome. This insurgency conflict with its ethnic undertones left an 
indelible mark on Fiji’s military institution. Coupled with its recent 
peacekeeping history, the Malaya campaign imbued confidence in the military 
to conduct large scale internal security operations post coups, and to adopt a 
version of Malaysia’s concept of Kesban or ‘security and development 
program’, in which the Malaysian armed forces played a key role. For most 
returning soldiers, though, the ethnic issues in the British colony Malaya 
between the immigrant Chinese and the native Malay resonated to some extent 
with Fiji. As described by Ratuva:
The Fijians soldiers’ version of events as officially indoctrinated to them was simply to 
‘save’ the indigenous Malays (kai Malaya) from the evil communists (komunisi). In fact 
the term komunisi like Kai Idia (Indian) came to be associated with unscrupulous and 
arrogant behaviour within the indigenous Fijian society.29
Hence, ‘Chen Peng’ and ‘Communist’ became household names, albeit 
derogatory, for Fijians. Further, Fijian provincial camaraderie and the neo- 
traditional Turaga-Bati relationship were strengthened through service in the 
‘Malaya Battalion’. This national bond served the chiefly elite well in the lead 
up to independence, and was instrumental in the formation of the political Fijian 
Association, the forerunner of the Alliance Party. Colonel Ratu Edward 
Cakobau was the President of the Fijian Association. Other former Malaya 
battalion officers such as Lieutenant Livai Nasilivata, now a teacher in Nadi 
town, was the Fijian Association branch president in the 1960s.
Further exposures of a predominantly Fijian military to twentieth century 
military technological advances were to follow. In 1958, the military deployed 
over 300 troops to Christmas Island as part of the British nuclear testing 
programme. The Fijian troops were deployed in construction works and naval 
surveillance, roles that were later adopted in the post-independence military. 
The military, for this reason, was seen as a modernizing institution by ordinary
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Fijians. In 1961 as a direct result of the Fijian Battalion’s fine record in Malaya, 
and because of Fijian communal reforms, 212 youths were recruited into the 
British Army. Service with the British brought life changing careers for these 
youths as Fijians started to move from villages to urban centers in search of 
employment and better life opportunities.30
Post- Independence Military
In post-independent Fiji two models characterized civil-military relations -  the 
‘traditional aristocratic’ and ‘liberal democratic’ patterns.’1 In the ‘traditional 
aristocratic’ pattern members of the political branch of aristocratic families are 
accepted as politically legitimate in harmony with the civilian supremacy model.
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On the other hand, inherent in the ‘liberal democratic’ pattern is the belief that 
civilian politicians have an electoral mandate to rule. With Ratu Mara’s Alliance 
Party ensconced in power, the liberal democratic and the traditional aristocratic 
patterns were in union. High chiefs held cabinet posts whilst military officers 
were drawn from the same Fijian elite. What further consolidated cordial civil- 
military relations was the chief-warrior neo- traditional relationship between the 
ruling elite and the military as earlier discussed.
To illustrate the enduring potency of neo-traditional rule, Ratu David 
Toganivalu, reflecting after independence, said that a benevolent dictator could 
be appropriate for Fiji. Ratu David further explained that he was alluding to the 
paternalistic chiefdoms of traditional Fiji. In the transition to independence the 
Fijian elite who had shared in colonial autocratic rule were wary of liberal 
democracy, sensing that it would undermine their authority and the Fijian way 
of life. Moreover the fear that democracy would facilitate Indian domination 
given that their population numbers by the mid-1960s were in the majority was 
made prominent by the Fijian elite.
For the time Mara’s Alliance Party was in power, 1970-1987, civil-military 
relations also developed a patron-client dimension added to the fact that 
successive deputy Prime Ministers, Ratu Edward Cakobau and Ratu Penaia 
Ganilau, were former Colonels. This close patron-client relationship was 
influential in the military being given expanded roles, even though for the first 
nine years after independence Frank Rennie, a New Zealander, and Paul 
Manueli, a Rotuman and the first local to hold the position, were respectively
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Commanders. In 1982 Ratu Epeli Nailatikau, the son of former deputy Prime 
Minister Ratu Sir Edward Cakobau and son -in- law of Ratu Mara, became 
Commander. This appointment secured the traditional aristocratic aspect of 
civil-military relations. The move also cemented neo-traditional chief-warrior 
relations. Fiji’s military professionalism was different from the classic 
professionalism of the British military given this neo-traditional relationship, as 
Sanday has argued.34 Military recruitments in the 1970s and 80s continued to 
reinforce the exclusive nature of the institution with selection overwhelmingly 
skewered towards ethnic Fijians. Indo- Fijians on the other hand, it was said, did 
not take to soldiering for historic socio-economic reasons. The Indians of Fiji 
had developed into an egalitarian social class from a hierarchical caste system.55 
Few Indian martial castes such as Sheikhs and Rajputs where military service 
was appealing were recruited as girmitiyas. In retrospect, however, the failure 
of the Alliance government to introduce ethnic quotas for military recruitment, 
given its multi- racial policy stance, entrenched the military as a homogeneous 
ethnic institution.
Fiji’s transition to independence was peaceful and negotiated and did not suffer 
from decolonisation conflicts. Unlike others, such as the Indonesian military, the 
Fiji military’s raison d’etre was not determined by external or internal security 
threats. With government’s emphasis on nation building post-Independence, the 
military was given a lead role. The Alliance government’s national development 
goals in rural areas and maritime surveillance were allotted to the military. The 
formation of the RFMF's Rural Development and Naval Division Units in 1975 
saw regular force numbers increase from 400 to 8 00.36 Even today the stated 
roles of the RFMF remain: 1) Defence of the nation 2) Rural Development 3) 
Protection of Economic Exclusive Zone and 4) International Peacekeeping.
International Peace Keeping
The adoption of a political mediator role by Rabuka in executing the 1987 coup 
seemed all too sudden given the Fiji military’s much-touted professionalism and 
apolitical role since Independence. What brought about the change in military 
mindset? Undertaking a tour of duty in Lebanon mediating and liaising amongst 
factional leaders such as those of the Palestinian Liberation Organization and 
Flezbollah, were all part of a Fijian senior officer’s routine. Many of the senior
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officers, influenced by their ethnic political loyalties and peacekeeping 
experiences, approved of the 1987 Rabuka coup. At the strategic level the 
unintended consequences of Peacekeeping may not have been contemplated 
thoroughly. Ramesh Thakur first examined Fiji’s UN Peacekeeping participation
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as an instrument of the Alliance government’s foreign policy. He analyzed the 
contributions of mini-states and how Fiji was ‘punching above its weight’ in 
international macro-co-operation and creating a niche market for itself. Andrew 
Scobell later asserted that Fiji’s international peacekeeping role was a factor in 
Rabuka executing the coups of 1987. He emphasized that the threat to the 
military’s corporate interest was a factor that led to Rabuka’s coup. Thakur, 
writing prior to the 1987 coup, saw the positives while Scobell’s analysis after 
Rabuka’s coup dwelled on the risks of peacekeeping.
Fiji first sent troops for Peacekeeping with the United Nations Interim Forces in 
Lebanon (UNIFIL) in 1978. For a small and newly independent nation this was 
a huge international undertaking by any standards. The 1st Battalion Fiji Infantry 
Regiment was raised with a mix of soldiers from the military’s territorial and 
regular forces. The unit colours that were first proudly flown in the Solomon 
Islands then Malaya were again overseas-bound for peacekeeping operations in 
Lebanon. In 1980, a small detachment of soldiers was sent to Rhodesia- 
Zimbabwe as part of the Commonwealth Monitoring Forces. In 1982, with a 
growing international peacekeeping reputation, Fiji was invited to participate in 
the Multinational Forces and Observers in the Sinai Peninsula, Egypt. The 2nd 
Battalion Fiji Infantry Regiment of 500 soldiers was raised and deployed. By 
1985 peacekeeping duties accounted for Fiji’s main active duty military role as 
numbers increased to 2,000 regular force soldiers.40 By 1986 over 1,100 
soldiers, over half the regular forces, were serving in peacekeeping operations in 
the Middle East. In 1990, military peacekeeping deployments overseas were 
complemented with the Fiji Police Forces joining UN missions. More overseas 
engagements were to follow that would portray Fiji as a young and responsible 
international citizen and provide employment for Fiji’s youths. Further 
contributions were made to missions in Iraq (1990), Kuwait, Pakistan, Rwanda, 
Namibia, Cambodia, East Timor, Bougainville, the Solomon Islands, Iraq 
(2004) and Sudan. All this time recruitment heavily favoured Fijians. The huge
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ethnic disparity was simply put down to the unappealing nature of soldiering to 
Indo-Fijians. This heavily skewed ethnic recruitment reinforced a tacit belief 
within the institution of being the bastion of indigenous political paramountcy. 
The military’s exposure to United Nations peacekeeping in the Middle East 
heightened the awareness of ethnic and sectarian conflict amongst the ranks. It 
may be argued that the Military’s expanded role in UN peacekeeping was 
purposely embarked on to reinforce the Turaga-Bati political relationship. 
Robertson and Tamanisau’s comments on the political stature of Ratu Mara then 
may be apt, “To many people Mara was more than the Alliance Party. He was 
Fiji.”41 Mara’s intentions, which aimed at nation building, were deemed noble, 
echoing Ratu Sukuna’s enthusiasm a generation earlier. The recognition for Fiji 
as a good international citizen given the available resource of a military with 
prior international engagements was enticing. Mara’s deputy, the Minister of 
Home Affairs, responsible for the military, Ratu Penaia Ganilau needed little 
persuasion to undertake such a commitment. Mara’s decision resonates with 
Argentina’s President Carlos Menem’s decision to engage in UN Peacekeeping 
for, “the low cost opportunity to receive overseas payments and perform a 
positive military role overseas which converged with foreign policy.”42 The 
decision later proved to have far reaching stability consequences for the nation.
Unintended Consequences of UN Peacekeeping
The intended outcome of peacekeeping was quite obvious: to provide jobs for 
youths and uphold basic principles of international conduct as a newly 
independent nation. Since the first UN peacekeeping mission in Kashmir in 
1949, a body of literature has concluded that participation in peace operations is 
beneficial for military institutions and for civilian control. Recently there has 
been literature on the unintended consequences of UN peacekeeping on a nation 
and its military force, although the scope does not include the internal political 
instability dimension created.43 Rabuka the coup maker had admitted, “My work 
as an international peacekeeper reinforced my views about the need for 
reconciliation when societies and countries are divided.”44 
Deryck Scarr was first to raise the issue that Fiji’s UN peacekeeping 
contributions had considerably raised the country’s international profile but had 
hardly enhanced the army’s Westminster brand of professionalism.45 It is
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argued that the expansion of the military’s political role since the first coup was 
underpinned, in several ways, by participation in international peacekeeping 
missions and that service with UNIFIL Peacekeeping operations established the 
self-image of Fiji’s military elite as political mediators. UNIFIL’s mandate as 
stipulated in UNSC resolution 425 called for the protection of the people of 
Southern Lebanon from the Israeli Defence Force and various armed elements 
such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), Afwaj Al-Mugamah Al- 
Lubnaniyya (AMAL) and the more radical Hezbollah. By the time the Battalion 
had pulled out in 2002, the mediator role forged in Lebanon became engrained 
in the collective military psyche and memorialized by the deaths of thirty seven 
Fiji soldiers.
Moreover senior Fijian military officers became attuned to taking on military 
appointments of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Keeping Operations that 
was very much in touch with the UN General Assembly and Secretariat. The 
implication of a ‘Lebanon situation’ is obvious in Rabuka’s coup operational 
orders (OPORD 1/87). In the conclusion to the OPORD Rabuka clearly states, 
“You will see that the sit [sic] Fiji is in is dangerous and will develop into 
something much worse and resembling Lebanon and other troubled areas of the 
world” 46
Again in Rabuka’s senior officer’s presentation paper on the perceived threats 
facing Fiji a Middle Eastern scenario was envisaged for Fiji.47 The deployment 
of Fijian troops amongst ancient cultural groups in the Middle East conflict gave 
them a sense of self belief in being part of a complex diplomatic solution on an 
international stage. Furthermore, being identified with other foreign soldiers 
engendered a wider sense of corporateness in their profession. Officers who 
were central to the military’s role in coups such as Sitiveni Rabuka in 1987, 
Filipo Tarakinikini in 2000 and Pita Driti in 2006, were all previous 
commanders of Fiji’s peacekeeping battalion in Lebanon.
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Lebanon Battleground of the Middle East
Lebanon with all its peacekeeping challenges shaped the outlook of the RFMF 
as an institution comparable to its involvement in the 1950s Malayan anti­
communist insurgency campaign. Firth has also made the argument that
Service abroad also accustomed Fijian military officers to the role played by military 
forces in imposing order, and gave them an understanding of military intervention in 
civil affairs in other parts of the world. Participation in peacekeeping not only 
necessitated a much larger Fiji military, it also required a more sophisticated one, whose 
officers were in a position to work effectively with UN officials, local politicians and 
other defence forces.49
The tragic Qana massacre of Lebanese civilians inside a Fijian UN position 
during the Israeli Defence Forces Operation Grapes o f Wrath in 1996 illustrates 
the point. Unlike the Srebrenica massacre where Dutch peacekeepers bowed to 
pressure to not shelter Bosnian refugees, Fijians opened their headquarters to 
shelter fleeing civilians during heavy Israeli shelling of Southern Lebanon. For 
the Lebanese, the Qana massacre became the tragic symbol of ‘national unity’ 
restored, assisted by the humanitarian spirit of the United Nations’ Fijian 
peacekeepers.50
Again to illustrate the Fijians’ prowess in peacekeeping, during an IDF ground 
incursion into the neighbouring UN Nepalese battalion’s area of operations, an 
armoured personnel carrier (APC) with a section of Fijian troops was sent as a 
blocking force. Against a column of Israeli tanks and APCs led by bulldozers, 
Timur Goskel the UNIFIL spokesman revealed
They [IDF] did it by smashing through our vehicles with tanks and bulldozers.. .there 
were some fistfights, there were some arguments, and there was some physical pushing 
back and forth, but nobody used weapons.51
Fijian troops serving with the UN have indeed gained a reputation as ‘no
nonsense’ and impartial peacekeepers. Moreover, hailing from a small nation in
the South Pacific, isolated from partisan global politics, has reinforced the
impartiality image of Fijians, vital to international peacekeeping. A reported
incident in 1988 substantiates the point made where a Fijian soldier of the
United Nations peacekeeping force in southern Lebanon was wounded in a
shootout with Shiite Moslem militiamen. According to U.N. sources
The peacekeeper was shot in the chest during a 20-minute fire-fight with six gunmen of 
the Syrian- backed Amal militia in Ein Baal, six miles southeast of the southern port
75
city of Tyre. The sources said the shooting broke out when soldiers manning a Fijian 
checkpoint in Ein Baal tried to prevent the militiamen from driving their green Volvo 
station wagon into U.N.-policed territory with their arms. “When the Fijian checkpoint 
told them they cannot cross, they headed for a dirt road. A Fijian soldier fired a warning 
shot in the air,” one source said. “The armed elements apparently thought they were 
under fire, so they shot back and a fire fight ensued in which one armed element also 
was slightly wounded.52
Peacekeeping as the centerpiece of government foreign policy, then, has 
spawned political instability because the military capability to intervene in 
domestic politics became increasingly predicated on numbers swelled by 
overseas peacekeeping commitments. From a force of 400 at Independence, 
active duty troop numbers increased to a peak of 6000 by December 1987 as a 
result of the expanded roles of national development and peacekeeping. Today 
the Fiji military has strength of 3200 active or regular soldiers and 6000 
reservists, or a total of 9200 troops. (See Graph 1)
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After peacekeeping the further expansion of the military came as a direct result 
of the 1987 coup. To control the emergency situation, which critics argued had
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been created by the military in the first place, the military formed new infantry 
battalions overnight using reservists and by recruitment drives. The size of the 
regular force of the military reached 3,600 in December of 1988.53 An elite 
counter-revolutionary warfare unit was also formed to protect against anti- 
government armed insurgency. As a consequence of executing an indigenous 
supremacist coup, the military appropriated a permanent internal security role. 
Moreover the defence of the nation role, after the coup of 1987, came to mean 
internal security rather than external.
By the 1990s, as a result of this rapid expansion, the military had an unwieldy 
span of command stretching over units nation-wide and overseas. This called for 
an organisational restructure of the small obsolete colonial garrison-type 
headquarters. The restructure of RFMF headquarters in 1999 was to have 
important ramifications for the military’s command echelon. Two components 
were created: a Strategic Command and a Land Forces Command, the latter 
being more operationally focused as recommended in the 1997 Defence White 
Paper. The elite counter revolutionary unit of the First Meridian Squadron 
(IMS) formed by Major General Sitiveni Rabuka still came directly under the 
command of the Commander RFMF.
Table 1. RFMF Strength Increases since 1970.
1970 1975 1986-88* 2000
Force Type
Regular Force 200 800+ 2,200^-3600 3,545
Territorial 400 400 1,000~- 2,000 3,500
Force/Reserves
Total 600 1,200 3,600- 5,600 7,045
Source: www.rfmfmil.fi and National Security White Paper 2004, “A safe and 
prosperous Fiji”.
* Increase due to 1987 Coup 
~ Increases due to Peacekeeping UNIFIL and MFO.
+ Increase due to Rural Development /EEZ surveillance.
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Diagram 1
Fiji Military Forces Organization 
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In May of 2000 the Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) had an 
organization as depicted in Diagram l.54 Under Land Force Command, the 
RFMF’s units consisted of three infantry battalions and five other units, plus the 
independent 1st Meridian Squadron. The First Infantry Battalion of 625, based 
since 1987 with the United Nations Interim Forces in South Lebanon, (UNIFIL); 
the Second Infantry Battalion of 339 serving since 1982 with the multi-national 
forces and observers (MFO) in Sinai, Egypt; and the Third Infantry Battalion, 
activated after the 1987 coup and based at the Queen Elizabeth Barracks in Suva 
with over 900 troops serving with companies in Nadi, Lautoka and Labasa. The 
Engineers Regiment, with 500 men formed in 1975, was also based at the Queen 
Elizabeth lower camp. Also formed in 1975 was the RFMF Naval Division with 
an establishment of 200 men. The Navy’s patrol surveillance fleet consists of 3 
Australian Pacific class patrol boats and 2 US off shore patrol vessels, which are 
stationed at the main Stanley Brown naval base at Walu Bay Suva. The Queen 
Elizabeth Barracks was also the headquarters for the Logistic Support Unit 
(LSU) with 400 soldiers. An Army Training Group (ATG) based at Nasinu on
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Suva’s outskirts, with 100 serving personnel, was responsible also for running 
the Officers’ school at Vatuwaqa. The ATG was the military’s main training and 
recruitment centre and also responsible for the pre-deployment training of 
peacekeeping bound soldiers. In addition to this, the military had four infantry 
reservist battalions and Naval and Engineers reservists of some 3500 all ranks.
The Officers’ Training School at Vatuwaqa was the focal point of those efforts 
to separate the RFMF from civilian politics, and was simultaneously aimed at 
building a more meritocratic organisational framework. Former RFMF 
Commander Brigadier Ian Thorpe opened and ran the school from 1990 to 1999. 
The emphasis was on conducting junior and mid-level officer qualifying courses 
and bridging courses paving the way to further overseas military studies. The 
school cultivated an ethos of military professionalism and favoured an apolitical 
stance. By the time of the May 2000 coup, all senior staff officers and unit 
commanders of the RFMF had undergone study at the Vatuwaqa College. It had 
become the mandatory officer education path prior to engaging on higher-level 
overseas courses at military institutions in New Zealand, Australia, United 
Kingdom, United States and Malaysia. By the turn of the millennium, the 
military had qualified and experienced officers in its senior ranks who promoted 
civil supremacy and eschewed military intervention in politics.
The potential for the employment of Fiji soldiers given their reputation as 
peacekeepers was also being capitalized on by Fiji’s former colonial master. In 
1998, the British government as it did in 1961, offered Fiji’s youth much sought 
after employment with its armed services. Over 2,000 Fiji citizens have taken up 
this entitlement as Commonwealth citizens and now serve with the British 
armed forces.55 This has had a significant economic impact on the nation with 
remittances reaching an all time high of more than F$300 million in 2005. With 
British Army Fijian soldier casualties from the Iraq and Afghanistan wars 
mounting, however, the realities of soldiering as a profession are beginning to 
dawn on the families of soldiers
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Defence White Papers 1997 and 2004
Post-independence, there were two attempts to formally review and formulate 
government defence policy. In 1996, Rabuka’s SVT government set up a 
committee of three, chaired by Berenado Vunibobo, with economist Akuila 
Savu and former Commander RFMF Brigadier Ian Thorpe. The 1997 Defence 
White Paper, Defending Fiji, contained some effective military reforms. The 
Labour Coalition government that came to power, with some suspicion, shelved 
the White Paper. In 1999, though, as recommended in the Defence Paper, 
Commodore Bainimarama began implementing some of the 1997 Paper 
recommendations, including the restructure of RFMF headquarters into an 
upward and outward-focussed strategic headquarters and a downward-focussed 
operational Land Forces Command headquarters. As part of this restructure, the 
CRW unit was designated the new name of First Meridian Squadron (1M Sqn) 
by Colonel Ioane Naivalurua, a co-founder of the unit and Land Force 
Commander, 1999-2000.For the first time since independence the RFMF had 
strategic defence directives in place. With the Defence Paper as guidance, there 
was great resolve within the officer corps that the mistakes of the past, 
especially as regards military intervention into politics, would not be repeated. 
Otherwise practically all of the other recommendations were never implemented 
as government had not budgeted for reforms as recommended. The Fiji Labour 
Party (FLP) coalition government’s obvious fear of military expansionism, 
having itself been ousted by Rabuka’s military in 1987, was undoubtedly a 
factor. Arguably had the FLP government fostered a closer relationship with the 
military, through the recommendations in the Defence Paper, it would have 
gone a long way in mitigating the FLP’s fall from power at the hands of rebel 
leader Speight.
In 2003 the Qarase government, with the prompting of the military and police, 
commissioned a Security and Defence Paper. Australian military officer Bob 
Lowry, academic Stewart Firth and economist Jesoni Vitusagavulu produced the 
2004 Security and Defence White Paper, A Safe and Prosperous Fiji. The 
SDWP examined Fiji’s strategic interests globally, regionally, and domestically 
and identified and assessed the threats and challenges to Fiji’s security. It
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concluded that (a) there is no external military threat to the sovereignty of Fiji; 
(b) trans-national crime and unsustainable resource exploitation is a growing 
threat to Fiji: and (c) that the greatest threats to Fiji’s security were internal. The 
Paper strongly recommended that internal security should be the preserve of the 
police rather than the military. Likewise, domestic intelligence gathering should 
be the task of the police and not the military, given that the military was tacitly 
engaged in such activity. However, the DWP recommended that the military 
role in assisting the police maintain order in times of crisis be continued, when 
so authorised by the Minister for Home Affairs.
At the broadest level, the SDWP concluded, the threat to internal security 
derives from the fundamental division of Fiji population into two large ethnic 
communities, and from the problems experienced in any cultural transition from 
traditional social and political life to modernity. The ‘wild cards’ most likely to 
challenge Fiji’s national interests, ignoring global phenomena such as 
pandemics, major global economic collapses, and terrorist attacks elsewhere 
are:(a) governments that ignore the relentless drumbeats of progress and fail to 
implement the development plans effectively; (b) systemic decay from failing to 
tackle domestic and international crime and institutionalised corruption; or (c) 
the convergence of events that might be managed individually but in concert can 
overwhelm the community, for example, the convergence of economic 
stagnation or decline with political instability, systemic decay and natural or 
man-made disasters. Controversially the paper called for a halving in size of the 
RFMF and a refonn towards making the selection process for position of 
Commander more accountable and merit based. After much remonstration from 
Commodore Bainimarama in person, the Paper was held in abeyance and never 
implemented. Unfortunately for the people of Fiji another chance at ensuring the 
military was answerable to political oversight went begging prior to the 2006 
coup.
Ethnic Politics and Military Intervention
We shall first examine what are seen as the political aspirations and grievances 
of both the major races. In pursuance of his native protection policy, Governor
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Gordon introduced a form of taxation which made the native owners farm their 
own lands, thus depriving the planters of a source of cheap labour. Governor 
Gordon then came up with the idea of the importation of labour from India. As a 
former governor of Trinidad and Mauritius, Gordon had experience of the 
indenture system in these colonies’ plantations that made huge profits for the 
planters. On 14th May 1879 the first ship Leonidas arrived with Indian 
indentured labourers, a full year before the Australian Colonial Sugar Refinery 
began its Fiji operations. By the end of the indentured labour emigration in 
1916, over 60,000 Indians had been transported to Fiji. Three out of four 
persons chose to remain after their contracts in accordance with the Salisbury 
Dispatch of 1875 which promised Indian indentured labourers rights to settle in 
the colonies. In the 1921 census, given the influx of the Indian population 
corresponding with the fall of the Fijian population because of devastating 
epidemics, Indian numbers were at 60,634 to Fijians 84,475.59 
The colonial government had discouraged the two races interacting socially and 
economically chiefly to protect the Fijian way of life.60 Given the fact that 
Fijians, as a matter of policy, remained in their villages, the major contributor to 
the economic life of the colony was the Indian community. To achieve equality 
rather than being looked upon as second-class citizens became their struggle. 
The 1920 and 1921 Indian laborers’ strikes on Viti Levu were the beginning of 
Indian political and economic consciousness made public. It was seen as the 
beginning of the post- indenture ‘Indian problem’ in Fiji: that is a claim to equal 
citizenship in Fiji, a claim made first against the European order then extended 
to the Fijians.61 In the 1920 strike Europeans with Fijians sided against the 
striking Indian workers by taking up arms to rein in dissenters. Such actions led 
Winston Halapua rightfully to argue, ‘The military represented the repressive 
arm of capital.’ The colonial era left a legacy which made the military 
conscious of its coercive role within Fiji.
The strike began with Public Works Department Indian labourers downing tools 
against the high cost of living. The confrontation with government was backed 
by Indian leader and Gujarati lawyer Manilal Maganlal Doctor and his Indian 
Imperial Association of Fiji. There was also colonial perception of disloyalty to 
the Crown given the rise of Indian nationalism throughout India and similar 
sentiments amongst the Indian Diaspora. The ostentatious use of the Fiji
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Defence Force where all European men of military age were alerted to arms was 
because the strike was seen as more than an industrial disturbance; it was 
regarded as a challenge to the unquestioned British dominated colonial order. 
The Fijian native administration also sided with government and Europeans by 
allowing Fijian auxiliaries and special constables to control striking Indians. 
This event created one of the enduring and defining cleavages of Fiji politics, 
the Europeans and Fijians versus the Indians.
Robert Norton, however, took a political economy view of the ethnic 
polarization. He argued that the source of modern political tensions lies in the 
contradiction in Fiji’s colonial society between the European dominated 
capitalist economy and a Fijian social system perpetuated on the basis of 
subsistence cultivation. He termed the Indian fanners as the “front line troops” 
of European capital.64According to this argument, it was the European 
dominated capitalist economy that stood in conflict with the construct of Fijian 
communal society. Brij Lai contends though, for the Indo-Fijians, victimization 
and transcendence of their situation have been the recurring dominant themes 
from colonial to post- independence Fiji.65 The Salisbury Despatch has been 
their charter for equality.
Donald Horowitz asserted that military coups in multi- ethnic states are often 
simplistically explained solely on the basis of racial conflict without 
consideration of other important socio-economic and political factors.66 John 
Davies describes Fiji’s political paradox, inherited from the past, as a protracted 
‘cold war’ that is ongoing.67 Davies addresses five issues as central to the Fijians 
interpretations of history and conflict: the indigenous iTaukei loss of identity, 
the loss of their motherland, the fear of Indian domination, the clash between 
urban and traditional cultural, and a cold war for the political domination of the 
country. Davies contextualized the prevalent Fijian political mentality as, 
“Complaints of the immigrant communities about affirmative actions, or not 
having sufficient seats in parliament, or about not been able to lease land on 
convenient terms are sensed by Fijians to be trivial in comparison.” 69 
It has been argued by scholars that this grievance and ethnic threat perception 
have, therefore, drawn Fiji’s military into intervening in politics. In spite of 
Davies’s characterization, historically there is a dearth of ethnic tension
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evidence to suggest communal conflict has underpinned politics during colonial 
and post-independence times. The structuralist and primordialist interpretations 
of ethnic conflict are far less applicable to Fiji than the instrumentalist. As the 
instrumentalists contend, ethnic conflict has been an instrument employed by 
politicians in Fiji to create a following and mobilise support. Indeed, it has been 
pervasive inter-communal outbidding by politicians, and recently the activity of 
the military, before general elections that has triggered political instability.
Towards Independence -Fijian Paramountcy
With the passing of UN resolution 1514 of 1960, ‘The Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples’, the process of 
decolonization became inevitable for remaining colonies. For Fiji, British 
sentiments sided with the indigenous Fijians in this process. In an unguarded 
comment, Governor Sir Derek Jakeway revealed his pro-Fijian sympathies when 
he said that, “Fijians should never be placed under the heels of an immigrant 
community and “what the Fijians thought mattered most having peacefully 
surrendered their sovereignty to the crown”. Furthermore, for the Fijian 
political elite, Gordon’s native protectionist policy was interpreted to mean 
continuing Fijian political paramountcy into the future. As earlier mentioned the 
charter for indigenous protectionism was the 1874 Deed of Cession.71 The 
common Fijian assertion that the indigenous people of Fiji had a right to 
political paramountcy in their own country, according to Newbury, became a 
political issue in the 1940s, with the assistance of Europeans, as Indian 
population numbers began to surpass Fijians. Newbury argues that, “Treaties of 
annexation conceal a dual political and legal purpose which is contextual
77according to time and place”.
The meaning of the Deed of Cession was being interpreted by Fijians, some 
sixty years later, in a differing context that concerned Indians rather than 
Europeans. Lai argues that what was a protective policy had now been re­
interpreted as an assertive political doctrine; for it was interpreted by Fijian
7Tinterests to mean that their rights were ‘uppermost.’
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In January 1963, on Wakaya Island, self-government talks started with the visit 
of Nigel Fisher, the parliamentary under-secretary of state for colonies. The 
Wakaya Letter, which was to become the basic negotiating document of Fijians 
in the lead up to Independence, was first presented here. 74 This letter asserted 
the principles of Fijian political rights beyond the protectionist context as 
introduced by Gordon. The Letter wanted the “spirit and substance” of the Deed 
of Cession preserved, with United Kingdom ties strengthened, land rights 
secured, Fiji a Christian state and a policy of racial parity in the civil service as 
the basis for any constitutional changes. The Wakaya Letter crystallized Fijian 
thinking and became the fundamental negotiations tool again at the London 
independence talks in 1969. In 1970, Sir Lesley Monson the British Permanent 
under Secretary had asserted that, “It would be hard for the United Kingdom in 
conscience and in political terms to deny Fijian paramountcy or they 
[Indigenous Fijians] will take it by force and create a security situation.” 
Therefore, independence was premised on Fijian paramountcy. The 1970 
constitution was a charade, as Lai argues, that was doomed from the start for 
three irreconcilable reasons. Independence talks that gave birth to the document 
had, paradoxically, promised ‘paramountcy for Fijians, parity for Indians and 
privilege for Europeans’./b His assertion is substantiated by examining the 1970 
electoral system. Eight seats in the senate were reserved for GCC nominees who 
had the right of veto over all legislation to do with indigenous interests thereby 
guaranteeing Fijian political paramountcy. Parity was supposedly granted the 
Indian community with 12 communal and 10 national seats matching the Fijian 
allotment. Privilege was retained for Europeans based on their contribution to 
the economy. A disproportionate 8 seats were allotted to Europeans, despite 
their numbering less than 4% of the population.
1977 Constitutional Crisis
Fiji’s first constitutional crisis post-independence had all the hall marks of 
ethnic politics. Brij Lai in tracing Fiji’s political ills argued that, “a feature of 
Fiji’s political evolution that haunts the nation to this day is its racial 
character.” Indeed Fiji’s first post-Independence constitutional crisis 
illustrates the past complexities combined with the fear of future unknowns 
prevalent in Fiji’s communal leaders then. It was profoundly significant as the
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harbinger of things to come. In April 1977, firebrand nationalist politician 
Sakeasi Butadroka’s Fijian Nationalist Party won 25% of the Fijian vote. 
Butadroka politically was the arch enemy of both the Indo-Fijians and Mara and 
his Alliance Party from which he was expelled from in 1975. Butadroka, the 
Rewa Provincial representative in Parliament and Assistant Minister for 
Commerce, Industry and Co-operatives, had worked in the co-operatives 
department as a civil servant and was knowledgeable about rural Fijians’ socio­
economic plight. In October of 1975, he moved a motion in parliament that 
Indo-Fijians “be repatriated back to India and that their travelling expenses back 
home and compensation for their properties in the country be met by the British 
government.”78 In the 1972 elections 25% of Indo-Fijians had voted for Mara’s 
multiracial Alliance Party, but Butadroka’s racial anti-Indian rhetoric and 
accusations that Mara had not done enough for Fijians definitely polarized the 
two major communities. By the time of the 1977 elections the Alliance party’s 
support from both Indo-Fijians and Fijian was waning. The election results 
confirmed a split in indigenous support for Mara’s Alliance Party which gave a 
narrow majority to the Indo-Fijian-dominated National Federation Party (NFP). 
Siddiq Koya, the NFP leader, was expected to become Prime Minister had it not 
been for some deft political manoeuvring involving the Fijian elite and splits in 
the NFP. Instead, the Governor-General, Ratu Sir George Cakobau, called on 
Ratu Mara to form a minority government. The events that led to Ratu Sir 
George’s decision, and his reasons for it, are still mired in controversy, with 
different parties involved telling different versions of the situation, and 
conspiracy theories have abounded. Others, both in Fiji and abroad, accused the 
Governor-General, the foremost chief in the Fijian chiefly hierarchy, of 
deliberate bias. Brij Lai points to the alleged complicity to preserve the 
government of his fellow-chief (and close cousin), Ratu Mara, as an indication 
that the indigenous Fijian elite would not tolerate an Indo-Fijian-led 
government. In hindsight the coups of 1987 and of 2000, both of which 
toppled governments dominated or led by Indo-Fijians, are evidence of this
on
assertion. Whether this controversial opinion is true or not, few doubt that 
Cakobau was pleased to be able to reappoint the government dominated by 
indigenous Fijians given that he and Mara were signatories to the Wakaya 
Letter. Ratu George defended his actions in a public statement said:
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In the recent elections, the people of Fiji did not give a clear mandate to either of the 
major political parties in the recent general election. It therefore became the duty of the 
Governor-General under the Constitution to appoint as Prime Minister the Member of 
the House of Representatives who appeared to him best able to command the support of 
the majority of the members of the House. The Governor-General has not been able to 
act sooner as it was not until this afternoon that he was informed who had been elected 
leader of the National Federation Party. The Governor-General, after taking all relevant 
circumstances into account, has come to the firm conclusion that the person best able to 
command support of the majority of the Members is the Leader of the Alliance Party, 
Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara. In compliance with the constitution and acting in his own 
deliberate judgment, the Governor-General has accordingly appointed Ratu Sir 
Kamisese as Prime Minister.81
Therefore, after controversial circumstances put down to NFP in-fighting and 
procrastination (the NFP deliberated for days on who their leader should be) the 
Governor General and Vunivalu of Bau, Ratu George, reinstated Mara as Prime 
Minister. Mara in a radio broadcast said in reply to Ratu George’s momentous 
decision, ‘Sir I will obey your command.’ This terse comment implied 
subservience like a true loyal bati on the part of Mara and illustrates the 
contemporary manipulation of the Turaga-Bati relationship. Brij Lai stated that 
Ratu George’s ‘deliberate judgment’ was legally flawed and in actual fact 
amounted to a constitutional coup. Lai stated that Ratu George was “the direct 
descendant of the chief who had ceded Fiji to the United Kingdom in 1874: Ratu 
Seru Cakobau. It was his traditional cultural responsibility to stand by his 
people”. With little doubt, the interpretation of political paramountcy and the 
assumptions imbued in the Wakaya Letter by Fijian elites underpinned the 
Constitutional crisis of 1977. In fact during the crisis the military was put on 
alert. The question still remains today, what would have happened had the 
Governor General Ratu Sir George Cakobau not appointed Mara to form a 
minority government. The Governor General’s decision set a disturbing 
precedent for future political crises that has subsequently haunted the nation. 
The assumptions in the doctrine of indigenous political paramountcy became 
major factors in generating the coups of 1987 and 2000.
Conclusion
The modem phenomenon of the Fiji military’s intervention in politics resonates 
with the centrality of the Turaga-Bati relationship in the post-independence 
period, and in a process that was to reach climax in 2006, the eventual inversion 
of the traditional diarchy where the Sacred King, the Roko Tui Bau was
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supplanted by the Warrior Chief, the Vunivalu of Bau as supreme chief. 
Gordon’s native protection policy bequeathed a colonial Fijian orthodoxy with 
many neo-traditional characteristics, central to which was the Turaga-Bati 
relationship. The nascent colonial military was hence imbued with the 
traditional chief-warrior relationship. During World Wars I and II, Ratu Sukuna 
used these global conflicts to showcase this relationship and further the interests 
of the Fijian elite. The loyalty and fighting prowess of Fijians forged even 
stronger political bonds with the Europeans at the expense of the Indians. The 
racial cleavage caused by the 1920s strikes was further widened during World 
War II by what seemed like the Indians’ un-patriotic stand in demanding equal 
pay with European soldiers.
The Malayan Emergency campaign in the 1950s continued to bond Fijians 
nationally. High chiefs were given command of the Fiji Battalion thus further 
enhancing the neo-traditional Turaga-Bati relationship. Fijian national 
camaraderie was also strengthened as soldiers were placed in companies based 
on provincial origins. This national camaraderie became the capstone in the 
formation of the political Fijian Association with former Fiji Battalion 
commander Ratu Edward Cakobau as national president.
On the road to Independence Gordon’s protection policy was interpreted as a 
politically assertive tool by the Fijian elite to claim paramountcy. Indians on the 
other hand clamoured for political parity denied by colonial policy. Lai, Norton, 
Davies and Scan* have argued that ethnic politics has underpinned military 
intervention in all of Fiji’s coups in one form or another. Post-independence 
ethnic politics led to the 1977 elections crisis. Vunivalu of Bau and Governor- 
General Ratu Sir George Cakobau’s decision to re-instate Ratu Mara as Prime 
Minister unveiled the hard political realities of race, which were finally laid bare 
by the Rabuka coup. But as this chapter has shown, ethnic divisions and 
identities, while they may have provided the occasion for the assertion of ethnic 
Fijian dominance, were not central to the changes taking place in the key 
relationship of government and military. What was central was the persistence 
of tradition, which was the legacy of colonial rule, and which found expression 
in the unique origins and characteristics of the Fiji military forces as an 
indigenous institution.
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The most prominent unintended consequence of Fiji’s involvement in 
international peacekeeping has been the military’s adoption of a political 
mediator self-image. Peacekeeping as a role has allowed the military to keep a 
large standing force that is pre-disposed to political intervention. The defence 
white papers of 1997 and 2004 were unsuccessful attempts to articulate a 
defence and security policy for Fiji, and thereby mitigate against military 
intervention in politics. As Scobell argued, the 1987 coup was triggered when 
the military’s corporate interest was threatened. Furthermore the ‘Revulsion 
against civilian incompetence and corruption’, is a frequent justification for 
intervention by military forces in newly-independent states. Today the human 
security dimension of defence is touted as a prominent role of Fiji’s military. 
This argument has led to the militarization of government and, as we shall see, 
to an inversion of the neo-traditional chief-warrior relationship. The role of the 
military in post-colonial Fiji has caused a transformation in civil-military 
relations. From being subservient to civilian rule, the military has become a 
mediator in ethnic politics, and in charge of an authoritarian regime. The 
Turaga-Bati relationship underpinned the reasons for the coup.
As we shall examine in later chapters, Commodore Bainimarama has continued 
with the perception that politics and security are tied. Along that route the 
military has created security and insecurity for the nation. In the next chapter we 
will analyze the coup of 1987 and the Turaga-Bati relationship between Rabuka 
and Ratu Mara and Ratu Penaia.
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Chapter 3
The 1987 Coup
Introduction
The May 1987 coup has come to define the intervention in politics of Fiji’s 
military forces. Led by Lieutenant Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka, a third ranking 
officer, the coup was executed in order to re-assert chiefly paramountcy and pre­
empt ethnic violence. It was also a coup within a coup that was planned and 
conducted without the knowledge of Rabuka’s two senior officers and in 
collusion with civilian elites. Since the defeat of the Alliance Party in the April 
election the political status quo was perceived to have been undennined in the 
eyes of many Fijians like Rabuka. The election of a predominantly Indo-Fijian 
government had galvanized Fijian elites to agitate against the Coalition of 
National Federation Party and Fiji Labour Parties. The actions of Rabuka’s men 
in storming parliament and overthrowing the sitting FLP/NFP government thrust 
the military onto the nation’s political centre stage. During this crisis the 
Turaga-Bati relationship was remoulded and reshaped as Rabuka’s relationship 
with paramount chiefs Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara and Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau 
was constantly wrought with tensions.
This chapter argues that intrigues between the chiefs and military officers under­
pinned the 1987 coup. It argues that the manipulation of the Turaga-Bati 
relationship and the use of Rabuka by Fijian elites are critical to understanding 
the coup. We first examine the post-1987 elections period and the formation of 
a nationalist coup coalition. Secondly, we examine the execution of the coup 
and the overthrow of the Bavadra led FLP/NFP government. What were the 
reactions at large and how did the relationship of Rabuka, Ratu Penaia and Ratu 
Mara unfold? Thirdly, we discuss the relationship between the Great Council of 
Chiefs, the military and the Governor General which initially set the scene and 
helped consolidate Rabuka’s coup. We also discuss the relationship between the 
Methodist church, the chiefs and the military that was key to the dynamics of the
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coup. We then examine Rabuka’s second military takeover in September when 
Ratu Penaia and Ratu Mara were ousted and then re-instated as post-coup 
leaders. Finally we examine the origins of the military’s emerging political role 
and its new self-image.
Post-Elections Agitation and Coup Coalition
In the April 1987 general elections, Prime Minister, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara’s 
political and chiefly mana suffered a huge blow with the defeat of his Alliance 
party by the Indo-Fijian dominated Fiji Labour Party/National Federation Party 
Coalition. There was a low 69% of registered voters turnout. Just over 9% of 
Fijians voted for the Coalition. At the close of polls, the Alliance Party that had 
been in power since Independence lost with 48.55% of votes cast and the 
Coalition came into power with 46.20% of the total.1 Fijian members who had 
won seats with the Coalition did so on the back of Indo-Fijian rather than Fijian 
votes. The victory by the Coalition exposed the deep ethnic political divide 
embedded in Fiji’s society. Even though Mara seemed magnanimous in defeat, 
the loss no doubt riled the now renowned Pacific Islands statesman and high 
chief.“ Lauan and Tovata deputations had approached him at his residence to 
show that they would not accept defeat. As explained by Robert Norton, “The 
principle of defending the dignity and authority of chiefs against the political 
ascendancy of the vulagi (foreigners) was at the heart of the ideological 
justification of the coup.”
iTaukei Movement leaders from Cakaudrove and Macuata also sought Mara’s 
audience. The leader of the Lauan delegation, Senator Inoke Tabua of Vanua 
Balavu, Lau, had pointed out in a letter to the press his skepticism about the 
Constitution and section 68 pertaining to Fijian protective provisions.4 Scarr 
succinctly sums Mara’s predicament, “He seemed to be facing the end of the 
world, and they took his silence for acquiescence.”5 Although Mara had 
graciously accepted the vote of the people in public, the Tui Nayau, the 
archetypical neo-traditional chief, was reticent and may have been nursing his 
wounded pride.6 There was also disparagement, however, amongst Fijians that 
the Tui Nayau had brought the loss upon the Fijian people by his obsession with 
his own international image and that a more action orientated solution to 
indigenous political paramountcy was necessary.
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Indeed within days of the Indo-Fijian dominated FLP/NFP Coalition being 
swom-in, the nationalist Fijian opposition conducted anti-govemment meetings 
and mounted a campaign to stir up ethnic tensions. In the weeks that followed, 
an anti-Bavadra government coalition of politicians, churchmen, and chiefs 
formed a national front with a destabilizing action agenda. A protest march by 
Alliance supporters in Lautoka and a village road block of the main Kings Road 
at Tavua followed in the days after.7 Alliance Senator Jona Qio Veidreyaki was 
also charged with the Lautoka fire-bombing of Attorney General Jai Ram
o
Reddy’s law office. Apisai Tora, a well-known political chameleon, added to 
the furore and was subsequently charged for inciting racial antagonism at a 
meeting of Western chiefs.9
On the 24lh of April nationalist supporters protested through Suva, some three 
thousand strong, some holding aloft anti-government banners such as “We 
Fijians have no confidence in the Coalition”, “Fiji belongs to the Fijians,” “Stop 
this Indian Government”, “Fiji now little India Say No”, “Fiji for Fijians,” and 
“Change the Constitution Immediately”. The Fiji Times of April 25, 1987, 
published the headline, “The Big March”. On page three it gave samples of the 
placards mentioned that were carried by marchers, obviously causing fear 
amongst the Indian community.10 Political mis-information and myth-making 
against government issued forth unapologetically from the newly formed 
nationalist Taukei Movement whilst anti-Indian sentiments peppered the media.
In the opening debate in Parliament, on the 13th of May, the volatile issue of 
Fijian paramountcy was purposely resurrected by deposed Alliance member 
Viliame Gonelevu now on the opposition benches. As a Taukei Movement 
founding member, Gonelevu asserted without evidence that, “the change in 
government would lead to the end of the Fijian Race.”11 Coalition Minister of 
State for Fijian Affairs, Ratu Filimone Ralogaivau, countered, “Let me assure 
the house that the fear expressed by the Honourable member is groundless and is 
obviously based on ignorance.” Ralogaivau explained that in order to change 
either the Fijian Affairs Act and the Native Lands Acts a three-quarter majority 
or 39 out of 52 votes was needed in parliament. The Coalition government with
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its 28 members of parliament fell far short of that number. This response by 
Ralogaivau was relegated to the inner pages of the Fiji Times whilst Alliance 
senator Jona Qio, charged for a firebomb attack on Jai Ram Reddy’s law firm, 
figured on the front page. Conscious of making an impact and to win public 
support the new government had moved to implement its promised social justice 
policies by promising ex-servicemen, civil service pensioners and people on 
social welfare benefits and disabled persons, free travel on buses, in June.
As the Taukei Movement began mobilizing in the wake of the elections key 
coup conspiracists Ratu Inoke Kubuabola and Reverend Tomasi Raikivi had 
invited Lt Col Rabuka to discuss the political situation. Rabuka had also 
solicited the views of his patron the Governor-General and Ratu Mara at a game 
of golf on the 10th of May.14 Why this concern by Rabuka? Even though as a 
military officer he was secluded from mainstream politics, Rabuka had personal 
relationships in what was a close knit Fijian society. Initially Rabuka justified 
his pre-coup actions by stating, “When a political party loses, and that party is 
the sole and final guarantor of your values, you would be forced to do something 
about it”.15
Rabuka, buoyed by his various high level consultations, was confident of a 
ready constituency and convinced by his colleagues that all that was needed was 
his military leadership. Lt Col Jim Sanday, the ousted military chief of staff, 
argued that Rabuka was a front man for those who lost power. This assessment 
by Sanday further pointed to a pre-coup coalescence of Fijian elites.16 Scobell, 
however, argued that one of the major factors that had triggered the coup was 
the military’s perceived threat to its corporate interest. Prime Minister Timoci 
Bavadra’s views on the need to down size the Royal Fiji Military Forces struck 
a nerve with the Fijian traditional institution and client of the previous Alliance 
government. The 1987 Fiji Labour Party election manifesto had also “deplored 
the Royal Fiji Military Forces as becoming more of a band of mercenaries for 
the UN and MFO and its role should be reviewed.”
What were these interlinked corporate interests? The military in post­
independence Fiji was always to be the protector of: 1) the Fijian national ethos
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system, based on the Lotu, (church) Vanua (Chiefly Tradition) and the Matanitu 
(Alliance Government) 2) the custodian of the Fijian race’s martial tradition and 
cultural capital 3) an exclusive Fijian institution that offered Fijian men 
employment as soldiers and peacekeepers in a patron-client relationship. The 
plausible alternate reason, therefore, was the military elite’s fear of downsizing 
which became the primary trigger for the coup.19 FLP policy induced an 
instinctively negative reaction from Rabuka and the military elite given its 
traditional patriotic past and peacekeeping achievements. As pointed out by 
Scobell ‘the RFMF had experienced first hand the realities of chronic ethnic and 
sectarian divisions and conflict while serving in Lebanon, and the thought of an 
ethnic insurgency in Fiji constituted a nightmare.’ Furthermore, the possible 
use of lethal force against rioting Fijians by the military which was 99% 
ethnically indigenous was one of the major reasons according to Rabuka for his 
intervention. Hence it was in the military’s corporate interest to protect Fijian 
communal political interests.
Therefore given its nation-building and peacekeeping roles, the military 
intervened in politics as the self-proclaimed continuation of this civilianizing 
trend of its roles. Having entered politics the military began to articulate a 
separate corporate interest as a result of the intra-national schisms that 
developed. After the commonly perceived inter-ethnic political schism was 
eliminated leadership tensions arose between the chiefs symbolized by Mara and 
Ganilau and commoners Rabuka and the Taukeists.
Rabuka had cited the protection of law and order for his reason to intervene and 
had acted in the national interest to pre-empt the nationalist Taukei Movement 
from creating an ethnic purge of Indians. Skeptics of this argument such as 
RFMF chief of Staff Colonel Jim Sanday, however, suggested that the Fiji 
situation was not similar to Lebanon because historically there was a marked 
absence of inter-communal violence in Fiji. It could be said that Rabuka’s 
argument did not hold as he had been colluding with key Taukei leaders prior to 
the coup. In any case Fijian soldiers had gained a reputation for preventing 
volatile local ethnic conflict between Palestinians, Lebanese and Israelis during 
Rabuka’s tour in Lebanon and this would have likely influenced his actions.
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There are those though who insist that the Tui Nayau was complicit in the coup. 
In response to allegations that he was an instigator in Rabuka’s coup Mara had 
said, “I have denied this many times, but I suppose the suspicion would always 
be there. I had to do it, because if my house is on fire with members of my 
family inside. Why should I wait”? 22
Indeed Indian High Commissioner Sreenivasan asserted that Mara could not but 
have known what was afoot, “because... nothing important could happen in Fiji
'yxwithout his blessing.” Sreenivasan was skeptical in the debate as to Mara’s 
actions during the coup. Since being formed in 1966, the Alliance Party under 
Mara for over two decades had dominated government and national politics. In 
fact Robertson and Tamanisau saw the coup in terms of an eastern or Tovata 
tribal conspiracy.24 That perception was based upon the long lasting political 
dominance of Mara, Ganilau and the Tovata confederacy chiefly elite and 
associates in Fiji’s post-Independence era.
The Alliance Party’s defeat, for Rabuka at least, was seen as a threat to the 
status quo and the neo-traditional chief-warrior relationship which he said he 
staunchly upheld. Rabuka had publically declared, “The chiefs are the wise men 
in Fijian society, guardians of our tradition. Take that power away and give it to
9 cthe commoners and you are asking for trouble.”
On the other hand, Rabuka’s two senior officers, Nailatikau and Sanday, had 
espoused firm allegiance to the elected Bavadra government. Rabuka’s destiny 
was sealed when his three Taukei Movement colleagues Inoke Kubuabola, 
Viliame Gonelevu and Jone Veisamasama pleaded with him, “Then you will
9 Ahave to do it. It is up to you.”
The Military Coup d’etat
At 10.00am, on the morning of Thursday the 14lh of May in Suva, Lt Col 
Sitiveni Rabuka with a section of armed soldiers of the RFMF Depot Unit 
stormed parliament and took the Bavadra government hostage, without a shot 
being fired. Ratu Finau, the son of Ratu Mara, had kept watch on the main door 
to parliament chambers, “And had signaled to Rabuka as he entered he had
97spoken to his father advising him not to come to Suva on Thursday”.
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Immediately after the takeover in a press conference Rabuka said that he had 
been monitoring events in Fiji since the elections, “ ...and I saw how these 
events could lead to serious situations and threaten law and order and 
property.” He told reporters his action was “pre-emptive”, designed to prevent 
unrest and violence. He said recent events had caused him considerable concern. 
Ousted Prime Minister Timoci Bavadra however on the day of the coup 
emphatically denied radio reports that his government had ever intended to use 
the army to quell disturbance in Fiji.29
The ease with which Rabuka was able to activate support from the Ministry of 
Home Affairs in which his brother- in- law Tomasi Tuiloma was a deputy 
secretary points to prior collusion amongst some senior Fijian government 
bureaucrats. Just minutes before his takeover Rabuka had shared a bowl of 
yaqona with Tuiloma at the Ministry of Home Affairs next to parliament 
building. Tuiloma was from Tubou Lakeba in Lau, hence had close blood links 
to Mara. In his Operation Orders for the coup Rabuka reveals that Tuiloma was 
briefed to immediately suspend Commissioner of Police Raman from duty after
*3 1
the coup. Things were not all plain sailing though. As a close confidant and 
patron to Colonel Rabuka, the Governor-General Ratu Penaia, having granted an 
audience to the coup leader that morning after the takeover of parliament, 
released a press statement:
As Commander in Chief in Fiji I now call upon all officers and men of the Royal Fiji 
Military Forces, the Royal Police Force and the Public Service to return to their lawful 
allegiance in accordance with the oath of office and their duty of obedience without 
delay.32
With this announcement, the Governor-General had reinforced the 
constitutionality of his office and urged all under his authority to back away 
from Rabuka’s unconstitutional actions that morning. This had international 
ramifications for the Turaga-Bati relationship.
Thousands of kilometers away, news of a military coup in Fiji had been filtering 
into Fijibatt Headquarter Qana, South Lebanon. The big quandary for the 
overseas troops was who held authority over them? This was the testing ground 
for the Turaga-Bati relationship and constitutionality. Was it the Governor- 
General and the incumbent Commander Nailatikau and the FLP/NFP Coalition
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Government or was it Lt Col Rabuka? Amongst the officers, knowing how small 
and close Fijian society was, they were skeptical that Rabuka’s coup was a self- 
thought out military intervention.
That afternoon the first message arrived by telephone from Rabuka to re-assure 
Colonel Ratu Epeli, the Battalion Commander, that his father, the Governor- 
General, was safe and well and that no harm would befall him. The high chief 
still remained in office at Government House as talks of forming an interim 
government continued into the late night. This reassured the Fijian soldiers that 
the Commander in Chief whose office as Governor General underpinned the 
Turaga-Bati relationship was still revered by Rabuka. But what about the 
incumbent FLP/NFP Coalition government? Rabuka also assured Major 
Draunidalo through Ratu Epeli that his former wife, Adi Kuini, now wife of the 
deposed Prime Minister Timoci Bavadra, was well and still occupying the Prime 
Minister’s government residence at Veiuto. At least blood was not shed in the 
first hours of the coup. Although the FLP/NFP Coalition parliamentarians were 
in custody, the Governor General Ganilau was in control.
Skepticism also came from fiercely nationalist politician Sakeasi Butadroka, 
who quipped, “This is not an army coup this is an Alliance Party coup! They 
just put up the Fijians as a front. They were only doing it because they had lost 
their positions.” Butadroka also lamented that being a businessman he should 
have patented his brand of nationalism as the coupists had misappropriated it 
from him. This anti-chiefly nationalism that was also intoned at times by the 
iTaukei Movement was to cause tensions, exacerbating intra-ethnic schism in 
the coming months. In essence, the argument was that the public justification 
adopted for Rabuka’s coup was ‘Fijian political paramountcy’ and that, “None 
of them wanted power to be exercised by anyone else except by the Fijians, 
preferably high chiefs. ’34 To illustrate the point, in her elation, the wife of Prime 
Minister Ratu Mara and herself the paramount chief of Burebasaga Confederacy 
was purported to have triumphantly said, “Rabuka achieved in seventeen 
minutes what the Alliance party had not been able to achieve in seventeen
1C
years.” Adi Lala was obviously referring to “Fijian paramountcy in the
i z
political governance of the country.” Rabuka had initially cloaked his actions
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using military speak such as ‘pre-emptive’ action designed to prevent unrest and 
violence. He further emphasized the national security factor as being 
uppermost in his action rather than any political motive. In his coup operational 
order 1/87, Rabuka however stated the mission of the coup was “to install a new 
regime that will ensure that the RFMF and national interests are protected.” 
Why indeed did Rabuka and his men intervene? Was it to prevent inter-ethnic 
conflict or to re-instate Fijian political paramountcy, or both? Robert Norton 
asserted that Rabuka was influenced by three motives- 1) his meetings with the 
Taukei Movement and the Governor General 2) the desire to avoid the Fiji army 
acting against Fijians and 3) his service with the United Nations peacekeeping 
forces in Lebanon.
For the international community, the coup was initially interpreted mostly as an 
inter-ethnic political conflict. The ethnic conflict argument became the most 
obvious explanation for the military takeover, the unintended consequence of 
colonial pluralism. As Donald Horowitz, however, cautioned, “military coups 
in multi-ethnic states are often simplistically explained solely on the basis of 
racial conflict without consideration of other important factors.”40 This raises 
questions about the inter-ethnic conflict hypothesis as the sole basis for Fiji’s 
first coup. Scarr claims that, “there was also a belief that Alliance multiracialism 
was partly the cause and that “as Fiji had become more prosperous so Fijians 
became, overall, relatively poorer”. 41 Scarr’s generalization of the Indians in 
the eyes of the Fijians was as ‘the typical Kai India was taken to be the 
presumably well-off shopkeeper not the barely-employed cane-cutter.’42 By 
1987 Fijians who until the mid-1960s were village bound were closing the 
economic gap dramatically.43 Naidu claims that ethnic tensions “were fomented 
to provide the right environment for intervention and takeover in Fiji’s coups.”44 
In fact the absences of inter-communal and inter-religious violence akin to Sri 
Lanka belie the inter-ethnic conflict hypothesis. The ethnic conflict logic for the 
1987 coup is weak when one compares the lack of bloodshed historically with 
the scale of other global inter-ethnic conflicts.
In fact, in his biography, Rabuka acknowledged he was the instrument of 
members and supporters of the Alliance party.43 Brij Lai has also contended 
that, “the presence of such a strong Alliance contingent in the Council
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reinforced the rapidly deepening suspicion of the party’s collusion with the coup 
makers.” 46 From its inception the Taukei Movement, which many viewed as the 
militant wing of the former ruling Alliance Party, embodied the grievances that 
it argued retarded the indigenous race and called for their redress. However, on 
closer inspection, the key movers and shakers in the Movement were made up of 
Alliance Party elites and stalwarts who were ruing the loss of political power 
and control of government’s purse strings after being shunned at the polls.
David Robie furthered this hypothesis when he found that the majority of the 
major actors were derived from the same Cakaudrove-Lau region.47 In other 
words, the military elite and the political elite were of a similar socio-political 
group. The opportunity to intervene was also being manufactured by the same 
socio-political elite in conjunction with the coup leader, Rabuka. It seemed what 
the chiefly elite in the Alliance establishment had wanted was now in the 
possession of an Indo-Fijian dominated party. Time magazine made the 
suggestion that the Alliance ‘could not accept its loss of power and the 
prerequisites of long held office.’ Mara, however, argues, “At our first 
meeting Colonel Rabuka told us that he was a soldier and did not want to run the 
government and the sooner he gets back to camp the better it would be for all.44 
The implication was quite explicit; Mara was called upon to run government 
because of Rabuka’s impetuous actions and therefore by inference was free of 
malevolence.
Colonel Sanday, the second in command of the RFMF, who was suspiciously 
summoned to Ratu Penaia’s office during the takeover of parliament, witnessed 
this relationship within the hour after the coup, when Rabuka entered the 
Governor General’s office to explain his actions. Ganilau was Rabuka’s 
paramount chief and military patron. To illustrate the point according to Deryck 
Scarr when Rabuka met with the Governor General on the morning after 
executing the coup, he did not say, ‘Well I’ve done it’ as was reported but 
referred to his having effected what the chiefs had wanted.50Sanday later offered 
an important insight into the Turagci-Bati relationship and stressed that the Fiji 
military professionalism differed from the classical professionalism of the 
British military.51 Commenting on the criticism that he was the puppet of the
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two high chiefs Mara and Ganilau, Rabuka said, ‘They look on me as one of 
their warriors of old, and a trusted man of modem times.’ This enigmatic 
relationship is what sets the Fiji military apart. Scarr best describes this 
relationship between Rabuka and Ganilau in their meeting after the coup that 
morning as ‘commander in chief, traditional overlord and long-time personal 
patron.’ This cordial scenario came to define the purpose of the coup and the 
neo-traditional chief-military relationship.
The Great Council of Chiefs and Military Relations
As a result of Rabuka’s coup, the Great Council of Chiefs was again thrust into 
national political prominence. On 20-21 May the Council was convened by the 
Governor-General to deliberate on Rabuka’s coup. For two days whilst the 
Council sat at Suva’s Civic Auditorium, a pensive yet jubilant crowd of 
hundreds of Fijians surrounded the main entrance to the venue. A pro-Rabuka 
coup bias against the moderate stand of the Tui Cakau elect and Governor 
General was evident amongst Cakaudrove senior chiefs, Ganilau’s own 
province. Mara’s wife Adi Lala during the meeting also praised the actions of 
Rabuka akin to a gallant chief or Turaga qaqa. The GCC played an important 
calming role during these tumultuous days, however much it has been criticized. 
What the coup showed in its wake was that tribal loyalty, obedience and respect 
for chiefly authority were still the keystones of Fijian ethical sense.54 After two 
days of deliberations, the chiefs expressed support for Rabuka’s actions. The 
Governor-General who had convened the Council was caught between 
Westminster constitutionality and his fellow chiefs’ decision to back the 
overthrow of government. Rabuka added pressure on the Governor-General by 
stating that he was still very much in command of the Army and the Police 
Force with a very strong backing from the GCC.55 This put Ganilau as 
Commander in Chief out on a limb. Apparently Mara was also on the popular 
Rabuka’s side for the present at least.
The Colonel’s agenda in collusion with the GCC was apparently being impeded 
by Ganilau. Rabuka reacted, “The Army may continue running the government 
with its own Council of Ministers if the Great Council of Chiefs disapproves of 
the Governor General’s Advisory Council.”56 This was in lieu of the GCC 
expressing support for Rabuka’s coup and hostility toward the Governor
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General’s appointed Advisory Council after the two days of deliberations. The 
initial cordial relationship between Ganilau and Rabuka had worn thin given the 
latter’s rise to political prominence. The GCC‘s decision to back Rabuka’s coup 
had tainted the native advisory body as nothing more than a political tool of 
Fijian elites.
The convening of a council of lesser chiefs or Bose ni Turaga (BNT) in 1988 
that first sat at Queen Elizabeth Barracks, was an attempt to balance the power 
of the GCC with a semblance of democratic rule. Chiefs elected to sit on the 
GCC from the provinces were often criticized for furthering personal political 
agendas at meetings against the wishes of their lesser chiefs in the provinces. 
Hence the BNT of no fixed composition was open to some 215 chiefs which 
made up Fiji’s vanua. Controlled by the Ministry of Fijian Affairs, the BNT’s 
aim was to get the second and third tier ‘grass root’ chiefs seemingly involved in 
vital political development when deemed necessary. It has been convened on six 
occasions since as a counterweight to what is seen as the growing politicization 
of the GCC.57
The coup also fostered a close relationship between the GCC secretariat at the
Ministry of Fijian Affairs and the Military. An all-purpose hall in Queen
Elizabeth Barracks was renovated with the Ministry of Fijian Affairs funds and
named Rabuka Hall to serve as the meeting centre for the GCC in 1988.
To illustrate the nexus that had developed between the GCC and the military
A prayer meeting by pro-Coalition government supporters had taken place at Albert 
Park in conjunction with the GCC meeting at Suva’s Civic Town Hall. Taukeists began 
a heated exchange of words as Fijians began bashing Indians. This led to a rampage 
through Suva by a surging mob. A truckload of soldiers arrived to quell the violence 
with Lieutenant Filipo Tarakinikini as their leader. The Officer then got onto the roof of 
the truck and announced to the violent crowd “the GCC has agreed to change the 
Constitution and give Fijians guarantee that they will always remain in leadership.” This 
quelled the flare up of violence which started at Albert Park yesterday morning. 58
Affairs were not that simple though as the GCC, iTaukeists, Coalition 
supporters, Ratu Mara and Ratu Penaia and Rabuka embarked on various 
political solutions including the setting up of the still bom Falvey Constitutional 
Review Committee to solve the political impasse.
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The Fiji Methodist Church-Chiefs- Military Relationship
Rabuka’s coup also brought to the fore the close relationship of the Methodist 
Church elites to the chiefs and the military in national politics. Indeed Rabuka’s 
coup could not have been possible but for the urging and backing of Methodist 
ministers such as Reverend Tomasi Raikivi who hosted a meeting at his home 
prior to the coup. Also present were Ratu Finau Mara, eldest son of Ratu 
Kamisese Mara; Ratu Keni Vuiyasawa, the brother of RFMF Commander 
Nailatikau and son- in- law to Ratu Kamisese Mara; Ratu George Kadavulevu, 
son of the paramount chief of Fiji, Ratu Sir George Cakobau; Filipe Bole, 
former minister in the Mara government; and unionist and Alliance stalwart 
Taniela Veitata.59 It was here that Rabuka -  a lay Methodist pastor himself-  
discussed political options, prayed and affirmed a coup coalition with a host of 
chiefs, politicians and the President of the Fiji Council of Churches Ratu Inoke 
Kubuabola.60 Raikivi gained further political prominence as an appointee on 
Rabuka’s Council of Ministers immediately after the coup.
Since the emancipation of Fijians from villages to towns and cities in the early 
1960s, many Methodist church circuits were formed in urban areas. Pastors of 
these urban circuits became quite influential socially and virtually took on the 
role of village chiefs. The pressures of urban living and modernity coupled with 
close habitation with other ethnic groups saw the rise of Methodist 
Fundamentalism led by pastors such as Manasa Lasaro. Christian religious 
fundamentalism embodies a demand for strict adherence to specific theological 
doctrines based exclusively on the bible. It is also usually understood as a 
reaction against the modernist theology of inclusiveness combined with a 
vigorous attack on outside threats to the fundamentalists’ religious culture. To 
the Methodists, the coup had a religious meaning. In the person of lay Methodist 
pastor Lt Col Rabuka, it was seen as a biblical moment, proof that the 
Almighty was on their side as an exclusive Methodist god. Prior to the coup 
given his deeply religious background and sense of destiny with the political 
events unfolding, Rabuka validated his actions as similar to the calling of the 
Prophet Jeremiah.61 To facilitate his coup Rabuka revealed in No Other way 
that he prayed for rain in order that his soldiers going into parliament that
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morning could wear raincoats to conceal their weapons. Rabuka effused, “I 
asked for rain, and it rained. That really strengthened my faith in God. I believed 
then that everything I was doing was according to God’s plan”. A ‘messianic 
mission’ and a ‘personal manifest destiny’, however, have often been used by 
many a military strongman to justify coups.63
The nexus between the Church and the military was displayed when, after the 
second coup, a Sunday trading ban decree was imposed to appease 
fundamentalists who had formed a powerful political bloc. For the adherents, in 
a theological way the coup was an event whose time had come as orchestrated 
by the Divine. The Sunday ban was an assertion of the exclusive fundamentalist 
Christian practice. Konrote goes further to assert that during the 1987 military 
coups
Fundamentalist Methodism became a powerful tool for nationalistic mobilisation and 
ethnic domination. The social, cultural and political turmoil that followed the coup 
produced a ready audience of followers within the faith to take advantage of the 
situation to oust those church leaders within the clergy who did not support the 
objectives of the coups. Following the military coups of 1987, and the subsequent 
reinstatement of the ‘Christian clause’ within the new (1990) constitution, the stage was 
set for fundamentalism to emerge with its own distinct identity within the Methodist 
church.64
On Sunday 18 December 1988 a group of Methodists, led by the general 
secretary Reverend Manasa Lasaro, blocked off roads at about 70 points in the 
greater Suva area to protest against the relaxation of the Sunday ban decree. 
Lasaro and his followers were arrested and jailed though Rabuka as Minister of 
Home Affairs ordered their release.
Lasaro was immediately suspended by the President of the Methodist Church, 
Rev. Josateki Koroi, for acting unconstitutionally in not getting church authority 
in staging the protest. Lasaro’s action split the Methodist Church. In a church 
coup, Koroi was unconstitutionally deposed by Lasaro and his backers. A court 
judgement found Lasaro and his group had acted unlawfully. Ratu Mara, 
knowing the political clout of Lasaro, offered the Methodist minister a position 
in his caretaker cabinet but this was turned down. Even though traditional 
reconciliation was later offered by Lasaro to Koroi, the Methodist church has 
been tainted by this clash. A clique of senior pastors, like Lasaro, in their
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religious orientation is generally viewed as upholding Christian fundamentalist 
principles coupled with an ethno-nationalist agenda.
The September Takeover
After more than five months of attempts to bridge the political divide amongst 
the various factions Rabuka executed a second bloodless political takeover on 
the 25lh of September. This putsch, compared to the May takeover, unfolded as a 
more coordinated military operation. This was due mainly to the establishment 
of the first Joint Operations Centre set up in Suva’s Central Police Station to 
coordinate all Police-Army Joint Operations (POLARJO).Lieutenant Colonel 
Isikia Savua who went on to become the Commissioner of Police in the Rabuka 
government was in charge of the centre. The command centre also closely 
monitored and coordinated national security including the activities of all 
political parties especially the Taukei Movement. Prior to the second coup, it 
had come to light that some members of the security forces were working with 
the Taukei Movement in creating mayhem. This suspicion stemmed also from 
the numerous unsolved arson cases in Suva city’s Central Business District. The 
Naboro Prison mass break-out on the night of the 22nd September in which 
controversially the prisoners were escorted through the Capital Suva to meet the 
Governor General was monitored from this centre. The security arrangements 
for the second coup of 25th September were also coordinated from this centre.
In September, Governor General Ratu Penaia, pressured by the international 
community, had brokered talks with ousted Prime Minister Bavadra and 
Alliance leader Ratu Mara and had forged what was a promising agreement. The 
fourteen point Deuba Accord gave executive authority to the Governor-General 
who was to appoint a bi-partisan Council of State from the two principal 
political parties, sharing equal portfolios.65 Scarr’s perspective on Rabuka’s 
second coup after the Deuba Accord, given the relationship between the coup 
leader and the Governor General, is applicable:
What does seem clear is that Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau overestimated his influence on 
Rabuka. Perhaps he forgot that traditionally the relationship between turaga and bati 
was symbiotic. The bati as defender of the borders was a very independent vassal. His 
support that gave the chief the power could be withdrawn. 66
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Ratu Penaia, bound to his oath of office, was also the custodian of other ethnic 
groups and was playing hardball to the demands of Rabuka, the GCC and the 
iTaukei Movement. Rabuka was also becoming restless as Ratu Penaia was 
treating him as a subject and certainly not a force to be reckoned as his equal. In 
league with the iTaukei Movement, Rabuka saw the Accord as reinstating the 
status quo and was now opposed to the political agenda of Mara and Ganilau, 
the two doyens of the chiefly order. Rabuka later explained his actions to a 
journalist, “We thought if the caretaker government would carry on long 
enough, they would forget the real issue which was to change the constitution, 
ensuring the paramountcy of Fijian interests.” Ironically this time, though, 
egged on by nationalists and guided by the military’s corporate interest, chiefly 
support crucial to his May coup was seemingly abandoned.
Rabuka, now as leader, cobbled together a military government mostly of 
opportunists and nationalists such as Sakeasi Butadroka, Apisai Tora, Inoke 
Kubuabola, Timoci Vesikula and Filipe Bole. Prominent in the nationalist 
agenda was the call for a republic. The Westminster system with the British 
monarchy as its head was now rejected for a ‘new destiny.’ On October the 7th 
as head of the military government, Rabuka declared the country a republic and 
abrogated the 1970 constitution. In the weeks that followed there were internal 
power struggles within Rabuka’s Council of Ministers, exacerbated by 
inexperience and incompetence. Private agendas, such as Minister of Lands 
Sakeasi Butadroka’s plan to return all Crown land to Fijians, pressured Rabuka 
to hand back the reins of government to his two chiefly patrons.
On the 5th of December, Rabuka dismissed his military government and 
announced a 25-member mostly Alliance cabinet headed by Mara appointed by 
a newly installed President in Ganilau. Rabuka had again deferred to the 
traditional Turaga-Bati political status quo. With the interim government now 
guided by the two high chiefs, Rabuka, also chosen as Minister of Home Affairs 
and head of the security forces, was tolerant for the present at least of chiefly 
rule. Through the execution of a second coup, however, what was certain was 
that Rabuka had asserted military interest as indistinguishable from the national 
interest. Rabuka, by declaring the nation a republic and abrogating the 1970
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Constitution, had created a self-image as the guardian of the nation. Mara’s 
interim government was given a mandate of two years to come up with a new
z o
constitution and electoral reforms to entrench Fijian and military interests.
The Military’s Emerging Political Role.
By late 1987, Rabuka had changed his political stance to believe that ‘the 
military commander should be a member of parliament and that he couldn’t 
stand by and watch politicians screwing Fiji’.69 Rabuka, through the Mara-led 
interim administration, had also given the military a new commercial role with 
the creation of the Auxiliary Unit and an expanded national youth scheme role 
that saw the military strength increase to 6,000 from a pre-coup figure of 
2,200. In addition, the Police Force, under the military installed Commissioner 
Josefa Lewaicei was obviously receptive to security decisions emanating from 
the military elite. This subordination to the military during the political crisis 
compromised Police procedures and independence. By 1989, having fully 
politicized the military, Rabuka was emboldened to chart a course that deviated 
from the traditional apolitical pre-coup stand.
The concept of using the military in a political/commercial/community role was 
modeled on the Indonesian military. The military and Mara’s interim regime 
since the May coup had forged closer ties with East Asian countries including 
Singapore, South Korea and Malaysia. Rabuka was even contemplating an 
‘army controlled economy’ over a ten year period. Scobell contends that in 
asserting his political will in his “second-September coup and third-December 
coup, Rabuka showed that he was independent of the chiefs and the Taukei 
Movement.”71 Rabuka initially was true to the call of the bati in carrying out the 
May coup, but having tasted power, he engineered a change in relationship in 
Fiji’s neo-traditional politics, between the military top command, the Taukeists 
and the Chiefs.
Moreover in 1989, the constitutional review process restarted with the 
appointment of the Manueli Committee, which documented the constitutional 
wishes of the iTaukei Movement, the chiefs, and the army and largely ignored 
the wishes of the FLP and NFP. Rabuka and the military’s intentions were 
articulated in a senior military officers’ presentation paper to the two 
distinguished chiefs in power in early 1989. Ganilau, the President, and Mara,
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the interim Prime Minister, were briefed in no uncertain terms about the 
military’s wish to play a political role in the national interest.73 Rabuka and his 
chief of staff Konrote presented the paper complete with charts describing the 
military’s future political role and intentions. The paper was presented in a 
military appreciation format in which the national political situation, 
assumptions, threat, an action orientated programme of priorities and 
recommendations were clearly laid out from the perspective of the two officers. 
The crux of the presentation was the military’s action-orientated programme 
priorities with a fifteen year timeline.
Phase one included changing all laws detrimental to Fijian progress, nominating 
a state religion and implementing new immigration laws to eliminate enemies of 
the State. Phase two was to complete all issues in sub-topics not completed in 
Phase one such as on the Vanua, Economy and Citizenship. Phase three entailed 
all action-orientated programmes to be approved by the GCC, put to the 
nominated administration and monitored/supervised by the FMF. Additionally, 
measures were recommended ‘to go beyond the bounds of apoliticalness that 
sanctioned the military prior to the coup’ [sic]. These included rejuvenating 
Operation Yavato (Anti-corruption investigations), the survey and registration of 
native lands and traditional fishing grounds and reversion from Mataqali to the 
Yavusa as the major Land Owning Unit.
These recommendations were produced after wide consultations with various 
Fijian government beauracrats and elites. Lieutenant Colonel Pio Wong, 
Rabuka’s chief operations officer and a veteran of peacekeeping operations, and 
Major Aisake Mataikabara, who had graduated with a Masters in International 
Strategic Studies, were charged with the creation of this document. The time 
frame of fifteen years clearly echoed Rabuka’s intent for the military to ‘not let 
politicians screw things up’ by bestowing upon itself a guardian political role. 
The role of the military was then established anew in Section 94 (3) of the 1990 
Constitution which stated: ‘It shall be the overall responsibility of the Republic 
of the Fiji Military Forces to ensure at all times the security, defence and well­
being of Fiji and its peoples.’ The phrase incidentally remains as Section 130 (2) 
of Bainimarama’s 2013 constitution.
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Within the RFMF, one of the well-worn criticisms of the coup has been a 
lowering of professional soldiering standards due to the pressures of rapid 
organizational expansion. For example, time in rank and qualification by 
courses were waived in order to fill newly created military posts. Promotions of 
senior officers were endorsed by the Commander in Chief Ratu Penaia Ganilau 
and publicized in the news media. After the coup it also was evident chiefly 
status and political affiliation mattered throughout the military as Ratu Finau 
Mara, Ratu George Cakobau, Ratu Keni Vuyasawa and Alliance politician Fred 
Caine amongst others joined up as officers. At Labasa, where many Fijian civil 
servants and government statutory bodies workers were being promoted 
overnight, security for the sugar mill and the port of Malau were controlled by 
the military. In April 1988, with the news that a container of weapons was 
smuggled into the country via the western port of Lautoka, the search for 
missing weapons spread to the north. Large scale searches of Indian owned cane 
farms were conducted with no results. Indo-Fijian fanners eager to settle old 
scores with adversaries in their community falsely pointed them out as suspects 
in what became a wild goose chase. The overnight expansion of the military 
had brought with it all manner of personnel and logistical challenges that even 
necessitated the conversion of government property at Vaturekuka Labasa as 
military quarters and offices. Furthermore instilling military discipline amongst 
civilian territorial and new recruit soldiers in newly created formations often fell 
short of professional standards.
The Politics of the 1990s
The Turaga-Bati relationship seemed cordial enough after the reinstatement of 
Mara to lead the caretaker government. Rabuka even praised Mara in 1989 at a 
recruit passing out parade stating, “In the face of criticism and allegations, the 
Prime Minister has decided to put his country and its people before his personal 
wishes.”74 Mara was also favourable to Rabuka by 1989, complimenting the 
coup leader on the lack of bloodshed saying, “I think we have been fortunate to 
have had a coup leader like him... and as a coup leader he is an angel.”75 For the 
military elite, however, the 1990s heralded a period of contradictory 
philosophies. On one hand a new officers’ school with a re-professionalization 
programme was embarked on yet on the other, the military elite demanded a
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national security role. Rabuka epitomized this dilemma as he held the twin posts 
of Minister for Home Affairs and Commander of the military. Rabuka was 
conscious that three years after his coup not much had been achieved by way of 
entrenching Fijian political paramountcy; hence his insistence on pressuring 
Mara’s administration.
Animosity grew between Mara and Rabuka on national issues in Cabinet. 
Rabuka’s public impatience at the lack of progress in the formulation of a 
Constitution caused him to cross swords with Mara. Rabuka was pushing for 
Fijian entrenched rights in the constitutional reforms which he stressed were one 
of the major aims of his coup. After the promulgation of the racially skewed 
1990 Constitution, Rabuka finally parted with the military and was made co­
deputy Prime Minister with Josevata Kamikamica who was a much favored 
candidate of Mara as future Prime Minister. With the formation of the GCC 
backed Soqosogo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei Party (SVT) as the political entity to 
unite all Fijians, a tug- of- war for the leadership saw Adi Lady Lala Mara lose 
out to Rabuka.
The defeat of the paramount chief of the Burebasaga Confederacy and wife of 
Ratu Mara created a rift in the once convivial Turaga-Bati relationship. In the 
1992 elections Rabuka went on to lead the SVT ahead of his rival Jo 
Kamikamica although without the numbers to give him the top post. Needing 36 
confirmed votes of those who held seats in parliament, Rabuka with some irony 
had to strike a deal with FLP’s Mahendra Chaudhry to gain the Prime- 
Ministership. Rabuka was quite conscious that Mara had formed an exclusive 
diners club of politicians and that “He was the Prime Minister and a commoner 
in a nation where, for most Fijians leadership was seen as a function of the high 
chiefs”, and that his enemies within his SVT party were many. Rabuka’s
unsteady reign as Prime Minister took a tumble when six of his party dissidents 
crossed the floor and voted against his budget of 1993.This unexpected move 
was more a vote of no confidence in Rabuka’s leadership and was plotted by Jo 
Kamikamica and Ratu Finau Mara who went on to form the Fijian Association 
Party with, no doubt, backing from Ratu Mara.
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In December Rabuka’s patron and President Ratu Penaia passed away leaving 
Rabuka without the steadying advice of his paramount chief, the Tui Cakau and 
head of the Tovata confederacy. In the 1994 elections, with the support of the 
ordinary Fijian vote, Rabuka and his SVT party managed a convincing win to 
resume the reins of government. Rabuka’s relationship with the now incumbent 
President Ratu Mara also plummeted when the high chief publically rued the 
decision to establish the SVT Party. This decision had been adopted and was 
first passed at a GCC meeting in 1990 at the Suva military barracks. With the 
1999 elections beckoning, it was public knowledge that the President in 
conjunction with his son-in-law the incumbent Commander of the military, Ratu 
Epeli Ganilau, and certain Methodist Church ministers were founders of the 
newly formed Veitokani Ni Lotu Vakarisito (VLV) Party, which was a 
competitor with Rabuka’s SVT.
Rabuka’s second tenure as Prime minister lurched from one crisis to another 
prime of which was the $200 million National Bank of Fiji scam. Rabuka’s one 
lasting legacy with opposition leader Jai Ram Reddy however was the 
convening of the Reeves Constitutional Review Commission which produced 
the amended all inclusive multi-racial 1997 Constitution. Rabuka and Reddy 
despite their best intentions to forge a power sharing arrangement as contained 
in the 1997 Constitution were humiliated at the polls, a backlash from their 
deeply divided own communities. The alternate vote system introduced to 
engender more centrist moderate voting in politically polarised ethnic 
communities wrought havoc for the SVT/NFP/UGP coalition. This saw the 
election of Fiji’s first Indo-Fijian Prime Minister, Mahendra Chaudhry, with the 
VLV Party’s Adi Koila Mara Nailatikau and Poseci Bune as part of his FLP 
Coalition government.
On relinquishing power to Chaudhry, Rabuka blamed Mara for his 1999 election 
defeat. Furthermore, with a new constitution in place that was hoped to foster a 
multiracial society, it ironically ended up further fragmenting Fiji politically. 
For unlike the 1970 Constitution which was derived from talks in London 
between the two major political parties, the Alliance and the National 
Federation, the 1997 Constitution was autochthonous. With the close of the
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decade and the demise of his political fortunes, Rabuka revealed in his 
biography he had harbored antipathies towards the Tui Nayau claiming that 
Mara had “given him the nod” in the weeks before his 1987 coup. Mara 
threatened to sue Rabuka for defamation.
Conclusion
Rabuka’s coup was a defining moment for the military in Fiji politics. It 
represented the re-assertion of power by the Fijian chiefly elite. Being the third 
ranking military officer, Rabuka’s takeover according to Fluntington’s 
classification appeared to be a ‘Breakthrough Coup.’ Huntington had warned 
that when junior officers or enlisted men seize power, the coup d'etat is a mutiny 
with grave implications for the organizational and professional integrity of the 
military. For Rabuka the opposite was true. He was the personal embodiment of 
the Fijian value system. As head boy, Rabuka had been groomed from Queen 
Victoria School, (Na Vuli Ni Turaga) the Fijian boarding school initially set up 
for chiefs’ sons. He was also a national rugby and athletic representative. As a 
Methodist lay preacher, he held appeal in Fiji’s predominant Christian 
denomination. As the commander of the Fiji’s peacekeeping battalion in 
Lebanon, his military leadership was proven under testing conditions. All these 
qualities endeared him to his loyalist soldiers and his powerful civilian political 
network.
Rabuka’s 1987 coup was the assertion of the neo-traditional Turaga-Bati 
relationship, where the modem bati was protecting Fijian political supremacy. 
The neo-traditional Turaga-Bati relationship had been utilized by the colonial 
administration to legitimize the ruling elite and create a military force. The 
relationship was further cemented during the World Wars, the Malayan 
Campaign and overseas peacekeeping operations. This nexus was further 
maintained through the chiefly rule of the Alliance government of the 1970s- 
80s. Scarr had argued that the Turaga-Bati relationship underpinned such Fijian 
political control. With the loss of the Alliance party at elections to an Indo- 
Fijian dominated FLP/NFP Coalition, a national Taukei Movement front 
agitated against government. The prevalence of ethnic outbidding by political 
elites has made the instrumentalist conflict view interpretation of the coup more 
compelling. In backing the instrumentalist view, Brij Lai’s assertion that
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Rabuka’s coup was manipulated by politicians with personal interests at stake 
has currency. Lai is adamant the coup was the work of disgruntled Alliance
79politicians who had lost the reins of government after 17 years in power.
These were ‘the politicians who were too eager for power and men who made
80the coup and did not reverse it’.
Lai’s description of Mara as being a ‘nationalist by instinct and a multi-racialist
O 1
by necessity’ may indeed be apposite. Ratu Mara’s, ‘...I only came in to put 
the fire out’ was a controversial justification for joining Rabuka’s coup. His 
Lauan and Tovata confederacy people had come to support him after his 
election loss and he as their chief had weighed up his options and 
responsibilities towards his distraught subjects. Ratu Mara denied any role in 
the plotting of the coup.83 However, as revealed by biographer John Sharpham, 
Rabuka “was prepared to hide Mara’s involvement, protecting him as a good
0 4
bati, the warrior doing the work of his chief.’’
Rabuka’s ‘second coup’ in September though seemed a rejection of this 
phenomenon. The coup was triggered by the Governor General’s successful 
party talks between the Coalition and the Alliance which gave birth to the 
stillborn Deuba Accord and a bi-partisan caretaker administration under
o c
Ganilau. The temporary parting of ways between the high chief and the 
military was however re-established after the declaration of the nation as a 
republic and the abrogation of the Constitution. Rabuka’s coup aim was 
evidenced in the adoption of the ethnically skewed 1990 Constitution under the 
influence of the Great Council of Chiefs. A parallel outcome of the Rabuka coup 
is that the Fiji military began to see itself in an expanded security role. With the 
benefit of three coups in hindsight, we experience a sense of dejä vu. The 
military that had intervened to protect a ruling class has become a political class 
itself, an inversion of the status quo. The military’s adopted mediator role has 
become an important factor in generating Fiji’s coups. With the passage of time 
and two further coups the Fiji military has no doubt developed a political 
corporate interest. The military coup of 1987 had only succeeded in freezing the 
patterns of conflict and failed to resolve the growing socio-economic chasm in 
Fiji. Indeed coups became a recurring phenomenon for the nation in the coming 
decades as the military elite continued to redefine its role.
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Chapter 4
The Origins of the Re-shaping of the Fiji Military, 2000.
Introduction
The coup of the 19th of May 2000 had a profound impact on the Republic of Fiji 
Military Forces. Initially, George Speight and his civilian followers hoped that, 
by storming parliament, they would trigger a supportive reaction from the 
military as in the 1987 coup. This did not eventuate. However even after the 
initial capture of Prime Minister Chaudhry and his cabinet as hostages, the 
rebels were able to return to the barracks to obtain more weapons1. The military 
was divided, not only along provincial lines. The schisms were regional, and 
reflected a split within and outside the army. Support for the George Speight 
coup came particularly from soldiers from the island of Vanua Levu and 
dissidents from Ra, Northern Tailevu and other provinces with strong links to 
the Bau chiefs and the Kubuna confederacy.
The role of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) during the 2000 coup is 
perplexing. In the wake of the 2006 coup, the military’s role in Fiji’s society has 
been portrayed as bridging the ethnic divide and suppressing the forces of ethno- 
nationalism . In fact, the military responded in an ambivalent manner to George 
Speight’s coup in May 2000. The common refrain ‘we support the goals (of 
George Speight’s coup) but not the method’ was echoed not only by many 
Itaukei politicians but also by the RFMF senior command.4 Although the RFMF 
ultimately imprisoned and arrested the coup leader, there was little sympathy for 
the ousted government of Mahendra Chaudhry, the country’s first Prime 
Minister of Indian descent. The 2000 crisis was the pivotal point in the 
reshaping of the Turaga-Bati relationship.
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This chapter examines the role of the Fiji military during the 2000 coup crisis 
which was the theatre for the beginning of the inversion of the Turaga-Bati 
relationship. Moreover the deposing of President Mara symbolized this 
inversion and the assertion of the military to political prominence and power. 
The first section examines the military’s involvement in the 19th of May 
insurrection, and its aftermath. With the public leak of a copy of the RFMF 
Board of Investigation Report chaired by Lieutenant Colonel Jack Evans, into 
the parliament takeover by George Speight and the 1st Meridian Squadron, much 
of the sequence of events have been corroborated.3 It also examines the actions 
of the Military Council formed during Bainimarama’s 37-day government of the 
29th of May to the 4lh of July. In particular, it examines the RFMF response to 
the destabilisation around the country orchestrated by George Speight’s Group 
inside parliament. The chapter argues that the RFMF’s initial concern was the 
safety and release of the hostages and the integrity of the military in upholding 
law and order. At the same time the fact was that the military senior officers 
from the outset were very much in sympathy with the nationalists. The 
military’s stance was summed up in its ‘we support the cause and not the 
method’ mantra. The transformation of the military into now playing the central 
role in national politics, unfolded during this crisis. It was during Commodore 
Bainimarama and the Military Council’s 37 day rule from the 29th of May to the 
4th of July that the indigenous affirmative actions policy was formulated. This 
controversial policy was later handed over to the military installed Laisenia 
Qarase interim civilian government.6
The claim that military action had been aimed at rooting out ethno-nationalism 
only became prominent some years later, when it was in the military’s interest to 
depict ethno-nationalism in negative terms. In September of 2005, for example, 
military spokesperson, Lieutenant Colonel Orisi Rabukawaqa, started using this 
term in media releases to justify the military’s opposition to the SDL 
government’s Qoliqoli (customary seashore rights) and Reconciliation bills.7 
When the military embarked on its ‘Truth and Justice’ campaign during the 
elections against the governing SDL party in the run up to the 2006 elections, 
the primary public justification had become an alleged effort to ‘cleanse’ Fiji of
o
trouble-making ethno-nationalists. The events of the present were justified by a
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revisionist historical interpretation of Fiji’s 2000 Coup events. According to this 
view, the RFMF was the saviour of Fiji in 2000, when it stepped in to crush 
George Speight’s coup. What is forgotten is that (1) the RFMF was deeply 
uncertain about how to respond to the May 19 2000 coup, and some senior 
officers were implicated in plots to unseat Chaudhry; (2) for some time after the 
coup, there was uncertainty about which side to take; (3) Bainimarama 
consistently justified his own abrogation of the constitution on the 29th of May 
2000 not (as some suggested) under duress due to Speight’s holding of hostages, 
but also much later, after the release of the hostages, in affidavits submitted at 
the time of the February 2001 Chandrika Prasad court hearings.
The Coup and Aftermath
The 19th of May coup did not come as a surprise. In fact on page two of the Fiji 
Times of the same day was the headline, ‘Taukei vow to remove PM’. The 
article stated, “Civil protests by the Taukei will continue until the Chaudhry 
government and the 1997 Constitution are removed”. Hostility to the Chaudhry- 
led government did not only come from the opposition benches, where the 
deposed ministers from Rabuka’s 1992-99 government sat. It also came from 
the Fijian political parties from within the FLP-led coalition, and even from 
ethnic Fijian MPs within the FLP. Many feared Chaudhry’s intentions with 
regard to land9. As aptly stated by firebrand politician, Apisai Tora, "When the 
Chiefs want to scrap ALTA, Tu Ma (literally Ratu Mahendra Chaudhry) wants it 
retained. When the Fijians don’t want the Land Use Commission, Tu Ma wants 
it implemented. When the Crown Schedule A and B lands are to be returned to 
Fijians, Tu Ma puts it on hold. When ALTA leases are revoked, Tu Ma pays out 
F$28,000 to evicted Indian tenants under the guise of rehabilitation”10.
The Fiji military was aware of these threats to government, as it had built up 
intelligence about what was transpiring in what is anyway a close knit society. 
The RFMF had since the 1987 coup been operating a military intelligence cell 
with close liaison with the Fiji Intelligence Service (FIS) set up by the Rabuka 
SVT government. In addition soldiers from the 1st Meridian Sqn and the 3rd 
Battalion of the RFMF were doubling as intelligence operatives feeding general 
information into the intelligence cell.
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As often retold by Commodore Bainimarama to his officers after the 19lh of 
May takeover, a few months after the FLP Coalition Government had won the 
May 1999 elections, leading Nationalist Sakeasi Butadroka had requested a 
meeting with him.. The naval officer had only in February of the same year 
assumed the Commander position of the RFMF. The gist of the meeting as 
recalled by Bainimarama was Butadroka’s appeal for the Army to overthrow 
Chaudhry’s government in a full-fledged military coup. On another front, the 
close links of the Army’s 1st Meridian Sqn with former Prime Minister and 
Commander Sitiveni Rabuka were even reported in the news to have been 
rekindled and a plot hatched in the weeks prior to the coup.11
Apisai Tora, the leader of PANU, in a meeting to revive the Taukei Movement 
in the west, announced his intention of bringing down Chaudhry’s government, 
blaming his leadership style and anti-Itaukei proposals on land and 
constitutional issues. " Despite widespread Itaukei disquiet about Chaudhry’s 
leadership, the Prime Minister continued to insist that he had a strong popular
i 'i
mandate . The police Commissioner Isikia Savua had also met with the 
Minister of Home Affairs, Joji Uluinakauvadra, raising his concerns of Itaukei 
political discontent. Despite all these warning signs the Minister had assured 
cabinet that the security forces were solidly behind government, confident after 
almost a year of being in power. Apparently the minister was basing his 
statement on blind assessment made for him by the FLP Coalition’s information 
gathering network. The Chaudhry government had disbanded the Fiji 
Intelligence Service, which it saw as an extension of Rabuka’s SVT 
government’s spying apparatus. The ABC’s Four Comer’s investigative TV 
programme in July 2000 interviewed Soqosoqo Vakavulewa ni Taukei (SVT) 
economic consultant Navi Naisoro, former Fiji Intelligence Service Director 
Metuisela Mua, and SVT’s Jone Dakuvula for their views on the Speight coup: 
all stated that a coup against the Mahendra Chaudhry coalition government was 
widely anticipated in May and pointed out the strength of indigenous Itaukei 
Fijian political dissent.14
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As ethnic Fijian politicians agitated against the Labour coalition government the 
military assured the nation that there would be “no coup.”15 This public stance, 
however, did not match the assessment indicated by the military’s internal 
intelligence reports. According to the Evans report, Lt. Col. Viliame Seruvakula, 
the commanding officer of the 3ld Battalion, through his own unit’s intelligence, 
was providing the Commander RFMF, Commodore Bainimarama, with 
information that a coup was being planned.16 The week prior to the coup, a full 
briefing regarding these reports was prepared for Bainimarama at the Officer 
Training School.This was followed by discussions of the military’s contingency 
plan on the suitable response in the case of such an event. Curiously, 
Bainimarama chose to go to a seminar in Norway, leaving Colonel Alfred 
Tuatoko as acting commander in his absence. Bainimarama’s action in the 
immediate period before the coup is difficult to understand. In spite of being 
given intelligence of an impending coup, he decided to be away at the most 
crucial time. President Mara had questioned the wisdom of this decision but had 
been assured that all was under control. As Mara later recounted:
He said [Commodore Bainimarama] he came to let me know that he is going to Norway 
for a conference. I said do you believe that this is the right time to go and he assured me 
and said there was some marches in the West a week ago and everything was all right 
and the reports I get was ok. I said alright, if you think it's alright, you can go . 17
Key Military Officers
There were seven key military players who were responsible for the decisions in 
the unfolding crisis situation of Friday the 19th of May 2000.18
Table 2; Senior Military Officers.
1) Commodore Voreqe Bainimarama (CRFMF)*
2) Colonel Alfred Tuatoko, acting Commander and Land Force Commander. 
(CLFC)
3) Lieutenant Colonel Samuela Raduva, Chief of Staff Land Force Command. 
(COSLFC)
4) Lieutenant Colonel Filipo Tarakinikini, Chief Staff Officer Logistic. 
(CSOLOG)
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5) Lieutenant Colonel Meli Saubulinayau, Chief Staff Officer Plans. (CSO 
PLANS)
6) Lieutenant Colonel Viliame Seruvakula, Commanding Officer Third 
Battalion Suva. (C03FIR)
7) Lieutenant Colonel Jone Baledrokadroka, Chief Staff Officer Operations.
(CSOOPSf
* left for Norway Sun 14 May 2000 and returned early morning of Sunday 21st 
May 2000
~ left for Sinai, Egypt with 2F1R (MFO) Monday 15 May 2000 returned 5 Jun
2000 .
The military commander’s absence overseas at the time of the May 2000 coup 
was reminiscent of the 1987 coup, when RFMF Commander Ratu Epeli 
Nailatikau had also been absent overseas. The 2000 coup , unlike that in 1987 , 
had been accompanied by considerable uncertainty about who were the behind- 
the-scenes plotters, and what role the most powerful of politicians played in 
backing, or at least tacitly endorsing, the activities of their juniors. 
Bainimarama’s trip had been organised by the Ministry of Home Affairs. In 
addition, I, who held the key Chief Staff Officer Operations appointment at 
Land Force Command, had left for Sinai to supervise the handing over of the 
Fiji Battalion command between Lt Col Waqavakatoga and Lt Col Jack Evans 
on the 15th of May.
The Land Force Commander/Acting Commander, Colonel Alfred Tuatoko, his 
Chief of Staff, Lt Col Samuela Raduva, the Chief Staff Officer Intelligence 
/Plans- Lt Col Meli Saubulinayau, and the Commanding Officer of the 3ld 
Battalion, Lt Col Viliame Seruvakula, were the ranking officers in the chain of 
command responsible for the major decisions on the 19th of May and during the 
crucial days thereafter. Lt Col Filipo Tarakinikini holding the Chief Logistic 
Officer appointment who became the military spokesman and ‘go between’ 
during the crisis was apparently attending lectures at the University of the South 
Pacific on the day of the coup and reported to Land Force Command 
headquarters at Queen Elizabeth Barracks shortly after the parliament takeover. 
Their decisions formed the basis of military orders, both written and verbal 
during the crisis. The military response, one of ambivalence at first but later as
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upholders of the rule of law against Speight’s supporters and rebel soldiers, was 
decided on by their judgement. When the coup happened, with the taking of the 
Labour Coalition Government’s members of parliament as hostages the officers 
that were in command of the RFMF steered the crisis in such a way as to (a) 
avoid bloodshed and b) negotiate for a peaceful resolution. However, conflicting 
with this command intention was the fact that weapons and military rations were 
conveyed into the parliament complex from the military’s Queen Elizabeth 
Barracks in the preceding days.
Confusion about the events at critical junctures was not confined to senior 
ranking officers. On the evening of Thursday the 18th of May, a troop from the 
1st Meridian Squadron led by a young troop commander Lieutenant Charles 
Dakuliga was on Makuluva Island, nine kilometres east of Suva for what was 
thought to be a unit survival exercise. From a military operational perspective, 
these troopers may have been prepositioned, in a safe staging location, the 
nature of the mission unbeknown to them. At around 223Ohrs Lt Dakuliga was 
phoned by a 1st Meridian Sqn non- commissioned officer Sgt Filimoni Tikotani, 
instructing him to attend a meeting at the Laucala Bay slipway in order to 
receive orders from their 1st Meridian Sqn acting officer commanding 
Lieutenant Penaia Baleinamau (see Map 1). At the rendezvous that night, 
Dakuliga was met by Sgt Tikotani, George Speight and his brother Jim Speight, 
Apenisa Ravutuqica (a reservist soldier) and a public works employee Simione 
Drole. 19 Lt Dakuliga was then informed of the coup the next morning. 
However, according to court martial records, some of his troopers, on his return 
to the island to brief them, were reluctant and hesitant.
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How the command structure was working at this point remains uncertain, 
particularly as regards the involvement of soldiers from the 1st Meridian Sqn in 
what was depicted as a ‘civilian’ coup. According to the Evans report at 0315hrs 
on the morning of the 19th of May phone records show Lt ColTarakinikini called 
Staff Sergeant Bainimoli at the 1st Meridian Sqn office at Queen Elizabeth 
Barracks and then called Col Alfred Tuatoko, the acting Commander, and Land 
Force Commander, at around 0400hrs“ . A little later he called Lt Baleinamau, 
the acting 1st Meridian Sqn commanding officer. What was discussed nobody 
knows. However, at 0745 hrs that same morning at the Laucala Bay slipway 
once again Lt Dakuliga and the troopers from Makuluva Island met Lt 
Baleinamau. According to Lt Dakuliga, this time the former British SAS soldier 
and 1st Meridian Sqn advisor, Major Ilisoni Ligairi, was present. The young 
troop commander with his forces was then told by Lt Baleinamau that Maj 
Ligairi would support a mission into the parliament complex and that it was only 
an exercise. They then drove to another co-conspirator Jo Nata’s Fijian Teachers 
Association flat at Knolly Street in central Suva to await the final signaL . All 
throughout the late night of the 18th May and the early hours of the 19th May, 
George Speight, the coup leader, was directing proceedings from his family
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home in Lami town before meeting up with the 1st Meridian Sqn troopers at Jo 
Nata’s flat in Suva’s CBD.
There was a high speed chase through the suburban streets of Suva as police 
gave pursuit of Speight and his group on their way to parliament. Sharp eyed 
traffic police had spotted a speeding red twin cab 4 wheel drive vehicle followed 
by a white mini bus and gave chase only to back off when M l6 rifles and 
military issue pistols were brandished at them at the entrance to parliament. At 
1040 hrs, the parliament session opened. The signal that it had done so was 
given by sitting Fijian Association Member of Parliament (ironically a member 
of Chaudhry’s People’s Coalition) and co-conspirator, Timoci Silatolu, who was 
in contact with George Speight by mobile phone. Speight and his armed group 
of seven stormed into parliament at 1045 hrs. What followed was a confused 
sequence of events, witnessed by members of parliament as well as school 
children in the public gallery and Fiji Times journalist Matelita Ragogo.24 The 
takeover of parliament was timed to coincide with a protest march through 
central Suva led by SVT /Nationalist Vanua Tako Lavo Party/Taukei Movement 
stalwarts. It was to be a replica of the 1987 takeover of parliament, a copycat 
coup. Yet unlike Sitiveni Rabuka’s orderly removal of parliamentarians in 1987, 
Speight was constantly on his mobile phone to nationalist politician Iliesa 
Duvuloco, leading the march, with the objective of destabilising the situation in 
Suva.
At 1320 hrs Speight spoke, from within parliament, to a stunned nation:
We, the People of Fiji, in our desire to achieve self-determination and control of our 
future destiny in all matters pertaining to our livelihood, and the affairs of the Republic 
of the Fiji Islands, executed this action this morning. There are a small number of us but 
as I speak and make these announcements, I speak on behalf o f every individual 
member of the indigenous Fijian community. Through these actions I am stressing 
ownership, asserting control, and asserting executive power over Fiji. We have revoked 
the constitution and have set that aside. We have revoked the powers of the Republic of 
Fiji. The executive control of this country currently resides in my hands.23
The appeal to the indigenous community, characteristic of all of Speight’s
speeches at press conferences, was also an appeal to the solidly ethnic iTaukei
military forces. George Speight was an unknown in public life and, for those
who did know him, his newfound championing of indigenous rights seemed
incongruous. In addition, Speight’s non-military background generated
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suspicion amongst senior military officers. The military top brass would never 
have supported a civilian-led coup, particularly one spearheaded by a part- 
European businessman. It was the presence of Major Ilisoni Ligairi and other 1st 
Meridian Sqn soldiers inside parliament, which sent a strong signal that officers 
close to the senior command were in support of the coup. As reported by AF 
Press on the 23,d of May , Rabuka had revealed the 1st Meridian Sqn unit was 
not taking orders from Speight. “They are listening to the old man, he is their 
leader,” he said. The “old man” (Na Qase) is a colloquial Fijian term of respect 
for the unit’s former co-founder and former British SAS trooper Ilisoni Liqairi 
also nicknamed “Horse”.
Had other alleged secretive military backers of the coup, such as the late 
Colonel Savenaca Draunidalo MC, stepped forward, it perhaps, would have 
added greater acceptance of the coup.from within the military. Shortly after 
Speight’s initial press conference, Maj Ligairi left parliament to meet with the 
Land Force Commander Colonel Alfred Tuatoko and his senior officers at 
Queen Elizabeth Barracks. He later recounted what transpired:
I went to the senior officers in the army and told them what happened. And I told them 
that I give (sic) the order, and I'm responsible for whatever is going to happen. I know 
that 1 broke the law of the Constitution. And 1 told them, 1 don't want any bloodshed.27
Tuatoko, an introverted and cautious officer, responded by stalling for time and 
then informing the President, Mara, of the meeting with the ex-British SAS 
soldier. On instruction from the President (whose daughter Adi Koila 
Nailatikau was amongst the hostages inside parliament), Tuatoko permitted 
Major Ligairi to re-enter parliament to ‘help protect’ the hostages’ lives. Did 
this decision on the part of Tuatoko indicate tacit support of the Speight ‘cause’? 
That question could be raised about many of the actions of senior officers and 
politicians over those tempestuous early days after the coup. Not the least was 
the President, who, questioned the wisdom of military decisions during the 
crucial first days. Mara later revealed
Then in one of the discussions, I was talking with [Colonel] Tuatoko in there, I said, I 
think the best thing to do is to invest the Parliament. There was already a number -200, 
2000 or whatever it is - don't allow anyone to cross Vuya, Queen Elizabeth and Ratu 
Sukuna [roads]. And see and negotiate. And involuntary [sic] Tuatoko said oh... dave na 
dra (blood will flow). You see the reaction of the man on whom I should depend for 
security. Well it so happened [that blood] did dave [flow], but I didn't think it [would] 
come out from the acting head of the Army.70
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It seems, from Ratu Mara’s point of view, the Military leadership was in cahoots 
with Speight’s group involuntarily. In Tuatoko’s case, since he had instructions 
from the President reinforces the view that his primary concern was the safety of 
the hostages. Nevertheless, as the acting Commander, Tuatoko was ultimately 
responsible for the actions of the 1st Meridian Sqn soldiers. It was Tarakinikini 
being a former founding member of the Counter Revolutionary Warfare Unit (1st 
Meridian Sqn) together with former British SAS soldier Ligairi, who of all the 
senior command were most likely to have sympathies with the unit if not
T I
Speight’s stated cause of the takeover.
The President in initially trying to steer a constitutional path after the parliament 
hostage crisis, condemned the takeover and declared a ‘state of emergency’. 
Appearing on TV One he was flanked by the Police Commissioner Savua and 
the Acting Commander Colonel Tuatoko and a perplexed Colonel Ulaiasi Vatu 
of Strategic Headquarters. Speight had earlier announced Colonel Vatu as his 
proposed choice for Commander. It later came to light that Senator Colonel Paul 
Manueli, also the former Home Affairs Minister in the Rabuka government and 
former Commander, had warned Colonel Vatu on hearing of Speight’s 
announcement. Vatu was warned to not collaborate with Speight and to appear 
in solidarity with the President and Colonel Tuatoko on TV One. Colonel Vatu 
was investigated and hounded till his demise in 2004 for this unsubstantiated 
collaboration with Speight’s Group and also the l sl Meridian Squadron’s 2nd of 
November 2000 mutiny at Queen Elizabeth Barracks.
In response, to the President’s TV address, at 1:00pm Saturday the 20th of May 
as captured on TV One, coup leader Speight swore in Ratu Jope Seniloli as 
President of the self-proclaimed “Taukei Civilian Government” on a grubby 
looking Bible. Speight was sworn in as interim Prime Minister then others were 
sworn in before Ratu Jope Seniloli as members of his Cabinet. The names put 
forward for the new regime were:
1. Deputy Prime Minister Timoci Silatolu
2. Attorney General and Minister of Justice Ratu Rakuita Vakalalabure
3. Minister for Housing and Urban Development Viliame Volavola
4. Minister for Youths and Sports Peceli Rinakama
5. Minister for Tourism and Civil Aviation Isireli Leweniqila
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6. Minister for Land and Mineral Resources Iliesa Duvuloco
7. Minister for Works and Energy Viliame Savu
8. Minister for Information Simione Kaitani
9. Asst. Minister for Lands Mitieli Bulanauca
10. Asst. Minister for Education Manasa Moce
11. Asst. Minister for Urban Development Eroni Lewaqai
12. Asst. Minister for Environment Antonio Tanaburenisau
13. Asst. Minister for Forest Lepani Tonitonivanua
At the outset on his arrival at Nadi Airport from Norway in the early hours of 
Sunday the 21st of May , Bainimarama returned to a country and a military in 
the midst of high intrigue. According to Lt Col Seruvakula, the Commander 
had to be protected away from the aircraft and out of the airport as a team of 1sl 
Meridian Sqn assassins were posted in the vicinity. The Commander was then 
driven via the longer route through the Kings Highway to Suva as a warning of a 
road ambush along the Queens Highway was evaded.
The first the public heard of Commodore Bainimarama in the news media was 
when he denied a Fiji Times enquiry on the night of Sunday 21st July that shots 
fired around the parliament complex were from RFMF soldiers. Apparently 
rumours were rife that foreign forces were to attack the parliament complex that 
night which sparked wild shooting by unidentified gunmen . It seems on the 
22nd of May the Speight group security advisors led by Maj Ligairi and Sgt 
Tikotani were becoming jittery about the military or foreign forces attempting a 
rescue operation on the hostages. Hence some 200 civilian supporters, both male 
and females, were let into the parliament complex, supposedly to act as human 
shields to a rescue operation. These civilians were split into the three traditional 
confederacy groupings and allocated security for areas within the complex. The 
inability to control civilians from entering the complex was a major security 
failure of the police and military. Isolating the Speight Group from its 
supporters would have denied them crucial moral and logistic support that could 
have shortened the hostage crisis. The confusion seemed to have stemmed from 
legislated procedures as to whether the police or the military was in control of 
security in these early days. Any plans of cordoning off the complex for a rescue 
operations were severely hampered with the ensuing influx of supporters.
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On Friday the 26th of May, the day the Great Council of Chiefs announced its 
support for the President Ratu Mara. After this announcement, later that day, 
Speight rejected an offer put to him by a delegation from the GCC. Speight and 
some chiefs had wanted the sacking of Ratu Mara, amnesty, and the installing of 
his interim Itaukei government amongst other demands. The same day in what 
was a letdown for the RFMF, Major Jo Savua and Sergeant Major Malakai 
Veisamasama and 18 troopers of the RFMF Engineers marched into parliament 
to the applause of George Speight and his supporters. Major Savua said his men 
considered the plight of the indigenous Fijians more important than the uniforms 
they donned. “Our support is for the plight of the indigenous Fijians and the 
future of our children”, he said. “We are doing this for the Fijian people” he 
said. The officers marched into the complex an hour after the negotiating
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committee from the GCC arrived. This desertion from the ranks from a close 
knit unit such as the Engineers had more to do with Major Savua’s close links to 
his brother the Police Commissioner Isikia Savua than anything else. The Police 
Commissioner’s role to date in the events of the 19th of May is still shrouded in 
controversy.
Tensions began to rise around the parliament complex on the weekend of the 
the 27th to the 28lh of May as soldiers of the 3ld Battalion tried to erect 
concertina wire and check points at entry/exit points. Armed soldiers were 
forced to back off to avoid an ugly scene at Veiuto as George Speight, 
accompanied by about 10 armed guards, ordered the soldiers to remove the 
barricades.34 Earlier that day Police Commissioner Isikia Savua said military 
assistance was requested due to an increase of arms being carried around by 
people.35 On the night of Sunday the 28th May, a horde of rebels from 
Parliament spilled out into the streets and ransacked Fiji TV One station in 
retaliation to a Close Up programme, fatally shooting a police man.
The 29th of May Military Takeover
In what amounted to a second coup, Bainimarama in a televised news broadcast 
to the nation, said, “At approximately 1800 hours tonight, Monday, 29 May 
2000, I have assumed executive authority of the country and henceforth declare 
martial law.” The action was a response to the rampaging of Speight’s mob 
through the streets of Suva which resulted in the killing of a policeman and
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trashing of the national TV station on the 28th of May. That night, the President 
and his family were evacuated for their safety to a naval vessel close to Daveta 
Levu passage at the entrance to Suva harbour. Aboard that vessel outside the 
harbour, Commodore Bainimarama with several senior officers presented a 
tabua (whale’s tooth) in a Fijian ceremony to the President requesting him to 
step aside (tu vaka tikitiki). The President acquiesced in the Fijian language 
saying that since the very people who were to protect him had asked for him to 
step aside from office, he would never again return to the high office. This 
second seizure of power, following Speight’s capture of parliament, was a 
capture of the President’s executive authority (as distinct from, parliament’s 
legislative authority), and was later argued by the military commander’s lawyers 
to have been done in accordance with ‘the doctrine of necessity’ to save the 
nation. This power seizure in the broader traditional sense was emblematic of 
the renowned inversion of the Roko Tui Bau by his Vunivalu. Only this time the 
bati was asserting political power over the turaga in the modem context.
In its public justification, the military strategy of removing the President and 
abrogating the 1997 Constitution was (again) to appease the George Speight 
Group and pave the way for the release of the hostages. Bainimarama would 
become acting President with a military executive council that would pursue 
affirmative action for indigenous Fijians and appoint a constitutional review 
commission. It has been said by some officers since, that the 29th of May 
abrogation of the constitution was not the first option entertained by the military 
council and all that was wanted was for the President to be relocated to Lau and 
the doctrine of necessity be invoked. Why abrogate the constitution at this 
point? One plausible explanation was, again, to appease the George Speight 
Group or were their other interests at work? Some senior judges, including 
Justice Gates, believed this to have been the case and claimed that Bainimarama 
was acting under the ‘doctrine of necessity’. However, judges sitting on the 
Court of Appeal in March 2001 disagreed with this interpretation, largely 
because they had an affidavit before them from the Commander defending the 
abrogation of the constitution. In other words, the decision to ditch Fiji’s 
fundamental laws on the 29th of May was not done out of expediency, but 
served some ulterior purpose. On the advice of his Military Council and in
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particular former commander Rabuka, Bainimarama tasted absolute power for 
the first time.37 For 37 days until the 4th of July, he retained executive authority. 
He was supported by a group of experienced and articulate military officers and 
senior civil servants that worked together as a team to give his rule credibility.
Let us now examine the actions and philosophy of that government. The 
Military Council that worked behind Bainimarama during the 37-day 
government was responsive to conflicting pressures. Although bound by the Fiji 
Constitution and by the Military Act Cap 81, the crisis had created a power 
vacuum into which the military stepped. A time limit of 30 days was set by the 
Council to bring the hostage crisis to an amicable solution. Ratu Epeli 
Nailatikau, the former military commander, had been proposed to head the 
military’s Council of Ministers and become interim Prime Minister. However, 
as the 30 day deadline neared, it was the unanimous decision of the Council and 
the Military Advisory Group that a person with better professional credentials 
and who could inspire civilian technocrats to right a flailing economy and 
articulate the military’s Indigenous Action Plan as demanded by the Speight 
Group was needed. Other members of the Council included Ratu Epeli Ganilau, 
as well as 1992-99 Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka, who was later requested by 
the Council to withdraw because of a conflict of political interest as he was the 
chair of the GCC and a former SVT Prime Minister. Rabuka later said he 
declined an offer by the Commodore to join the Military Council of advisers. “I
T O
declined because I felt the Council need people who are apolitical.”
Rabuka and Ganilau most influenced Bainimarama during his 37-day 
government and after his return to Fiji from Norway on the 21st of May. Both 
men had influence over an inexperienced and inarticulate Bainimarama. They 
were former military commanders who had entered the political arena straight 
after their terms as Commanders. Both were smarting from defeat in the May 
1999 elections. Rabuka’s nationalist SVT party had lost its hold on government 
to Chaudhry’s FLP coalition. Ganilau’s debut into politics with the VLV had 
been thwarted when he was defeated in the race for the Cakaudrove West Open 
constituency by Rabuka. Both men saw the Speight-generated crisis as a stage 
for regaining their lost political influence. The other officers on the Council
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included Major General Joji Konrote, Colonel Alfred Tuatoko and Colonel 
Ulaiasi Vatu. In addition to the Council a Military Advisory Group was formed 
of former senior officers headed by Colonel Jeremaia Waqanisau that acted as 
the think tank for the Council. The Military Council also co-opted a few well 
qualified technocrats to run the country during Bainimarama’s 37 day rule, 
including banker and financial adviser Laisenia Qarase39, Permanent Secretary 
of Finance Savenaca Narube, lawyer Alipate Qetaki, Public Service 
Commission Secretary Anare Jale and former diplomat and politician Berenado 
Vunibobo. This team of civilian administrators headed by Anare Jale acted as an 
advisory body. They were the intermediary between the military and other 
government Permanent Secretaries who had assumed executive powers in the 
civil service due to the stalemated political crisis.
The first meeting between George Speight’s group and the RFMF officers 
occurred on the 30th of May 2000. The RFMF negotiations team consisted of 
Colonel Alfred Tuatoko (Land Force Commander), Lt Col Sam Raduva (Chief 
of Staff Land Force Command), Lt Col Filipo Tarakinikini (Chief Staff Officer 
Logistics and Military Spokesman), and Major Etueni Caucau ( Director Army 
Legal Services). George Speight’s team consisted of Jim Silatolu, Meli Loki, 
Tevita Bukarau, Sereli Leweniqila, Jo Tuberi and Rakuita Vakalalabure. 
Speight’s group tabled their list of demands which included: 1) a pardon for 
those that abrogated the constitution, 2) the military executive council of 
advisers were to be free of people involved in the Alliance, Rabuka or Chaudhry 
governments, 3) other civilian Fijians were to be co-opted into the military 
executive council and 4) an interim administration be sworn- in before the 
hostages were released.40 The military’s negotiation team reported back to the 
Military Council who took on board these demands in selecting an interim 
administration. Differences began however, when Speight’s group wanted to 
include in the interim administration, people of its choice though not to the 
military’s liking.
Qarase and Military Interim Government
On the 13th of June at the Great Council of Chiefs meeting at Queen Elizabeth 
Barracks, the Interim Military Government - with Laisenia Qarase as its
137
spokesman - presented an Indigenous Affirmative Action Plan for endorsement 
by the GCC. The ex- banker had joined the military regime government on the 
9th of June. To digress, after the FLP Coalition government came to power in 
May of 1999, a senate committee for indigenous Fijians in business (where 
Senator Laisenia Qarase was a member) and a select committee on indigenous 
Fijian education were commissioned. This was in accordance with the social 
justice compact of the 1997 Constitution. These two committees’ findings and 
recommendations were to be the basis of the Military Council’s Blueprint for 
the protection of Fijian & Rotuman rights and interests (Blueprint) and later the 
20-year development plan (2001 -  2020) for the enhancement of participation 
of indigenous Fijians and Rotumans in the socio -  economic development of 
Fiji, commonly known as 20 Year Plan (20YP). These two documents were a 
holistic solution to Speight group’s list of demands. It was also hoped that this 
Blueprint would pave the way for the release of the hostages.
Table 3: Summary of the Blueprint proposals
C onstitu tion P rom u lgation  o f a p ro -in d ig en o u s con stitu tion  (such  as the 1990  
C onstitu tion );
Land T ransfer o f so m e  state land  to in d ig en o u s landow ners;
Land lease R evocation  o f the A gricu ltura l L andlord  and  T enants A ct 
(ALTA) w h ich  form ed  the basis o f agreem en t b etw een  
in d ig e n o u s  lan d  ow n ers and  Indo-Fijian farm ers to be rep laced  
b y the N a tiv e  L and T rust A ct (NLTA);
F ish in g  rights T ransfer o f o w n ersh ip  o f o ffshore areas (i qoliqoli) from  the state  
to lan d ow n ers;
L and com p en sation L and co m p en sa tio n  for la n d o w n ers w h o se  land  is u sed  for 
com m ercia l and  other purposes;
Fijian A d m in istration S tren gth en in g  the Fijian ad m in istra tion  and  G reat C ou n cil of 
C hiefs as in d ep en d en t in stitu tions;
Fijian trust E stab lish m en t o f a Fijian trust fu n d  to facilitate sa v in g  and  
in v estm en t for the in d ig en o u s com m unity;
Fijian fou n d ation E stab lish  a Fijian fo u n d a tio n  to carry o u t research into Fijian 
culture, la n g u a g e , eth n o-h istory  and  e th n o -g eo g ra p h y  and  m ake  
th ese  co m p u lso ry  subjects in  schools;
N a tio n a l sav in g E stab lish  co m p u lso ry  national sa v in g s  sch em e to finance  
in d ig en o u s b u sin ess and  education;
A ffirm ative action  la w E nactm ent o f an  affirm ative action  en ab lin g  law ;
M ineral royalty R ev iew  o f u n d erg ro u n d  m ineral and  w ater leg is la tio n  to increase  
royalty  for in d ig en o u s Fijians;
Tax exem p tion Enact an  en ab lin g  leg is la tio n  for tax ex em p tio n  for in d ig en o u s  
Fijian com p an ies;
L and adm in istration Im p ro v em en t o f serv ice  by NLTB and  N a tiv e  L ands and  
F isheries C om m ission ;
G o vern m en t assistan ce G o v ern m en t financial assistan ce for NLTB and  Fijian F lo ld in gs  
Ltd.
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Source: Blueprint, 2000
The policy of appeasement towards Speight’s demands diminished the status of 
the military and made it appear ambivalent. And It further weakened a lawless 
nation with a plummeting economy estimated at the time to have shrunk by nine 
per cent. Several officers wanted to uphold the integrity of the military by 
handing over to interim civilian caretaker government post haste and for the 
military to concentrate with the police on internal security operations. In truth, 
the majority of the officers were working as a team to contain George Speight’s 
group’s threat to the stability of the nation. The potential for ethnic loyalties to 
create splits was constrained by a deep sense of professionalism. Officers 
believed that the military had assumed too great a role in the governance of the 
country, at least for the stipulated time frame of 30 days. It was this sense of 
professionalism, and subordination to civilian authority, that ensured that -  once 
the threat to national security had passed -  officers and former officers advised 
the Commander to relinquish the reins of power to an interim civilian 
administration which was finally done on the Friday 28lh of July. This would 
not have been achieved had it not been for the successful raid and arrest of 
George Speight and some 400 of his group at Kalabu the previous morning.
In early June after several rounds of negotiations, the military were still at 
loggerheads with Speight’s Group given their shifting demands. Tensions were 
high on the 12th of June after soldiers fired on Speight’s motorcade which the 
rebel leader believed was an assassination attempt.41 Speight demanded a 
written apology from head of state Commodore Bainimarama for shots fired at 
two cars by soldiers after returning from a meeting with Ratu Josefa Iloilo, Ratu 
Jope Naucabalavu and GCC negotiator Ratu Epeli Kanaimawi. Military 
spokesman Lt Col Tarakinikini said it was an ‘unfortunate incident’42. To 
insiders in the military the incident was a timely reminder to Speight as to who 
the boss was.
By the 14th of June Bainimarama announced publicly that the military was on 
the verge of naming a civilian administration by the end of the week. He said the 
team would be made up of professional, competent and apolitical individuals.
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He added that George Speight and his group would not be part of any interim 
administration.43
On the 4th of July 2000 Bainimarama, at the urging of his Council, somewhat 
reluctantly handed over power to a civilian interim government headed by co­
opted member Laisenia Qarase. This was after the chiefs and people of Naitasiri 
province led by their paramount chief the Qaranivalu, Ratu Inoke Takiveikata, 
had marched to the Queen Elizabeth Barracks main entrance and demanded to 
meet with Bainimarama. They threatened the takeover of the barracks which sat 
on Naitasiri land if the military interim government did not hand back rule to the 
GCC which would then elect a President to form a civilian interim government.
Laisenia Qarase was sworn in as interim civilian government Prime Minister in 
a ceremony at the Queen Elizabeth Barracks, Nabua. He immediately 
announced a mini- budget in two weeks to address the shattered economy. His 
deputy was Ratu Epeli Nailatikau, the former Commander of the RFMF and also 
husband of Ratu Mara’s daughter Adi Koila, who was still a hostage inside 
parliament44. With the setting up of a civilian interim government under Qarase 
to deal with running the country and stabilizing the economy, the military was 
free to focus its attention on the security problem, and resolving the hostage 
stalemate that had risen with the George Speight group. However the refusal of 
the Military for Speight or any of his supporters to be included in any interim 
ministerial or other executive positions of government irked the rebel group.
Speight’s Group’s Destabilizing Activities
That afternoon at around 3:00 pm obviously in retaliation to the announcement 
of the military handing over to its installed civilian interim cabinet headed by 
Qarase, two soldiers on reconnaissance around the parliament complex, were 
spotted and chased by an angry horde of rebels. A gun battle ensued and lethal 
40mm grenade launchers were indiscriminately discharged by the rebel soldiers 
to provide covering fire for the mob against the soldiers of the 3ld Battalion on 
duty around the parliament complex. Five rebels were wounded (one later died) 
and fourteen other rebels taken into custody by police.45 Also that afternoon in a 
move that was obviously orchestrated from Speight’s group within Parliament, 
Major Ligairi’s grandson, Lieutenant Rupeni Vosayaco, and Lieutenant
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Valeniyasana claimed to have taken over the military in the northern town of 
Labasa46. Colonel Alfred Tuatoko and a negotiating team from RFMF 
headquarters Suva flew that same afternoon to Labasa to negotiate with the rebel 
officers who had command of the Sukanaivalu VC Barracks and its armoury47. 
However this proved unsuccessful as some northern chiefs and their people had 
started to enter the barracks and support the rebel officer’s cause by staging a 
protest sit in. A non-confrontational stance was taken by the negotiating team. 
Furthermore landowners also closed Waiqele airport in Labasa for three hours in 
support of the takeover at Sukanaivalu VC Barracks.
In the interior of Naitasiri at the Monasavu hydro-electric dam, a group of 
landowners disrupted the major power supply on Viti Levu by stopping the flow 
of water into the main station nearby. This in the ensuing weeks forced the Fiji 
Electricity Authority to limit power distribution because of the Monasavu
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shutdown which remained unresolved for weeks. From the 4 till the 10 of 
July numerous other destabilizing activities were orchestrated by Speight’s 
group from parliament such as: the takeover of Korovou town by reservist 
soldier and Speight’s relative Varinava Tiko and villagers, the kidnapping of Fiji 
Air pilots at Savusavu airport by Tevita Vakalalabure and his supporters, the 
burning of the Masonic Lodge and hostage taking at PAFCO Canning Factory 
Levuka, the takeover of a tourist resort on Turtle island, the roadblocks along 
the Queens Highway at Nabukavesi and the takeover of police stations at 
Savusavu, Seaqaqa and Tukavesi amongst others.
The Military responded to all these destabilizing activities nationally by 
declaring an exclusive military zone around parliament. Lt Col Filipo 
Tarakinikini in a press interview on Thursday the 6th of July rubbished rumours 
of a military strike on parliament. Tarakinikini said, ‘The imposition of this 
military zone will help the two parties focus more on a resolution”. The Decree 
signed by the Commander restricted supporters bringing in food and supplies 
and empowered the military to: order residents to vacate the area, temporarily 
acquire any land or building, prohibit entry of vehicles, aircrafts or vessels, 
restrict water, power, telecommunications etc, arrest and detain persons and do 
anything necessary for the purpose of the decree.49 This strong arm tactic 
worked. The rebels wanted to resume talks with the military and destabilizing
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activities around the country had galvanised people’s support for the military. 
Thus on the night of Friday the 7th July with Ratu Inoke Takiveikata, the 
Naitasiri high chief acting as mediator, the military suspended indefinitely the 
military exclusive zone around parliament.50
On the 10Ul of July, another break through deal was again brokered by 
Takiveikata between Bainimarama and Speight. It became known as the 
Muanikau Accord.51 Nevertheless, there were signs of uncertainty amongst the 
rebels: in particular, Major Ligairi - the security advisor who appeared to have 
assumed control at this stage -  dithered about whether to comply with the terms 
of the Accord. Major Ligairi even appealed to former Commander and his 
Cakaudrove chief Brigadier Ganilau in a meeting in a last effort attempt to lever 
favour for Speight’s cause with Commodore Bainimarama. On the 11th of July 
more disturbing news of rebel activities in Vanua Levu were received by 
military headquarters in Suva. After taking over the military’s Sukanaivalu VC 
barracks, rebel soldiers led by Lieutenants Vosayaco and Valeniyasana seized 
the police station in Labasa; five police officers were reportedly beaten and the 
town was held in terror by armed rebel soldiers. As if to reinforce Ligairi’s 
disquiet about the whole deal, that same night, villagers in his home province of 
Cakaudrove on Vanua Levu, seized the Savusavu police station and the nearby 
army depot. Also the same day in the Yasawas, rebel landowners captured a 
luxury island resort and locked up its owner Richard Evason.53
Another forty men from villagers around Seaqaqa Macuata province stonned 
and took over the Seaqaqa police station the same evening. These rebel groups 
said that they would give up the government facilities and resort once the 
Muanikau Accord was fully implemented.54 These rebel groups’ actions were 
obviously being coordinated by Major Ligairi from within Parliament complex 
Suva. As we shall see in Chapter Five, Speight’s potential to create further 
instability was far from over, and the signing of the Muanikau Accord had not 
ended his efforts to seize government authority in Fiji.
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Conclusion
This Chapter has examined the role of the Fiji military during the May 19th coup 
and its immediate aftermath. The George Speight coup was an event that 
profoundly re-shaped the thinking of senior officers and one that entailed a 
reorientation of the RFMF as a whole. This crisis was the genesis of the 
inversion of the Turaga-Bati relationship. In hindsight it has been depicted as 
a deliberate and concerted effort by the RFMF to tackle the destabilising forces 
of ethno-nationalism. In fact, RFMF action was driven by a set of pragmatic 
responses, first to the hostage crisis, and second to the widespread desire not to 
see the Labour coalition government restored, and third to the threat posed by 
the George Speight group to the integrity of the RFMF. Before the 19lh of May 
2000 and still by December 2006, the military remained a thoroughly ethnic 
Fijian institution, with a negligible number of Indo-Fijian soldiers. Claims of a 
multi-racialist orientation, and the historical appeal to the 2000 events as 
evidence of that preparedness to quash the forces of ethno-nationalism, were 
propaganda devised, in the later context of growing frictions with the Qarase 
government, to appeal to Indo-Fijians, domestic elites and overseas 
sympathisers.
What has surfaced with the Lt Col Jack Evans chaired Board of Investigation 
into the 1st Meridian Sqn takeover of parliament is the duplicity of intention and 
shirking of responsibility by Commodore Bainimarama. The finding by the 
board that, “whether the Commander RFMF had any control of the unit (IMS) 
could not be ascertained” is damning as Bainimarama himself refused to 
participate in the inquiry.55 From the investigation report it was established that:
1) Bainimarama personally brought Major Ligairi out of retirement 3 weeks 
before the coup. Ligairi guided the CRW troops into parliament and then was 
their leader in parliament.56
2) The RFMF supplied rations to the IMS soldiers throughout their time in 
Parliament.
3) The 1st Meridian Sqn soldiers continued to get paid throughout their time in 
parliament.
4) A senior officer took leave forms for the l sl Meridian Sqn soldiers in 
parliament to sign so they could be excused from normal duties.
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5) Bainimarama said he supported the aims of the coup in front of his officers.
6) The 1st Meridian Sqn continued to take arms out of the camp 36 hours after 
the coup.
7) Two separate officers informed Bainimarama there was going to be a coup.
8) The President Ratu Mara questioned Bainimarama whether it was wise to 
travel as there was a possibility of a coup.
9) Several of the senior military officers were sympathetic to the George Speight 
cause.
10) Bainimarama refused to appear before the Board of Inquiry.
During the hectic and rapidly shifting events of May-June 2000, institutional 
survival was the uppermost consideration for the majority of serving senior 
officers in the Land Force Command. Initially, there was considerable 
ambivalence and RFMF backing for a full-scale military coup was by no means 
out of the question. The RFMF might have chosen to support its 1st Meridian 
Sqn colleagues inside parliament. Provincial loyalties might have led people 
from the core rebel provinces like Naitasiri, Rewa and Tailevu to break ranks 
with those from other parts of the country. When Jo Savua and the Engineers 
regiment marched into parliament, there might have been a broader RFMF 
rallying to the George Speight cause. What the senior ranking officers could all 
agree on was that the crisis had to be handled patiently and carefully due to the 
hostage situation. The military in 2000, from being seen as ambivalent, came to 
be applauded as saving the nation . However it was more to do with 
institutional defence rather then the squashing of ethno-nationalism. In the 
immediate aftermath of the coup the issue of ethno-nationalism had to be treated 
sensitively within a predominantly Fijian institution.
The military’s ambivalence, stemmed from the military’s seeming accession to 
Speight’s changing demands and the Land Force Commander’s initial guidance 
of ‘no confrontation-no escalation’ adopted after his meeting the President Ratu
CO
Mara. However ultimately, the military held out against the hostage-takers and 
arrested and imprisoned George Speight and his supporters. As explained by 
military spokesman Tarakinikini after the signing of the Muanikau Accord, “The 
angle that they (international community) were coming from was they were 
trying to put a universal template on a solution, to this crisis. They wanted to
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treat it just like a straight-out hostage situation. But they did not appreciate what 
we saw. We understood our own people, our own culture, and that in time things 
would begin to clarify itself.”59 It was, as we will see in the next chapter, the 
formation of the Force Reserve Unit and the initiation of the Consecutive 
Internal Security Operations concept that played the crucial role in shifting the 
balance away from the George Speight group, and protecting the nation and 
integrity of the RFMF in 2000. The next chapter examines why George Speight 
became perceived by the RFMF senior command as a threat, and how the rebel 
forces around the country were suppressed. The chapter shows the bati now in 
the process of controlling internal security and subsequently national political 
affairs.
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Chapter 5
Why Speight’s Group Became a Threat to the Military
Introduction
The ousting of Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara as President and the declaration of martial 
law by Commodore Bainimarama on the 29lh of May 2000 transfonned the crisis into 
what was essentially a full scale military takeover, a second coup. George Speight, 
the leader of Fiji’s first civilian coup just eight days earlier complained, ‘Frank 
Bainimarama has couped me’.1 Mara’s removal or tu vaka tikitiki and Speight’s claim 
of ‘military injustice’ signifies the ascendency of the bati over the turaga. The 
military, partly by design but more so by accident, found itself in the process of 
ensconcing itself in Fiji’s politics.
On the 4th of July 2000 after 37 days in power, Bainimarama made a further unilateral 
announcement of a line up for a civilian interim government, headed by interim Prime 
Minister Laisenia Qarase. Speight and his supporters felt that the military had again 
upstaged their civilian takeover of the Chaudhry-led FLP Coalition government. The 
announcement triggered a gun battle that afternoon between soldiers and Speight’s 
supporters outside the Suva Parliamentary complex, in which six civilians were 
injured, with one later dying. This struggle for political ascendency in 2000 between 
the military and Speight’s group was to have a marked effect on Fiji’s political 
landscape for the next decade.
After the military moves undermined Speight’s quest for national political 
participation, the concern was that a nation-wide destabilizing backlash was being 
orchestrated. This nefarious campaign eventuated and was controlled from within 
parliament complex to pressure the military and its interim civilian government to 
accede to the group’s various political agendas. From the 4th to the 10th of July, 
Speight’s group coordinated a series of civil disturbances that almost crippled the 
country. Alarmingly, the rebels had also adopted a reinvented political ideology based 
on the Matanitu Vanua, or a nationalist government fused with a Christian belief 
system. This seemingly novel idea was appealing to Speight’s na'ive though growing 
band of supporters from the least developed areas in the interior of Viti Levu. Many 
opportunist chiefs had also joined the Speight bandwagon and had dredged up various 
historical grievances in particular land issues in sympathy with his ‘cause’.
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The first part of this chapter will review the military’s response to George Speight’s 
threat to national security and the events leading to the signing of the Muanikau 
Accord. The second part will look at the Bose ni Turaga and the Matanitu Vanua 
Government which became the adopted ideology for the Speight’s group’s political 
campaign. Part three will review the formation of the Military’s Force Reserve Unit. 
Part four will cover Speight’s arrest and the raid on his supporters at Kalabu. Part five 
will review the military’s nationwide clampdown.
Military Response
During the trying months after the parliament complex hostage takeover, senior 
military officers with years of international peacekeeping experience feared that inter 
and intra-communal violence could erupt locally. On the 5th of July, in a calculated
move the military, in response to Speight’s Group’s national destabilizing campaign,
2isolated the Parliamentary Complex by declaring a military exclusive zone around it. 
The aim was a tried and tested counter-insurgency move to isolate ‘the head from the 
body’. The military’s newly formed Force Reserve Unit (FRU), with the 3ld Battalion 
and Fiji Navy, were given the task of policing this zone. This strategy worked as 
Speight and his group holed up with the hostages in the parliament complex saw the 
ramifications and were forced to return to negotiations the day after.3
Muanikau Accord- an Uneasy Truce
The breakthrough created by talks on the suspension of the military exclusive zone 
around the parliament complex created the vital momentum needed to unlock the 
hostages crisis. For within 48 hours of getting the two parties talking, Naitasiri 
Paramount chief Ratu Inoke Takiveikata brokered the Muanikau Accord between 
Speight and Bainimarama on Sunday the 9th of July.4 The Accord called for the 
release of the hostages, and the securing of all military weapons from the rebel 
soldiers in return for full amnesty of the hostage takers. Initially it seemed the 
military had come out the losing party. The Speight group had become emboldened 
by its ‘victory’ after the signing ceremony at the Vice President Ratu Iloilo’s 
residence at Muanikau. That night with joyous singing of hymns, Speight and his 
group marched triumphantly back to the Parliament complex at Veiuto, half a 
kilometre away. There were still reservations within the Speight camp, especially 
from security advisor Major Ligairi, that the military would keep their word. It
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seemed Ligairi had reasoned that without any of Speight’s group appointed to the 
interim civilian government, their fight for their cause was not achieved. In a move 
reminiscent of Rabuka’s attempt to further legitimize his coup and inhibit the 
authority of the provincial chiefs of the Great Council of Chiefs, Speight’s group 
looked to convene a Bose ni Turaga (BNT) comprising chiefs of districts or tikinas.
Bose ni Turaga and Matanitu Vanua
On Wednesday the 12th of July, some 200 lesser chiefs of the BNT assembled at the 
Parliament complex with High Commissioner to Malaysia Adi Samanunu Cakobau as 
chief guest. This conglomeration of lesser chiefs integral to the grass root functions of 
Fijian society was first used by Rabuka to strengthen his Fijian supremacist political 
agenda. Speight and his supporters were hoping to use the BNT as a similar forum 
because the GCC was seen as siding with the military and its installed Qarase led 
interim administration. On the agenda of this BNT meeting was the setting up of a 
commission of enquiry to investigate anti- Fijian activities of the ousted People’s 
Coalition government and the concept of a Fijian administration to include the issue 
of sovereignty.5 Speight’s cause had now taken on a political ideology based on post- 
Christian Fijian sovereignty and Methodism’s doctrinal harmonizing of the Matanitu 
Vanua. This thinking was based on an academic working thesis that reconciled and 
reconstructed Fijian post-Christian Sovereignty as practiced by Ratu Cakobau with 
the Methodists’ connexional government.6 The sentencing of Ratu Mara Kapaiwai, 
Ratu Cakobau’s cousin and antagonistic rival, to the gallows in 1859 as sanctioned by 
high chiefs in the presence of Methodist ministers points to the existence of such a 
government.
General Manager of the Native Lands Trust Board, Maika Qarikau, also briefed the 
convened BNT on the deed of sovereignty concept. This was a sticking point with 
nationalists who took umbrage that national sovereignty was not returned to Fiji’s 
high chiefs at Independence as they had ceded the country to Great Britain. A 
Matanitu Vanua government as promoted by Qarikau would utilize its own land 
resources independent of central government. In convening the BNT, the Speight 
group’s immediate aim was obvious. This meeting was purposefully timed to 
legitimize Speight’s Matanitu Vanua government and to challenge the military’s 
interim civilian government and Great Council of Chiefs meeting to be held the 
following day to select an interim President and Vice President at the Military
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barracks in Suva. Even the 1st Meridian Squadron’s entire cache of arms, ammunition 
and general Special Forces equipment were put on display at the Parliament Complex 
to impress the chiefs and general public who had gathered for the BNT.
To national relief, on Thursday the 13th of July Speight and his group kept to their 
side of the bargain. A bearded and frail Prime Minister Chaudhry and the remaining 
26 hostages were released much to the elation of their families and party stalwarts. 
Concurrently, the GCC had assembled at Queen Elizabeth Barracks and selected Ratu 
Iloilo the incumbent Vice President as interim President and Ratu Jope Seniloli 
(Speight’s choice for President) as his Vice President. That same morning, the FRU 
in a show of force had convoyed through Suva and was positioned on the highest 
conspicuous feature, the Tamavua Reservoir, the whole day to ensure Speight kept his 
word. After the return of CRW weapons from Speight’s group on Friday night the 
14th of July,8 (where some 27 weapons were found to be unaccounted for) hopes were 
high that the over 400 Speight supporters in Parliament, would vacate the premise 
immediately for their villages. This was not the case as the supporters rallied for the 
next four days and even held a full burial ceremony in the Parliament Complex 
grounds for the young villager from Namara, Tailevu, who was fatally wounded 
during the shoot out of the 4th of July.
In the coming days, through intermediaries such as the Police Commissioner and 
Ratu Takiveikata, Speight engaged the interim President in his choice for the interim 
cabinet line-up. For the military, Speight and his group, with his military advisors 
such as former Lieutenant Colonels Metuisela Mua, Tevita Bukarau and Rusiate 
Korovusere and his operational commanders such as Majors Savua and Ligairi, had 
become a formidable threat to the national security of the country. Speight and his 
lieutenants were now moving around in armed convoys with the intention of 
participating in the running of the country with the interim military installed civilian 
government. The group’s nationalistic Matanitu Vanua government based on a deed 
of sovereignty involving the church, the chiefs, the Fijian people and their land, was 
being set up and was gaining momentum in competition with the military installed 
interim government.
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George Speight’s Political Campaign
On Wednesday the 19lh of July, George Speight and some 500 of his supporters 
abandoned parliament in a convoy of buses after wilful acts of looting and vandalism. 
The once esteemed pristine complex was left a burning, stinking mess. They 
continued their seemingly victorious political crusade and moved base to Kalabu 
Fijian School at the invitation of Ratu Inoke Takiveikata. Helpless road side vendors 
at Kalabu market were robbed of their produce by the unruly mob as their convoy 
rumbled by. Speight’s agenda would inevitably clash with the military’s endeavours 
of taking the nation forward with its installed interim government under the GCC- 
nominated President Ratu Josefa Iloilo. In the following days, as the military 
attempted to work in tandem with the GCC in consolidating an interim government, 
trouble was brewing. During the 56 day hostage crisis, the military came under heavy 
criticism for being powerless, impotent and even clueless in freeing the hostages. Its 
appeasement policy of ‘we support the goals but not the methods’ was seen as 
kowtowing to Speight’s ethno-nationalist agenda. What was little known was that the 
military until about the first week in July, did not have a military option for the rescue 
of the hostages, or even a national internal security response to protracted rebel 
criminal activities as the situation deteriorated.
The RFMF’s Force Reserve Unit
The change from the military’s policy of appeasement to measured military 
engagement was triggered because of the Speight group’s numerous changing 
demands in negotiations in the month of June9. A special Force Reserve Unit of the 
RFMF was raised on the 27th of June 2000 as instructed by the Land Force 
Commander Colonel Tuatoko on approval from Commodore Bainimarama. This 
force was raised because the assessment I reached with Tuatoko and Tarakinikini was 
that a) a military option had to be planned for in light of Speight’s erratic demands 
and in the event of hostages being killed b) the military was losing the operational 
initiative in as far as internal security and that c) the police force’s integrity had been 
totally undermined by armed rebels. The Commander’s intent was that the force was 
to be held in reserve and engage decisively on deployment. It had to have experience 
and toughness as deployment in rugged terrain was envisaged.
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The unit was within days fashioned into a force with soldiers from Nadi and 
Lautoka’s 3ld Battalion’s rifle companies and Suva-based units, especially from the 
Engineers Regiment. Its base headquarters was set up at the Engineers Headquarters 
at the lower camp Queen Elizabeth Barracks. A scaled model of the parliament 
complex was constructed and daily intelligence was gleaned and briefings held on the 
hostages and the general security situation layout in parliament with assault 
commanders. Released FLP Coalition parliamentarians were interviewed in 
constructing an armed assault rescue plan of the hostages. Assault routes and 
approaches to each target within the parliament complex were planned and rehearsed 
with backup options. At the height of its internal operations, the unit had pooled some 
20 vehicles of all shapes with an array of military automatic arms that included rocket 
grenade launches and general purpose machine guns. Stun grenades and tear gas 
canisters were issued per section commander and close combat and fighting in built 
up areas with gas masks were drilled into the unit. The unit also had a team of snipers 
and military engineer demolitions experts. Infantry company strength live firing battle 
drills were rehearsed at the firing range at Vatuwaqa and in the Macuata and Naitasiri 
Provinces live jungle lane shoots were conducted.
A FRU team of snipers was deployed to Levuka town on the island of Ovalau to 
reinforce the resident 3ld Battalion section as a result of rebels burning the 125 year 
old Polynesian Masonic Lodge and taking over the Pacific Fishing Company 
cannery..10 Several rebels and a CRW soldier were eventually taken into custody. On 
Monday the 17th of July 2000 the FRU, now code named Gideon Force, carried out 
its first armed operation with the planned storming and rescue of prison wardens. 
Some 30 prison wardens were held hostage at gun point for four days by hardened 
prisoners led by notorious criminals Nimilote Nimacere and Aiyaz Ali, at Naboro 
Maximum Prison.11 This hostage taking was initiated by George Speight’s Group 
from parliament to create fear in the general public at large and put pressure on the 
military and GCC as to its choice of President. This was a similar ploy used by the 
Taukei Movement in the 1987 coup mass Naboro prison breakout. The use of the 
FRU in this rescue operation was censored in the news media for security reasons. 
The success of this operation raised the stature of this unit within the military, with 
the prisons department and the police force as a capable internal security force able to 
take on the difficult armed rescue operations in a standoff situation.
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Speight’s Arrest and the Kalabu Raid
The release of the 26 FLP parliamentary hostages allowed the military freedom to 
deal with Speight’s group on a military level. On the 26lh of July the political 
situation unbeknown to the nation had finally come to a head for the military and a 
marked change in stance towards Speight and his group was adopted. Their blatant 
opposition was untenable to the military that was trying to return the country to the 
rule of law through an interim civilian government. Speight and his group were 
pressuring Ratu Iloilo, the President, to reconsider the military’s civilian government 
ministerial line up to include his supporters.14 The President was also cautioned by 
the Commander that if he did accept Speight’s choices then the military would not 
support such a compromised government. What also forced the military’s hand was 
that Speight’s Kalabu camp was being used to train a rebel youth army. The rebel 
camp had also harboured escaped prisoners who were in cahoots and known to be 
engaged in criminal activities in the neighbouring suburbs with impunity.15
This national security and criminal impasse had been monitored with growing alarm 
by the military and police. On the evening of the 26th of July, the operational order 
was given by the Land Force Commander for the FRU to clamp down. Their first 
mission was to sever the centre of gravity of the group which was its leadership and 
command group and their main base at Kalabu. Speight and his entourage in two 
vehicles were arrested on the night of the 26Ul July 2000 on Kalabu Bridge. In the 
following hours, other Speight Group leaders were arrested from all over the nation. 
At first light on the morning of the 27th of July 2000, the Force Reserve Unit of the 
military raided Kalabu Fijian School arresting some 400 of Speight’s followers 
including females. One known asthmatic person died as a result of the tear gas used in 
the operation and soldier Sapper Alifereti Nainoca suffered a gunshot wound in the 
melee that ensued. A few missing weapons and all sorts of stolen goods were 
recovered. Four of the thirteen prisoners who had escaped from Naboro were 
captured during the raid, although notorious armed criminals such as Nimacere and 
Semesa Roko escaped after harbouring with the group.16
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As a result of the Kalabu raid and the rebel leader’s arrest, the threat of Speight and 
his group meddling in the affairs of the civilian interim government were negated at 
least for the time being. On the afternoon of Friday the 28th of July an interim civilian 
government was finally sworn in of those technocrats the military deemed capable 
and apolitical. The majority of these officials later stood and won as members of the
1 7SDL party in the August 2001 elections.
Military Nation-Wide Clampdown
After the Kalabu raid, the enormous public backing for the military was evident. To 
seize the initiative gained and sustain the positive momentum the military then came 
up with the Consecutive Internal Security Operations (CISO) concept that was to be 
adopted nationally. This concept required the Force Reserve Unit to conduct raids on 
known rebel areas beginning with the north in Vanua Levu and then Viti Levu in 
consecutive moves, one area at a time. The lack of military logistic support for 
national scale operations was glaring, e.g. transportation both road and sea. Hence the 
option of the military conducting Multiple Internal Security Operations (MISO) using 
all its units nationally was ruled out for a more cautious sustainable approach. The 
threat of armed opposition using missing or stolen military weapons was a major 
constraint that dictated the tempo of operations. Besides, the better part of a container 
load of Russian military weapons smuggled into the country during the 1987 coup 
had not been recovered and was believed to be in public circulation.
Following the 26th of July arrest of George Speight and the raid on Kalabu, the 
retaking of the rebel held Military barracks in Labasa was an operational priority. 
Security forces morale was low in the north and public confidence in the military 
needed to be regained. Furthermore two foreign pilots were held hostage briefly 
when their airplane was seized at the Savusavu airport on Vanua Levu. Other 
destabilizing activities were numerous. Reports of Speight supporters seizing 
government and police stations and Indo-Fijian farms, and burning cane fields in 
Vanua Levu were in retaliation to the military raid at Kalabu on 27lh of July.
The decision was made to deploy to Vanua Levu at the soonest and training and 
preparations were stepped up into the night at Queen Elizabeth Barracks Suva. 
Special blue arm bands were made and issued to all FRU soldiers prior to embarking 
for Vanua Levu. These were to be worn on armed engagement with rebel soldiers
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reported to be still in military uniform from the northern Sukanaivalu VC Barracks 
Labasa.
In the early morning under cover of darkness on the 3ld of August the FRU embarked 
at Natovi jetty Tailevu North on a chartered roll-on-roll-off inter island ferry with all 
its vehicles and supplies aboard. Disembarking at Nabouwalu jetty Bua Province 
around llOOhrs the unit began rolling up the Nabouwalu-Labasa main road
1 o
immediately so as to capitalise on the element of surprise. That afternoon in 
coordination with local police, the unit swept through to Dreketi government station, 
Nakanacagi village, Seaqaqa settlement and to Labasa town in search and arrest 
operations of civil disturbance suspects. One armed mute villager who was part of a 
rebel group that had invaded and terrorised an Indian farmer’s residence including 
killing his farm animals was caught red handed. On arrest he had escaped armed with 
a .22 rifle and in the melee to recapture him, the notorious mute was shot and 
evacuated by military ambulance to Labasa Hospital.19 As numerous arrests were 
made, the convoy of vehicles increased and government vehicles were 
commandeered to transport rebels to Labasa police station. On the sweep up to 
Labasa town, a couple of rebel soldiers were apprehended including a rebel district 
chief in stolen vehicles fleeing Labasa that same evening. On entering Labasa that 
night, the FRU placed a cordon around the town and set up road blocks at both ends 
of the town at Vulovi and Nasekula. The results were instant as Lieutenant 
Valeniyasana and several rebel soldiers, caught by the speed of operations, were 
arrested that evening, and were unaware of the FRU presence.
That night the Sukanaivalu VC barracks was freed from rebel soldiers’ hands. The 
next day operations spread over to Cakaudrove via the Labasa-Savusavu Highway 
and the Hibiscus Highway to Loa in Buca Bay. Villagers from Major Ligairi’s village 
of Nabalebale in the Wailevu district who were largely active with Lieutenant 
Vosayaco, their kinsman, were arrested for road blocks and other civil disturbance 
charges. In operations over a week over three hundred Speight supporters and fifty 
five soldiers were rounded up including the key rebel officers and chiefs.
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Map 4. Vanua Levu-RFMF Force Reserve Unit Deployment Areas
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In the early morning of the 8th 01 August 2000 in Sawani, Naitasiri province a 
deliberate armed ambush by notorious criminal Nimilote Nimacere and his group 
killed soldier Private Joela Weleilakeba and policeman Corporal Raj Kumar.“  This 
was retribution for the Kalabu raid as Nimacere and group including a former CRW 
soldier had slipped out during the arrest operation with a few of the military’s missing 
arms.
The Force Reserve Unit was hastily withdrawn from Vanua Levu to hunt these killers 
down. Other known Speight group rebels who had escaped from Kalabu had 
sabotaged the Monasavu Hydro-electric dam and were hiding in the highlands of 
Naitasiri. The Unit on disembarking at Natovi jetty spent its first night at Vunidawa 
government station in upper Naitasiri. We were then briefed on the situation by police 
and provincial officials. The next day the FRU moved into the upper Naitasiri area 
with elements of the 3ld Battalion from Suva. Immediately with this show of force, 
the Monasavu Hydro-electric dam was secured and villagers arrested. Simultaneously
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negotiations ensued with dam landowners as to their long held grievances which 
culminated in a $50 million payout.23 In the following weeks a joint police, military 
and prisons department search ensued and a public relations campaign launched in the 
upper Naitasiri, Wainibuka, and Western Viti Levu areas from a temporary military 
base at Wainavau Wainimala district.
This operation was somewhat reminiscent of the 1874 pacification campaign of hill 
tribes in the same head water areas of the Wainimala and Wainibuka rivers. To the 
military it seems these descendants of proud and egalitarian highlanders were as 
rebellious and independent as their forbearers. Known areas of Speight support were 
surveillanced and at least thirty rebel individuals including two escaped prisoners and 
two Sawani ambush suspects were arrested. Long range patrols were conducted 
through the Nadarivatu Plateau, Tavua, Ba, Lautoka and the Nausori Highlands to 
Nadi. Nimacere was pursued in jungle terrain around Nadovu village, Wainimala, but 
escaped the dragnet with the help of sympathetic villagers. The armed fugitive was 
later fatally shot whilst trying to escape a joint Military and Police search operation in 
Nadonumai settlement, outside Suva. Another temporary FRU base was set up in the 
village of Rokovuaka Nalawa Ra in pacification operations along the Wainibuka 
River and Sawakasa district in Tailevu North the heartland of George Speight 
supporters.
Map 5. Viti Levu
Force Reserve Unit Deployment Areas
159
By mid-August of 2000, all rebel areas were pacified and military operations were 
scaled down as Speight and his group as well as the majority of his supporters nation­
wide were being brought before the courts. The military had triumphed and was even 
more feared, as its will had prevailed through successful internal security operations.
The 1st Meridian Squadron members who had been part of Speight’s group were 
taken back into the military as part of the 3ld battalion pending a military board of 
investigation. It was then decided by the Commander that the 1st Meridian Squadron 
be immediately disbanded. A qualified trauma expert, Father Makario Waqanivalu 
was called in to counsel all officers and soldiers and especially the errant rebel 
soldiers who had gone through these stressful months. As a result of these nation­
wide clampdown operations from July to August of 2000, 3500 people were being 
investigated, 2115 had been charged and produced before the court, 704 had already 
been found guilty,99 had been sentenced to jail, 97 were given suspended sentences, 
45 were fined and 461 on bound over or acquitted.24
Despite the internal security crisis during these months, the military was still able to 
rotate troops for Peacekeeping duties to East Timor, Lebanon and Sinai to the credit 
of the institution. By December of 2000, another two hundred new recruits were only 
too eager to join the ranks from over two thousand applications.
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Conclusion
This chapter has looked at the role of the Fiji military during the unsettling months of 
July to mid-August 2000 as a result of the 19th of May Speight coup. The focus is on 
a period during the George Speight coup when the Fiji Military senior officers 
underwent a re-shaping in thinking which partly accounts for what is presently 
happening in Fiji politics today. During this time the military underwent a process 
that transformed the Turaga-Bati relationship. The time honoured role of the bati 
being subservient to the turaga was being redefined. The military had deposed 
President Mara, got the GCC to back its interim administration and its choice for 
President, and held Speight’s supporters in check. Speight and his supporters had 
become emboldened by the apparent appeasement policy of the military and were 
bent on creating national havoc in order to force their intentions and political choices 
on a divided nation. The RFMF role in the 2000 coup was not directed at tackling 
ethno-nationalism, but was driven by a set of pragmatic responses, first to the hostage 
crisis, second to the possible restoration of the Labour coalition government restored, 
and third to threats to the military as an institution.
Institutional survival was very much the consideration uppermost in the minds of the 
majority of serving senior officers in Land Force Command at the time even though 
ambivalence prevailed in the opening days of the coup partly due to the hostage 
situation. It was the creation of the Force Reserve Unit that gave the military freedom 
for swift internal security action. This military capability also translated to a tougher 
negotiations and political bargaining footing that played a crucial role in protecting 
the integrity of the RFMF in 2000. There were overwhelming sighs of relief from 
within the military and the national and international community with the successful 
raid on Kalabu. As news got out, bouquets of flowers and get well cards from local 
embassies were showered on the injured soldier, Sapper Alifereti Nainoca, who took 
part in the raid. The existence of the FRU gave the military an operational capability 
previously unavailable to back the Commander Commodore Bainimarama’s tough 
rhetoric and negotiating stand with Speight4s group. The speed with which the 
military counter-attacked and regained Queen Elizabeth barracks, in less than six 
hours after fifty CRW soldiers mutinied and attacked on the 2 Nov 2000(to be 
discussed in a later chapter) is credited to the existence and professionalism of this 
unit on that day.
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As a political doctrine ethno-nationalism continued to flourish. George Speight’s 
Group leaders went on to form the Conservative Alliance Matanitu Vanua (CAMV) 
party with a reinvented political doctrine. The Star of David symbol of the party 
encapsulates its Judeo-Christi an biblical fusion with nationalist political adaptations. 
To prove its indigenous political potency especially on Vanua Levu and Tailevu 
North, the CAMV party won 6 seats in the 2001 elections with George Speight even 
winning his seat from prison. This is proof of the power of this multifarious 
indigenous political movement that sprang up during the 2000 crisis and stretched the 
Fiji Military to its fullest capacity. Crucially, CAMV held the balance of power in the 
Qarase SDL government after the 2001 elections. The military’s strongest opponents 
were in a key position to influence government policy, and the consequence was the 
precipitation of an ongoing feud between the government and the military. 
Commodore Bainimarama had tasted power and undergone a huge learning curve in 
military command during the period covered especially the 37 days he assumed 
authority as President and Head of State. This was emblematic of the nineteenth 
century Vunivalu’s usurpation of the Roko Tui Bau, an event now re-enacted in 
another form in the early 21st century.
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Chapter 6
The 2nd of November 2000 Military Mutiny at Queen Elizabeth
Barracks, Suva, Fiji
Introduction
The mutiny by members of the military’s 1st Meridian Squadron formerly the 
Counter-Revolutionary Warfare Unit (CRWU), shook the very foundation of 
Fiji’s well-disciplined and tight knit military. Around mid-day Thursday the 2nd 
of November 2000, the Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) was tom apart 
in a bloody armed struggle as opposing forces vied for control of Queen 
Elizabeth Barracks (QEB). On one side were rebel soldiers of the Meridian 
Squadron sympathetic to a nationalist agenda which the military for months had 
counteracted. On the other were the loyalist forces that upheld Westminster 
military professionalism. Late that afternoon in a counter assault, loyalists 
liberated QEB, the headquarters of the RFMF. This action recast the military 
from being an ambivalent agent of Fijian nationalism, to the nemesis of the 
forces of ethno-nationalist politicians and chiefs. The harrowing ordeal saw 
eight soldiers killed and more than twenty eight others wounded. In a military 
court martial fifty six perpetrators were sentenced to jail for their crimes.
Photo 5. Commodore Bainimarama laying wreath at mutiny memorial service on 02 Nov 2007. 
Loyalist soldiers killed that day were Pte Temo R Veilewai, Pte Osea Rokosirinavosa and Cpl 
Simione Rawaileba. Image: Fiji Times.
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The military misadventure was inextricably linked to George Speight’s May 
2000 coup of Chaudhry’s government. Speight and his band of elite troopers had 
stormed parliament taking Coalition parliamentarians hostage and hoping for 
support from the senior military hierarchy. As previously mentioned, military 
ambivalence prevailed as the military adopted a no-confrontation, no-escalation 
policy. The military’s complicity with the coupists, its role as the ultimate 
guarantor of security for the state and the mediating power broker role it took 
on, were among the factors that led to the mutiny. The role of Naitasiri’s high 
chief titled the Qaranivalu in the mutiny further reveals the influence of the 
Turaga-Bati relationship as discussed in previous chapters. Ratu Takiveikata 
was later jailed for his part in the mutiny as revealed by mutiny leader Captain 
Shane Stevens.
In part one we examine the 1st Meridian Squadron and the political and military 
issues that led the unit to mutiny including the key actors involved. In part two 
we examine the operational and tactical aspects of the mutiny and the counter 
offensive that was hastily coordinated as the events unfolded.
The CRW Unit -1st Meridian Squadron
In May 1987 after carrying out his coup, Rabuka had established a unit known 
as Sierra Company. The unit had operatives conducting surveillance on 
dissidents to his coup and suspects capable of destabilizing the then interim 
government. A former Fiji senior non-commissioned officer (SNO) in the 
British Air Services (SAS) Ilisoni Ligairi was recruited. He was promoted to 
Major to transform Sierra Company to what became known as the Counter- 
Revolutionary Warfare Unit (CRWU), and later 1st Meridian Squadron. In the 
1997 Defence White Paper, the role of the CRW is stated under ‘Internal 
Threats’ paragraph 7.14 as:
Presently in Fiji the Force assigned to study, train and conduct counter terrorist 
operations is the Counter Revolutionary Warfare Unit of the RFMF. It is equipped to 
carry out specialized aspects of the national counter terrorist operation at times when 
conventional police capabilities are no longer appropriate and in rare emergencies, only 
after specific authorization by cabinet. 1
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From its inception the unit was run secretively with its own administration, 
training and logistics cadre controlled by Ligairi. According to the Evans Report 
in 2000, even the Unit’s Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) remained secret.2 
Major Ligairi had virtually created a private army only accountable to the 
Commander RFMF.
A mutiny is defined as an open rebellion against authority especially by 
members of the armed forces against their officers. Lammers defines three types 
of mutinies: the promotion of interests movement, the secession movement and 
the seizure of power movement. The aim of this mutiny was to seize military 
and political power from Commodore Bainimarama. In what is essentially a 
close knit force how did this sad episode in Fiji’s proud military history happen?
By the end of October 2000, coup front man George Speight and others alleged 
to be key supporters were detained on Nukulau Island, off Suva, facing treason 
charges. Seven of the elite Meridian Squadron soldiers who had taken part in the 
takeover of parliament and the subsequent hostage taking of the Coalition 
government parliamentarians were also incarcerated. This allowed Laisenia 
Qarase’s interim government, supported by the military and the country’s 
indigenous Great Council of Chiefs, freedom in steering the country back to 
democracy.
The discernible reason for the mutiny was that it was executed as retribution for 
the arrest and incarceration of George Speight and his supporters who had 
overthrown the Labour Coalition government. Speight and his group had been 
arrested in a military raid on the 27th of July at Kalabu outside of Suva. This 
military operation in effect dismantled Speight’s nationalist movement’s 
attempts to be part of the interim government.
According to one media report, a Meridian Squadron soldier said the mutiny 
was led by some of the rebel members who took over Parliament and who were 
recently released by the army.4 The soldier was quoted as saying:
We felt betrayed by Bainimarama. When the Muanikau Accord was signed, we gave up 
our weapons in good faith. We had nothing to do with the weapons that went missing 
and we thought he would honour the agreement. Instead look at what they did to those 
who were in Parliament. We were not happy with the way the military treated the 
civilians, especially those at Kalabu.5
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Grievance or Conspiracy?
After the signing of the Muanikau Accord between Speight and Bainimarama, 
members of the Meridian Squadron who had been part of Speight’s group were 
posted to the 3ld Battalion under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Viliame 
Seruvakula. Though they still had the use of their separate offices and barrack 
facilities.
On the afternoon of Thursday the 26th of October, in a traditional reconciliation
ceremony seven days before the fateful mutiny occurred, Captain Shane Stevens
and rebel Squadron soldiers presented their matanigasau to Bainimarama,
Seruvakula and myself, in the 3ld Battalion operations room. The rebel members
of the Squadron, in taking over parliament had sought forgiveness of their
misdeeds in traditional Fijian fashion. This was accepted by the Commodore
Bainimarama in true ‘prodigal son’ reconciliatory manner. The Commander,
however, made it clear to the elite soldiers that the Squadron was to be
disbanded. All Squadron soldiers hence came under command of the 3ld
Battalion. During the days preceding the mutiny the healing and forgiving
process was generally thought to have been well received by the errant
Squadron soldiers as friendships were re-established back in barracks. In
hindsight, however, the announcement by the Commander had triggered deep
resentment within the Squadron and some senior officers who had not wanned
to Bainimarama’s leadership. Colonel Jeremaia Waqanisau in the Evans Board
of Investigation Report had alluded to this state of resentment by asserting, “An
army officer must always be the commander of the RFMF.”6 Lt Col Meli
Saubulinayau, also in the investigation, went further to state, “We did not like
the Commander because he was from the Navy. That is a simple fact. The
majority of the green unifonn guys did not like him.”7 Such resentments
commonly exist in military establishments. As stated by Lammers:
For instance, there used to be a controversy in the British Navy between gentlemen and 
officers risen from the ranks. Captain Bligh of the Bounty rose from the ranks, while 
Fletcher Christian, the master’s mate who led the mutineers was a gentleman; the status 
inconsistency between this commanding officer and his subordinate may very well have 
been a factor in the ensuing mutiny.8
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Bainimarama had risen from the naval ranks whilst army officers like Captain 
Shane Stevens, the mutiny leader, and Col Ulaiasi Vatu and Lt Col Filipo 
Tarakinikini who were accused by Stevens of being associated with the mutiny 
were Sandhurst-trained officers.
Coincidently, in the days prior to the mutiny, the military’s Strategic Command 
Headquarters consisting of a staff of about 20 senior officers and senior non­
commissioned officers co- located with Land Force Command at QEB moved 
out to their new location at Berkeley Crescent in Suva’s Domain area. Officers 
who were not approving of Commodore Bainimarama’s appointment as 
Commander had been posted to this higher headquarters conveniently away 
from soldiers. In hindsight, some senior officers may have been forewarned of 
the ominous plot and this move preceding the mutiny remains suspicious.
Was the mutiny a conspiracy to arrest or even assassinate the Commander, 
essentially another coup? There were various media versions of the mutiny. 
Military spokesman Major Howard Politini, in an interview a day later, said, 
“We believe they were going to get the commander one way or the other. The 
message seemed that they were not happy with the commander for planning to 
disband the Squadron.”9
Politini then revealed that during the mutiny the military refused to listen to any 
demands from the rebels and so did not know what their wider aims may have 
been and whether they had been aiming also to free Speight. Politini also 
strongly rejected claims from New Zealand Foreign Minister Phil Goff that 
former military spokesman Filipo Tarakinikini, a former founding officer of the 
Squadron and senior military spokesman, was behind the mutiny. Tarakinikini 
in a press release denied this accusation. He and Ulaiasi Vatu of Strategic 
Command Headquarters were cleared in a mutiny inquiry a few months later 
after being accused by mutiny leader Captain Shane Stevens as co-conspirators. 
Politini said during the mutiny rebels were talking to the press on a mobile 
phone “and we are investigating that angle.” Politini earlier told Radio Fiji the 
rebel soldiers attacked unarmed and defenceless people working in their offices, 
"firing indiscriminately" as they attempted to take over the camp. He said, 
“Loyal troops were now trying to capture all "those who perpetrated this terrible 
incident against their comrades”. Radio Fiji reported the rebel target was to
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seize Commodore Frank Bainimarama.10 Suva’s FM96 Radio on the day 
reported Commodore Bainimarama was rushed from the camp by eight 
bodyguards, coming out through the bushes and being sped away in a four- 
wheel drive vehicle.
Mutiny Five Hours on the Brink
Thursday the 2nd of November was like any other normal working day at 
National Operations Centre (NOC) Queen Elizabeth Barracks. I had held the 
appointment of Chief Staff Officer Operations (CSO Ops) since the restructure 
of the military headquarters in August of 1999. I was in charge of the every day 
running of the NOC and had arrived at 0745 hrs at my office. The NOC had 
controlled and monitored the RFMF’s Land Forces units to include its 
international peacekeeping operations. It was the nerve centre of Land Forces 
operations consisting of a signals communications centre, an operations and 
duty officer room, the intelligence cell, the plans office, the operations staff 
offices and the Force Reserve Unit office. The Force Reserve was a new unit 
established as its name signified in late June 2000 as a response to the threat of 
George Speight and his supporters getting out of hand. On settling into my 
office, I sorted through the routine in-tray correspondence to read the last 24 
hours operational situation report and information brief that included national 
news items of interest. This had been prepared by the night duty operations and 
intelligence officers. I noted that the 3ld Battalion’s rifle companies were still out 
doing live ammunition firing exercise and training at Balenabelo range in the 
upper Sigatoka Valley, Nadroga.
Also that morning, I was briefed that Father Makario Waqanivalu had members 
of Meridian Squadron undergoing a post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) 
rehabilitation session at the 3ld Battalion’s headquarters lecture room. Father 
Makario was a well qualified PTSD psychologist who had also dealt with such 
cases in the Bougainville and Solomon Islands conflict. At around 0700hrs that 
morning, unbeknown to NOC, a section of Meridian Squadron soldiers was 
detailed by Captain Shane Stevens, the leader of the mutiny group, to clean 
Squadron weapons that were held at the main QEB armoury. These weapons 
were thought to be the total unit’s holding. Most of these weapons were taken 
into parliament during the hostage crisis and were now kept in the main armoury
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as opposed to the Squadron’s armoury. Little was it known, that Squadron 
troopers had hidden arms and ammunition in their barracks in anticipation for 
this day.
At around 1200hrs, I joined other soldiers at the Rabuka Hall for an aerobic 
exercise session for about 45 minutes during lunch break. Lt Colonel Orisi 
Rabukawaqa, the Chief Staff Officer Plans (CSO Plans), and warrant officer 
Rakikau the intelligence senior non-commissioned officer of NOC, who had 
attended the exercise session with me, then went to the swimming pool next to 
the hall for a swim and cool down. At around 1300 hrs whilst in the pool, rifle 
fire and grenade explosions were heard from the direction of the National 
Operations Centre. We were shocked as we knew no training instruction was 
issued for the day for the discharge of blank rounds within barrack grounds. I 
remembered with a sense of foreboding that the Meridian Squadron had done a 
mock exercise in seizing the barracks a few years back.
We then heard the unmistakable sound of live rounds whizzing above the 
swimming pool and knew that things were definitely wrong. Corporal Bilo, a 
physical training instructor, came running past the swimming pool ducking his 
head in response to sporadic gun fire and informed the officers of the worst: the 
Squadron rebels were on a rampage using live rounds. As we climbed out of the 
pool, in our swimming trunks, we were told that rebel soldiers had taken over 
the NOC and were firing indiscriminately at unarmed soldiers. Cpl Bilo was also 
certain that some soldiers were injured and that he had seen armed rebel soldiers 
dressed in black tee shirts around the 3ld Battalion headquarters complex. Cpl 
Bilo had gone to use the photocopier machine at NOC and was lucky to escape 
as the mutinous troopers stormed and then took hostage staff at the NOC 
complex.
As fate would have it, I had left my working military uniform at the physical 
training instructors’ office at Rabuka Hall close by. I promptly made my way 
there and changed into them, all the time mentally figuring out military options 
as the security of the barracks was my overall responsibility. All my years in the 
military had not prepared me for such a bizarre military contingency. At around 
midday, the Army rugby seven-a-side team with Major Mason Smith as 
manager had assembled at Rabuka Hall awaiting their transport to a tournament
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in Ra province. I immediately ordered Major Smith to secure the back entrance 
to the barracks as soldiers began fleeing for their lives from the indiscriminate 
shootings.
After getting dressed in my uniform, I sent a soldier on foot to evacuate my wife 
and toddler daughter from our married quarters within QEB. I quickly assessed 
from the sketchy information I was able to piece together that rebel troopers 
were determined on taking over the top QEB camp by lethal force. The rebels 
had probably succeeded given that they were up against unarmed soldiers. I 
needed to regain control of the situation. I then proceeded to make my way 
down to the Engineers Headquarters across the Nabuni creek suspension bridge 
to my former unit where I had served 17 years of my career. Prior to my 
appointment as CSO Ops in August of 1999, after commanding troops with the 
Multi-National Forces and Observers in Sinai Egypt, I had commanded the 500 
man strong RFMF Engineers Regiment headquartered at Queen Elizabeth 
Barracks lower camp along Cunningham Road. In addition, for security and 
secrecy, the Force Reserve Unit formed in late June of 2000 was based at the 
Engineers complex. On this day the FRU was in base on rest and recreation with 
its unit’s weapons and ammunitions kept at the Engineers armoury.
That week the Engineers were preparing for Sappers Day to be held on the 
Friday the 3ld of November. A huge temporary corrugated iron shed was being 
built to house the 500-man event at their headquarters. Sappers Day is an annual 
event celebrating the work of the Engineers and commemorating the founding of 
the unit on the 28th of August 1975. Apparently the event was delayed that year 
because of the political crisis, as the Engineers were tasked for internal security 
from their normal rural development work. It was thought the political crisis had 
so stabilized that Sappers were able to meet and celebrate that Friday in joyous 
comradeship.
On the eve of this Sappers Day, however, events were to take a bizarre turn that 
will forever be etched in the history of the Engineers Regiment. It was from this 
unit’s headquarters complex that for some five hours on the 2nd of November, 
the planning, preparation, counter-assault and recapture of Queen Elizabeth 
Barracks were executed. Engineer troopers especially young Sappers from the
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unit’s Trade Training School (TTS) made up the overwhelming majority of the 
counter-assault force which recaptured QEB.
It seemed the mutineers had picked a day when the infanteers were out of camp 
in numbers, overlooking the fact that the engineers as a unit were at home. This 
motley bunch of soldiers saved the Fiji Military from certain compromise and 
humiliation at the hands of elite rebel mutinous soldiers.
Also around 1230 hr that day the Commander Commodore Bainimarama was at 
lunch at the officers Mess which was perched on the highest western knoll in 
camp with a commanding view of the top camp Queen Elizabeth Barracks and 
surrounds. A group of mutinous soldiers, on initiation of the mutiny by Captain 
Shane Stevens from their Squadron office, headed straight for the officers mess 
in an attempt to seize the Commander. Other groups of rebel soldiers with the 
aid of weapons hidden in their barracks were tasked to overpower using lethal 
force, the NOC, the 3,d Battalions operations headquarters and armoury, the 
Force Reserve Unit’s barrack block, the main and back camp gates, the main 
QEB administration building and the Commanders office building. The main 
QEB armoury was the first point to be overpowered by rebel soldiers who then 
held captives, the armourers/ storemen.
Information was also coming through, that rebel soldiers who were undergoing 
PTSD rehabilitation had suddenly begun discharging their hidden firearms, 
sending 3ld Battalion soldiers fleeing in all directions and leaving Father 
Makario scurrying for cover in a nearby drain culvert. Father Makario was to 
suffer a serious stroke in the following weeks. This debilitating brain injury was 
put down to the stress that this incident had on him. It has since left him 
seriously handicapped for life. Reports filtering in also confirmed that a soldier 
was shot dead in the FRU barracks whilst fleeing through a window. He was 
later confirmed by the military hospital to be a loyalist FRU soldier Lance 
Corporal Simione Rawaileba. Two other loyalist soldiers Private Osea 
Rokosirinavosa of 3ld Battalion was shot from a sniper rifle in the head and 
Private Jone Veilewai, a FRU orderly room clerk, was shot whilst having lunch. 
There was also incessant indiscriminate fire by rebel troops around the 3ld 
Battalion headquarters complex.
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Officers and soldiers at NOC, including Major Niko Bukarau and Captain Jone 
Kalouniwai of the Intelligence cell, were bound and held at gun point as 
captives in their offices. The main gate of the barracks was also taken over by 
rebel soldiers.11 From verbal reports streaming in, it was clear that other FRU 
soldiers in the barracks were shot and wounded. Many of them narrowly 
escaped by jumping out of barrack and office windows for their lives. A steady 
stream of wounded soldiers was being conveyed to the Military Hospital all 
afternoon as the carnage unfolded.
The mutiny was apparently timed to coincide with the Commander’s presence at 
lunch at the Officers Mess. Bainimarama had entered the barracks through the 
camp back entrance in his vehicle with his armed escorts in another back-up 
vehicle and had gone straight to lunch. A team of rebels then opened fire on the 
officers Mess and were making their way to the Mess dining room but were kept 
at bay by return fire from the Commander’s body guards parked at the back of 
the mess. One of the body guards had mounted the Officers Mess roof and 
mounted his Ultimax machine-gun and returned fire. The Commander was 
saved when Captain Jotama Misivono and Lt Col Silivenusi Waqausa who were 
lunching with him hurriedly evacuated him to safety down the Namadi gully 
with body guards covering his escape with fire. A getaway vehicle then picked 
up the Commander at the bottom of Vunakece Road Namadi Heights. 
Bainimarama was to suffer the butt of many a cruel joke about this getaway 
incident. Had he been captured by the rebels no doubt the day would have ended 
in disaster for him. There is criticism that his body-guards were heavily armed 
enough to make a stand at the Officers Mess and defend Bainimarama as QEB 
was ‘the Commander’s castle.’ This would have reinforced troop morale 
knowing that their leader had not abandoned them.
Meanwhile at the Engineers lower camp, I had met with Lt Col Solomone 
Raravula, the Engineers commanding officer, his second-in- command, Major 
Maciu Waqanisau, and Captain Sanaila Seru, the Operations Officer. The unit’s 
senior staff was marshalled to a meeting in the Engineers operations room. The 
operations room became a hive of frantic activity and phone calls as these 
officers tried to establish control of the situation.
Officers and senior non- commissioned officers from all other QEB based units 
who had fled the top camp like Captain Don Sinclair of the Transport unit and
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Sergeant Molia of the Band unit were busy helping out. Mobile phones were 
ringing incessantly at the Engineers Headquarters that afternoon as this drama 
played out. To add to the confusion the rebel soldiers had intermittently 
launched live 101 mm grenades into the Engineers HQ complex. Soldiers 
scampered for cover as the explosions thundered on impact around the complex.
Lt Colonel Silivenusi Waqausa and Captain Jotama Misivono, who were at the 
officers’ mess and helped protect and evacuate the Commander to safety, had 
later found their way down to the Engineers HQ camp at Nabuni. With them, I 
started piecing together what had happened. Captain Misivono who was the 
Operations Officer for the Force Reserve Unit was also a former member of the 
Squadron and knew most of the current members quite well. He was dispatched 
to the top camp to make contact with the rebel soldiers in an effort to arrange a 
cease fire. Misivono kept in touch with me with updates by mobile phone. 
Situational updates were also being phoned in from loyalist soldiers caught up 
within QEB’s top camp area. This gave me a good picture of what had 
transpired and what was unfolding. In the meantime, after the “stand to” alert 
had been activated by the Engineers headquarters at the lower QEB Nabuni 
camp, soldiers started to draw live ammunitions and arms and take up defensive 
positions to secure the high features along Cunningham road. Soldiers who had 
fled the top camp had also assembled at the Engineers HQ and had filled us in 
on their assessment of the situation.
A disorientated Lieutenant Penaia Baleinamau, the Acting Officer Commanding 
Meridian Squadron, had also been captured within the top camp and was also 
being interrogated. From injury reports gained from the military camp hospital it 
became clear to me that the rebel soldiers were on a killing rampage as victim 
soldiers with gun shot wounds were completely taken by surprise and unarmed. 
In a poignant moment during this ordeal female officer Captain Amelia Tadu 
contacted me by phone stating she had been shot in the shoulder and was 
heavily bleeding. She was pleading to be medically evacuated whilst the make 
shift NOC was frantically trying to alert rescue medics and ambulance to other 
gunshot victims.
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Photo 6. Captain Amelia Tadu is helped into hospital after being wounded during the gun
battles. Picture : Reuters.
By 1500hrs at least three loyalist soldiers were confirmed fatally shot and dead 
on arrival with at least another six seriously injured and more victims on their 
way to Suva’s Colonial War Memorial Hospital. I decided that a negotiated 
ceasefire was futile and that a military option had to be worked out before the 
last light of day. At this stage, the chief of staff of Land Forces Command Lt 
Colonel Samuela Raduva, who had fled from his office, turned up at the 
Engineers operations room. He had before this made his way down to the 
Ministry of Home Affairs where the Land Force Commander, Colonel Alfred 
Tuatoko had also withdrawn to and was now located.
Colonel Tuatoko was having lunch at his QEB married quarters when the 
mutiny started and hastily left for the Ministry to be with the Pennanent 
Secretary, Brigadier Jioji Konrote and interim Home Affairs Minister Ratu 
Talemo Ratakele. Lt Col Raduva, who was then directed by Colonel Tuatoko to 
my location at the Engineers Unit, was also a former Engineers Commanding 
Officer. Raduva was then in phone contact with the Land Force Commander 
and the Minister of Home Affairs all that afternoon relaying and taking 
instructions. Later that afternoon a special National Security Council meeting 
was convened, without Prime Minister Qarase who was on route back from the 
Pacific Islands Forum in Kiribati. In the five hours or so that the NOC was 
overrun by the rebel soldiers command confusion often reined. Various senior
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officers issued instructions through the use of mobile phones to troops without 
central coordination. Command decisions were made from the three other 
military bases in the Greater Suva area: - Army Training Group Nasinu, Stanley 
Brown naval Base and the Strategic Command that had set up headquarters in 
Suva’s Domain that week. To exacerbate matters, when the mutiny began, Lt 
Colonel Seruvakula, who commanded the 3ld Battalion responsible for the 
security of Suva city, was with his rifle companies in a live firing exercise in 
Nadroga. His 3ul Battalion headquarters in QEB was also taken over by the 
mutineers.
Whilst in the heat of co-ordinating the medical evacuation, I was surprised when 
informed by Lt Colonel Raduva that former Prime Minister Maj Gen Sitiveni 
Rabuka wanted to speak to me on his mobile phone. Rabuka had entered the top 
camp and was at the officers’ mess. He wanted to negotiate a deal. I flatly 
refused to speak to him by Raduva’s mobile phone. Then, yet again, I was 
handed a phone to talk with Major Niko Bukarau, the intelligence officer, who 
was held captive at NOC. Lieutenant Charles Dakuliga, a rebel mutineer officer, 
came on. I then asked Dakuliga who their leader was. Dakuliga replied that it 
was Captain Shane Stevens. I then asked to speak to Captain Stevens who 
apparently was also in the NOC complex. This was denied. It was later heard on 
radio; Captain Stevens had rung Radio Fiji and Radio FM 96 publicly 
requesting negotiations for various aired grievances. It was also broadcast on 
public radio that villagers of Naitasiri province were on there way to enter and 
picket the barracks in support of the mutineers’ grievances.
It was later revealed by Dakuliga later in court that, “former Prime Minister 
Sitiveni Rabuka told him to hoist a yellow flag signaling a stop to the fighting 
and start of negotiations and that he would talk to Lieutenant-Colonel Jone 
Baledrokadroka.” I then told Lt Dakuliga that there was not going to be any 
negotiation as loyalist soldiers were already killed and seriously injured, and 
that the rebel IMS soldiers had to surrender. I was then given a phone to speak 
to Major Bukarau, who was told to stay patient as the military was going to 
resolve the issue that day even if it meant an all out assault. I was resolute that 
QEB camp had to be recaptured by last light that afternoon. I strongly suspected
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negotiations would have bought time for civilians to enter camp to act as a 
‘human shield.’ This ploy was used during the takeover of Parliament and the 
Sukanaivalu VC barracks in Labasa. I also knew that an assault in the dark of 
night was impossible with untrained troops and without night observation 
devices. Had the assault been done at night, this would have caused many 
casualties. I knew that had I lost the closing window of opportunity that evening 
then the next possible time for an assault would have been first light the next 
morning. By then civilians would have entered QEB making it impossible to 
assault. It was therefore my lot to make the best of a bad situation, given the 
troops I had. I was left with no option but a counter-attack assault by last light to 
regain QEB. This decision was then relayed to the Ministry of Home Affairs 
that afternoon.
Battle Preparation
Commodore Bainimarama, after his evacuation to safety from the Officers’ 
Mess, turned up at Engineers headquarters. Bainimarama had already been 
briefed by Colonel Tuatoko at Home Affairs and Lt Colonel Raduva had kept 
him updated of the situation in QEB by mobile phone. Bainimarama was 
subsequently briefed by me. The Commander was told to withdraw to the Naval 
Base as it was too dangerous for him at the Engineers complex which was 
vulnerable to sniper fire and exploding 40 mm grenades. Bainimarama agreed 
to withdraw to Stanley Brown naval base at Suva’s Walu Bay for his safety. 
This left me, Raduva, Raravula and Waqausa to deal with the tactical situation. 
After the medical evacuation of wounded victims, an assault plan was put 
together by my team of senior officers. Captain Seru the Engineers operations 
officer was ordered to marshal the Engineer troops into assault groups. Captain 
Seru was then to alert the Nabua police station of the impending assault in order 
to warn off the public in the area.
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Diagram 2.
Main Sequence of Events 
Time (Hrs) Event
0700 Rebel troopers clean unit weapons at QEB Main Armoury
0900 Father Makario commences PTSD classes for rebel troopers at 
3rd Battalion HQ
1200 QEB Lunch Hour
1230 Commander Commodore Bainimarama at Lunch Officers 
Mess
1255 Mutiny begins under Captain Shane Stevens
1500 Maj Gen S Rabuka enters camp for Officers Mess
1530 Rebels demand negotiations aided by Rabuka. Evacuation of 
wounded.
1600 Counter Assault Plan (CAP) is completed
1700 Authorisation to initiate CAP given by Govt Security Council
1800 Counter Assault Begins
1900 Counter Assault Successful
2000 NOC is restored and QEB secured.
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Map 6. Counter-Assault Plan (CAP)
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The senior officers present then went through the military appreciation process 
on the whiteboard in constructing a tactical assault plan. We began by 
summarising the situation on the ground and constructing a profile and strength 
of our adversary, the Meridian Squadron. We plotted a best course of action as 
learnt during tactical exercises at our Officers’ Training School. This was, 
however, not an exercise but the “real thing” in surreal circumstances and 
surroundings. Even our peacekeeping experiences had not prepared us for such 
an unlikely local event. Years of peacekeeping operations had blunted our skills 
for real battlefield procedures. Further, the plan was to be executed by soldiers 
many of whom; their only infantry assault experience would have been during 
recruitment training. But for those present that afternoon at the Engineers lower 
camp, we were resolute to take back the upper camp, the core site of the RFMF. 
The tactical assault plan did finally eventuate, plotted by the makeshift team of 
officers, (see Counter-Assault Plan) Being amongst members of my former unit, 
the Engineers gave me confidence and faith as the team sorted out the details of 
the assault plan. What strengthened the counter-assault was that we had a core 
of Force Reserve Unit troops. Since its formation in late June 2000, these troops
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had been in constant fire and manoeuvre live training exercises. The unit had 
also endured rugged internal security deployments to Vanua Levu and the 
Monasavu area.
The plan was to assault onto the Officers Mess high ground in three groups, 
using three routes from the north making use of the deep northern escarpment as 
cover. As a preliminary operation, we had to secure the crest of the Nabuni 
creek escarpment as we feared sniper fire from the rebels. The main assault start 
line was to the bottom of this escarpment. The main assault group consisting of 
a company size was organised into section assault teams of eight to ten men 
commanded by an officer, senior or junior non commissioned officer available. 
The soldiers were briefed on the assault plan and quick rehearsals of fire and 
manoeuvre drills were conducted in section teams.
The mission was to capture the vital ground which was the officers mess 
complex and QEB flagpole high feature. At around 1600 hrs. I gave the final 
address to the paraded assault formation. I re-emphasized the mission and the 
importance of teamwork in the coming hours. The mutineers by this time had all 
withdrawn to the officers mess high feature
I had contacted Lt Colonel Patrick Hennings, the Commanding Officer of the 
Army Training Group in Nasinu outside Suva, to close off traffic at the Four 
Mile Bridge, and secure the camp approaches along Ratu Mara Road. Lt 
Colonel Hennings had also tried to negotiate with Rabuka and some of the rebel 
soldiers when the assault started. Lt Colonel Pita Driti, the Commanding Officer 
of the Logistic Support Unit in QEB, was also told of the plan to assault. After 
ascertaining his unit’s strength he later informed me that they could not fonn 
teams in support of the main assault. He was told to hold his position with his 
troops. Lt Colonel Viliame Seruvakula had by now arrived at the Engineers 
complex from Nadroga some three hours after the mutiny started. He was told of 
the plan to assault. He was then told to provide a blocking force from remnant 
soldiers of his 3ld battalion along Mead Road and Namadi Heights.
At about 1700hrs, Raduva, the chief of staff, informed me that authorisation 
had been given to recapture Queen Elizabeth Barracks by the National Security 
Council. The Council was convened by interim Home Affairs Minister Ratu
181
Talemo Ratakele whilst Prime Minister Qarase was attending the Pacific Islands 
Forum meeting in Kiribati. The assault teams were ordered to shake out into 
assault positions beneath the gully slopes along Nabuni creek. All were issued 
with additional ammunition magazines, with ammunition re-supplies team 
formed to bring forward reserve ammunition when called for. The covering fire 
team with an M60 machine gun was deployed to the Nabuni high feature.
The assault teams were then given clearance to test fire their weapons into the 
Nabuni far creek bank. This simultaneous thunderous discharging of weapons 
all along the Nabuni creek bank created doubt in the minds of the rebels as they 
believed all the noise to be a deception plan. The military deception tactics of 
‘making noise in the North and attacking from the South’ was foremost in the 
rebels’ minds. On that day however our troops confused the rebels by ‘making 
noise in the North and attacking from the North’. I was later told this by one of
13the mutinous rebel soldiers Feoko Gadekibau in Naboro jail in 2007.
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Map 7: Topographical View and Overlay Map of CAP
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At 1800hrs- H-Hour, on the signal of green flares fired into the failing evening 
light the assault began. Lieutenant Aca Rayawa with Sargent Akuila Mairewa 
led the main assault group. The right assault group was led by Captain Etika 
Kaurasi of the Military Police. The left assault group was led by Sargent Major 
Maku Veikila. Lt Colonel Raravula brought up the rear with the reserve and 
resupply teams. The covering fire team on Nabuni Hill had opened up raining 
live rounds upon the Officers Mess high feature. The initial phase of the assault 
was cautiously slow as the teams tried to ascend in line abreast. At places the 
angle of ascent was as much as sixty degrees in incline up the northern 
escarpment. The setting sun to the west cast the shadows of the Tamavua ridge 
down the slopes of Namadi heights masking the assault ascent amongst the low 
bush and reeds. Under the cover of failing light and smoke the main assault team 
and the left and right flanking teams began their ascent in fire and manoeuvre 
formation.
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I was frequently in contact with Lt Colonel Raravula during the whole 
approach, assault and securing phases. Lt Colonel Samuela Raduva the chief of 
staff Land Forces was with me and relaying information to the National Security 
Council at the Ministry of Home Affairs. The exchange of fire was furious as 
the assault crested the northern escarpment ridge. The main assault was then 
joined by Lt Colonel Patrick Henning’s, troops from the Army Training Group 
Nasinu and remnant troops of the 3ld Battalion as they combined forces with the 
left assault group. As the main assault group reached the top camp ridge line, the 
covering fire provided from Nabuni feature was lifted. Covering fire was now 
provided from the left flanking assault teams who were also tasked to clear 
office buildings. The main assault teams then working in fire and manoeuvre 
mode fought their way to the officers mess high feature. The speed of the assault 
and intensity of fire caused the mutineers to escape up the Namadi heights gully 
under cover of darkness. Raravula then informed me at 1900 hours that they had 
successfully secured the Officers Mess high ground and that his reserve forces 
were doing a sweep operation through the lower camp to secure all vital areas 
before dark.
I then ordered a cease-fire as the assaulting force reorganised on the Officers 
Mess feature. Rabuka was caught in the cross fire and had taken cover in one of 
the bachelor officer’ quarters. Up until the last moments of the assault Rabuka 
had been busy trying to avert an assault in favour of a negotiated settlement. The 
former Commander of the RFMF was apprehended by Lt Col Raravula and 
detained. Rabuka was later tried for inciting mutiny charges and found not 
guilty, though serious doubts still linger about his role in the mutiny. I then 
ordered the assault force to hold the Officers Mess high feature for the night in 
case of a counter attack by the mutineers. I then ordered the whole make shift 
operation staff at the Engineers operations centre to make their way to the NOC 
at the top camp to restore national operations as soon as possible that night.
Fortunately no lives on both sides were lost during the assault. Two mutineers 
had been injured with gun shot wounds during the whole five hour ordeal. 14 
This was the only counter-assault operation casualty report that was sent to 
Home Affairs that evening once NOC was up back in order around 2000hrs.15
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That night a stunned military was left asking deep questions of itself. The 
capture of notorious escaped prisoner Alifereti Nimacere that night at 
Nadonumai outside Suva raised the spirits of the soldiers somewhat. The next 
morning, the full effect of the mutiny and counter assault was seen as the 
military took stock. Building walls were pockmarked with bullet holes, 
windows, office furniture and equipment were smashed, treasured trophies, 
photos and other military memorabilia destroyed in the officers’ mess, office 
and barrack floors bloodied. Most of all in Suva’s Colonial War Memorial 
Hospital eight soldiers lay dead and twenty eight other soldiers seriously 
wounded. In addition seven civilians including Mr James Pillay living some 
distance from QEB in the Suva suburb of Samabula were injured through stray 
bullets.16
Conclusion
Why did the mutiny happen? Most of the mutinous troopers had sided with 
George Speight’s nationalist takeover of the Chaudhry government. They had 
harbored a grievance that the military had sold them out.1 A few who had 
returned from peacekeeping duties, driven by loyalty to their elite unit, had also 
joined the mutineers. What had triggered the mutiny was the announcement by 
the Commander Commodore Bainimarama the week before, that the unit was to 
be disbanded. Unfortunately disinformation by some senior officers in the week 
prior to the mutiny had precipitated the attempt to displace Bainimarama as 
Commander. Bainimarama who led, or rather misled, the military into a political 
role in the 2000 crisis has a lot to answer for, given the findings of the Evans 
report. The report asserted, “IMS was very much a private army, with its own 
agenda, answerable only to Commander RFMF.”2 Colonel Ilaisa Kacisolomone 
as president of the military court martial in sentencing the mutineers had also 
urged Commodore Bainimarama to reveal the names of those who advised him 
to abrogate the 1997 constitution. He said Bainimarama owed a duty to the 
nation to name those who advised him. The Colonel revealed those in authority 
did not really accept the abrogation of the Constitution by the Commander but
i n
went along drafting decrees to maintain their respective powers. This may be
1 See RFMF BOI Evans Report, 09 Aug 2000.
2 See Evans Report findings, p37.
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taken to mean that acceptance of Bainimarama’s actions was done more out of 
self preservation rather than a respect for the law. Sitiveni Rabuka was drawn 
into the military barracks that fateful afternoon by a phone call by mutiny leader 
Captain Shane Stevens. Bainimarama was to have been ‘replaced’ by Rabuka, a 
co-founder of the Squadron, had it not been for the quick and brave actions of 
loyalist officers and soldiers.
Perhaps Kacisolomone’s summation and sentencing at the completion of the 
Court Martial trial is appropriate to conclude on. On sentencing, the mutinous 
soldiers were described by Kacisolomone as “a menace to society who must be 
restricted in every way”18. Captain Stevens was jailed for life and 43 other 
troops to terms ranging from four to ten years. Kacisolomone had said the 
mutineers had caused a lot of suffering and devastation to the country during 
one of its most trying times and acted in a cowardly way with the use of illegally 
seized weapons. He said the incitement to mutiny and mutiny were the most 
serious offences that had shocked Fiji’s military. He called for an investigation 
into what he called the ‘disloyalty virus’ within the military which had the 
potential to become an epidemic. Kacisolomone said several military officers 
were sympathetic to those responsible for the political upheaval in 2000. The 
Colonel continued, “We hear too often from our Fijian leaders that most, if not, 
all, support the cause but not the means when talking about the 2000 coup”19 
Kacisolomone noted: “Surely, any causes worth pursuing and inculcating into 
the fabric of our everyday life are those which ensure for us a better future rather 
than a cause which denigrates human dignity and brings about hatred and 
sufferings, economic disaster and total disregard for law and order.” He said the 
‘cause’ led to imprisonment of high chiefs, brilliant young men, and custodians 
of law and order.
It was the quick action of a few officers and soldiers that saved the Fiji military 
from the jaws of defeat that fateful afternoon in November 2000. In effect the 
event was an attempt to displace what many military insiders saw as 
Bainimarama’s inept leadership. It also showed the RFMF had regrouped in the 
face of ethnic factionalism though the consequences of a politicized military 
stemming from the mutiny still haunt Fiji. The event transformed the military 
into an agent of partisan national politics rather than what many officers hoped
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would be an apolitical professional institution. Bainimarama became 
emboldened by this successful retaking of QEB to shore up his claim that 
soldiers supported him in a political mediator role when in fact the hasty 
counter-assault was for institutional survival. After this infamous event, 
Commodore Bainimarama became fixated on mediating Fiji’s ethnicized 
politics, a fixation that led to the military coup of 2006. The Turaga-Bati 
relationship had also underpinned the mutiny with the involvement of the 
Qaranivalu and high chief of Naitasiri as later revealed by mutineers Captain 
Shane Stevens and Sargent Bonafasio in the Court Martial. With grievances 
against the Commander and the military, the mutineers had resorted to 
traditional chiefly authority for support. In the eyes of the mutineers, the turaga 
was still an essential element in settling political or military grievances. 
Unapologetically, the military leadership has valorised this military
misadventure to play politics and obfuscate the mutiny deaths of the five
20Meridian Squadron soldiers.
Interlude
THE order to assault members of the Counter Revolutionary Warfare soldiers 
who were in police custody after the November 2, 2000 mutiny could have been 
issued by the Military Commander Commodore Voreqe Bainimarama, it was 
revealed when key military witness Colonel Jone Baledrokadroka was 
questioned. Colonel Baledrokadroka who took the stand before Justice Filimoni 
Jitoko in the High Court chambers today said he was Chief of Staff Operations 
around the time of the munity and gave no orders for CRW members who had 
surrendered, to be assaulted during detainment Disbanded CRW unit member 
Barbados Mills filed a lawsuit against the military for "vicarious liability" after 
he was taken with five other unit members to the Vatuwaqa Rifle Range where 
they were alleged to have been assaulted by a group of soldiers.
Fiji Times, ‘Order to assault could have been issued by Commander: 
Baledrokadroka’, Wed 17 October, 2007.
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Interlude
THE assault of Counter Revolutionary Warfare Unit soldiers after the 
November 2, 2000 mutiny could have been ordered by any of the four command 
centres, a key witness in a civil lawsuit against the army revealed at the High 
Court chambers yesterday.
Jone Baledrokadroka, the first defence witness in the in-chamber hearing before 
Justice Filimoni Jitoko, said the command centres included the Stanley Brown 
Base, which at that time was headed by military chief Commodore Voreqe 
Bainimarama.
Mr Baledrokadroka said he was the head of National Operations or Chief Staff 
Operations at that time and did not issue any instructions, verbal or written, for 
CRW soldiers to be assaulted during their detainment in police custody.
On Tuesday, three former CRW soldiers told the court they were released from 
police custody after a note signed by Colonel Baledrokadroka was issued. 
Barbados Mills, a former soldier with the disbanded CRW Unit, is suing the 
military for "vicarious liability" after alleging he was among five other CRW 
soldiers taken from police custody and assaulted at the Vatuwaqa Rifle Range 
by uniformed armed soldiers.
He claims the assault included Sergeant Waisea Salato and Corporal Jack 
Komaitai.
Mr Baledrokadroka said it was against military law for anyone to act "over and 
beyond" instructions issued by him after the Operation Orders were issued for 
the arrest of CRW soldiers.
"That weekend, the commander was in charge of Stanley Brown (base). There 
could have been communication counter-commanding what I was doing at 
QEB." he said. "Just because you are in army uniform does not give you the 
authority to do something like that. I wouldn't. They were acting under 
someone's orders, but not my authority."
The state of confusion the military was in after it was "under-siege" was 
"exacerbated" by the establishment of other command centres, he said.
Command centres were set up at the military headquarters at Berkeley Crescent, 
another was at the Armed Training Group at Nasinu, one at QEB and another at 
the naval base in Walu Bay, Mr Baledrokadroka said.
He said any orders contrary to his intent were a military offence and 
disobedience to lawful command or standing orders. While refuting allegations 
he authorised the release of CRW soldiers from police custody, Mr 
Baledrokadroka said any such move would have warranted an explanation from 
him to his superiors including the Legal and Land Force units. The only note 
that would enable the release of CRW soldiers from custody was a court order, 
Mr Baledrokadroka said.
He admitted there was a possibility of anger among the ranks - from the top to 
the bottom - after the mutiny. "It was beyond my authority to release those in 
police custody. That's only possible through the legal and Land Force Command 
above me. Be it security or criminal, I have no authority," he said.
"If there was such an assault on CRW soldiers it could have been owed to the 
tension felt after the mutiny," he said.
Fiji Times ‘Officer: I never gave order’ Thurs, Oct 18, 2007.
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Chapter 7
The Emerging Antagonism between Qarase and Bainimarama
Introduction
The emerging antagonism between Laisenia Qarase and Commodore Voreqe 
Bainimarama was the unfinished business of Speight’s coup in 2000. In a New 
York Times interview, Bainimarama said he could think of only one mistake 
regarding his seizure of power more than six years before: he wished he had 
done it in 2001.1 Bainimarama said in 2007 that the 2006 coup was to have 
eventuated in 2001 but the military wanted to give Qarase a chance to mend his 
ways.2 He further lambasted the former Prime Minister stating, “he has never 
educated our people in the villages about the wrongs of 2000 which have 
resulted in the ever present coup mentality." Qarase, on the other hand, said the 
2006 coup was more a consequence of personal differences than anything else.4 
Both leaders’ explanations resonate with John Fitch’s analysis in his seminal 
work, The Military Coup d ’Etat as a Political Process. Fitch argues that, 
‘antagonism and personal ties’ appear as a relative constant in individual 
decisions to support or oppose a coup.5
After the failed George Speight coup of 2000 the military adopted a political 
interest in domestic affairs which it justified as necessary for national security. 
According to leading Fiji lawyer Graham Leung the military was emboldened to 
adopt the mediator role by members of the legal fraternity and other political 
and civilian stakeholders.6 By April 2005, the Qarase-Bainimarama feud had 
intensified after a national security review report by a panel of experts had
n
recommended to government a halving of military numbers. The schism was 
further exacerbated by supporters of Bainimarama such as FLP’s Mahendra 
Chaudhry and NAP’s Ratu Epeli Ganilau in opposition to Qarase’s SDL Party, 
the GCC and the Police Commissioner Andrew Hughes. Allegations of 
government ethnic policy parochialism were countered with military 
malfeasance. As Commissioner Hughes revealed, “We wanted to arrest and 
charge Commodore Bainimarama but he was permanently covered by heavy
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security. I was very keen to avoid an armed confrontation between the police
o
and the military. So we waited.” By late 2006, the US embassy reported to 
Washington that Bainimarama privately told European Union diplomats that, “If 
anyone insulted the army of course we must have them taken to barracks and 
have them beaten up.”9 The confidential memorandum went on to further claim, 
“Telephoned threats of rape have been regularly used by the military to 
intimidate political activists.”10
Bainimarama’s detractors accused him of hypocrisy for vehemently opposing 
government’s leniency towards perpetrators of the 2000 coup when there were 
unanswered questions about his role in the same takeover. The antagonism 
finally came to a head in Commodore Bainimarama’s ‘clean-up campaign’ coup 
of 2006 that was to challenge the Turaga-Bati ideology and reverse the 
relationship between the military and the chiefly elite and associates.
The central argument Bainimarama advocated in his ‘clean-up campaign’ of 
2006 was a familiar one in the debate about Fiji’s politics, and contended that 
ideas of iTaukei paramountcy and iTaukei identity almost entirely served elite 
iTaukei interests. Robertson and Sutherland, well-known as advocates of this 
theory of iTaukei ‘false consciousness’, described the 2000 crisis in these tenns:
In 2000 it had another dimension -a Fijian one. Fijians confronted Fijians on a scale not 
seen since the early days of colonialism. Fijians killed Fijians. Commoners defied 
chiefs. Chiefs fought among themselves. Tensions between the country’s 14 Fijian 
provinces ran high. Even the Fiji military suffered. Humiliated by its failure to contain 
the rebels, it had also to endure the shock of a violent mutiny. If nothing else, the unrest 
of 2000 shattered the myth of a united Fijian people.11
Why, they asked, did intra-ethnic antagonism continue to emerge despite the 
military’s best efforts as ‘saviours of the nation’ in 2000 and in spite of the 
military’s installation of the Qarase led interim government in 2001? Robertson 
and Sutherland answer was that:
Fijian leaders have exploited the disadvantage of the Fijian masses by projecting it as 
the disadvantage of all Fijian people, the elite included. They have used the 
‘paramountcy of Fijian[iTaukei] interests’ to hide the reality of the paramountcy of elite 
Fijian[iTaukei] interests. How to resolve it is the indigenous question. It is the key 
question facing Fiji today. It is Fiji’s unfinished business. 12
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This thesis takes a different view. While conceding the force of this analysis as a 
partial explanation of Fiji’s political evolution since independence, it argues that 
the 2006 coup repeated the ancient hierarchical power inversion of the Bauan 
Sacred King (Roko Tui Bauj by his Warrior Chief (Vunivalu). In the modem 
setting, Bainimarama is the Warrior Chief who has usurped power for himself, 
re-enacting a well-established iTaukei power transition. The key point is that, 
like other warrior chiefs before him, Bainimarama did not seize power in order 
to end the subjection of the commoner iTaukei , but rather to replace the chiefly 
elite in continuing that subjection. Just as they used the paramountcy of iTaukei 
interests to justify their authority and privileges, so Bainimarama has used the 
idea of national unity to justify his.
This chapter examines the issues and tactics that were employed by the military 
in intervening in politics before executing the reversal of the Turaga-Bati 
ideology with the takeover of the Qarase-led nationalist government. The 
chapter outlines the major schisms that arose between the two major actors and 
protagonists, Bainimarama and Qarase, and analyses the contentious issues in 
the lead up to the coup according to Finer’s modes.
Modes of Intervention
Samuel Finer’s modes of intervention offer us a thematic structure to analyze 
the antagonism that culminated in the displacement and supplanting of the 
Turaga-Bati relationship.
Finer examined intervention along a continuum where both legal and coercive 
mechanisms are employed. For practical purposes, Finer condensed military 
intervention into four levels: influence, blackmail, displacement and
supplantment. These levels of intervention are attained by certain characteristic 
methods or modes, alone or in conjunction with one another. Finer lists them as:
1) The normal constitutional channels.
2) Collusion and /or competition with the civilian authorities.
3) The intimidation of the civilian authorities.
4) Threats of non-cooperation with, or violence towards, the civilian 
authorities.
5) Failure to defend the civilian authorities.
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6) The exercise of violence against the civilian authorities vis a vis a 
military coup d’etat.13
Indeed looking at Finer’s levels of intervention it can be hypothesized that 
Bainimarama’s coup was played out according to these levels culminating in the 
final supplanting of the Turaga-Bati relationship. In pressuring then outrightly 
opposing the SDL government from 2001-2006, Commodore Bainimarama and 
the military, employed all these modes in escalating order culminating in the 
displacement and supplantment of the ruling SDL Coalition Party and 
associates.
Normal Constitutional Channels
After Speight’s 2000 failed coup and the 1st Meridian Squadron’s mutiny at 
Queen Elizabeth Barracks, the military was determined to bring to justice those 
who had perpetrated the crises. Former military commander and interim Deputy 
Prime Minister, Brigadier Ratu Epeli Nailatikau, declared the military’s stance 
stating that
Unadulterated greed and the unbelievable arrogance as was shamelessly displayed by 
chiefs and people alike on May 19 will not bring about paramountcy in this day and age. 
Justice has to come before reconciliation.14
This view was contrary to that of interim Prime Minister Qarase and his political 
colleagues, who saw traditional vanua reconciliation as taking precedence over 
Western justice. Bainimarama, however, had no intention of seeing Fiji’s first 
Indo- Fijian Prime Minister Chaudhry’s deposed government restored to office 
as it would rekindle nationalist tensions. The military’s stand since the start of 
the crisis was seen by many as being ambivalent and one of appeasement 
towards Speight nationalists. After assuming rule on the 29th of May 2000, 
Bainimarama and the military took up the mantle of national security watchdog 
to reinstate political stability. NGOs such as the Citizens’ Constitutional Forum 
(CCF) applauded the military’s stand.
Chandrikha Prasad Case
On the 14th of November 2000 Justice Antony Gates’s High Court ruling, in the 
Chandrika Prasad case, held that the 1997 Constitution was not abrogated and 
that the military installed caretaker government led by Qarase was illegal. An
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appeal was lodged by the caretaker government. On the 2nd of March 2001, the 
Fiji Court of Appeal (FCA) ruling upheld Justice Gates’s constitutional ruling of 
the 14th of November, and also affirmed the illegality of the military installed 
government. The nation again found itself at a constitutional crossroad. Gates’s 
judgment that the military interim administration led by Qarase had “no 
constitutional foundation of legality” was a blow to Bainimarama who was 
credited for restoring normalcy. Bainimarama was adamant, however, that the 
military would uphold the rule of law and abide with the Appeals Court 
decision.
The GCC and the President then called for fresh elections under the 1997 
Constitution. The FCA ruling further strained relations between Speight’s 
nationalists and the military. Bainimarama had also granted Speight’s group 
immunity through the promulgation of Decree No. 18 which came into effect on 
the 13th July 2000. This decree was the outcome of the Muanikau Accord, which 
gave Speight and his group amnesty from prosecution for treason. In return the 
Coalition government hostages would be released and all weapons used 
recovered by the military. This was later to prove a hollow victory for Speight 
and his group who kept demanding a say in the military-installed interim 
government. The storming and arresting of Speight and his supporters at Kalabu 
Primary School later in July 2000 was seen by the rebels as a breach of this 
decree.15
On the 31st of May 2002, Justice Wilson in the case of the State versus Ratu 
Timoci Silatolu and Josefa Nata, in the High Court of Fiji, ruled that the 
Immunity Decree promulgated by Bainimarama in his capacity as Head of 
Government at the Muanikau Accord, was null and void because it was 
unconstitutional. The two were being prosecuted for treason. They were later 
jailed for life with coup leader George Speight for their part in toppling 
Mahendra Chaudhry's Labour-led government. Apparently they were granted 
immunity from any civil or criminal prosecution by Commodore Bainimarama. 
Throughout his first term, as Prime Minister, Qarase found himself carefully 
treading between his nationalist coalition partner’s grievances against 
Bainimarama and the military’s call for justice before reconciliation. Both
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leaders were, however, determined to follow normal constitutional channels as a 
principle, for as often in politics, the rhetoric hid power undercurrents and 
divergent interests.
Collusion with key political actors
The outcome of the Chandrika Prasad constitutional case saw military attempts 
to protect its corporate interests come to the fore. In the wake of Speight’s coup 
and the military’s installation of an interim government, the Chandrika Prasad 
court case in November 2000 was a victory for constitutional law. The ordinary 
Indian farmer had taken the military and the interim government to court and 
claimed a violation of his constitutional rights. Justice Gates ruled that 
Commodore Bainimarama had erred in law with his proclamations of the 29th of 
May 2000, prime of which was the purported abrogation the 1997 constitution. 
As was stated by Justice Gates:
Once the hostage crisis was resolved and all other law and order matters contained, if 
not entirely eradicated, the Constitution, previously temporarily on ice or suspended, 
would re-emerge as the supreme law demanding his [ Bainimarama’sjsupport and that 
of the military to uphold it against any other usurpers. The doctrine could not be used to 
give sustenance to a new extra-constitutional regime. Nor could it provide a valid basis 
for abrogating the Constitution and replacing it with a Constitutional Review 
Committee and an interim civilian government. Necessity [doctrine] did not demand 
any o f that.16
However, at the Chandrika Prasad ruling appeal, brought by the interim
administration, in March of 2001, the judges ruled that it was indeed the
intention of the Commander to abrogate the constitution. As stated:
On the basis o f the further materials before this Court (including the Commander's 
affidavits) we have no hesitation in holding that Gates J was in error when he found that 
the Commander had “no genuine desire to remove the 1997 Constitution”. We are 
satisfied in the light of the further material placed before us that the Commander, for the 
reasons he conveyed to the President at the time, did have a genuine desire to do just 
that.17
This begs the question whether the Commander’s intentions were really as 
noble as trying to save the country from the scourge of Speight and his 
supporters in his ‘genuine desire’ to remove the 1997 Constitution. Or did he 
have a personal or political motive for military intervention at this early stage of 
his career as Commander RFMF? The events which have unfolded since tend to 
suggest that he had political rather than purely professional motives and used 
Speight as scapegoat.
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As the military had installed Qarase with a mandate, his interim government’s 
survival and success depended on the military as the guarantor of national 
security. Commodore Bainimarama, in submitting three affidavits as part of the 
interim government’s Appeals Court case, however, contradicted the military’s 
stance of standing firm stating, “The next elections should be held under a new 
constitution because of perception of coup makers that the present constitution 
had “watered down the interests of the Fijians.”18 In the third Affidavit, the 
Commander also disputed claims by Jone Dakuvula of the CCF, a witness for 
Mr Prasad, that Bainimarama would support a government of national unity if 
the Gates ruling was upheld.19 Dakuvula had highlighted the fact that the 
military would uphold the rule of law and had no other option but to support the 
recalling of parliament. 20 It appears Dakuvula had used a newspaper article that 
reported Bainimarama and his staff officers had unexpectedly used the occasion 
of a Cabinet informal visit to the President to give a presentation on the 
military’s stand on the upcoming Appeals Court ruling. Bainimarama said he 
could not make a blind commitment to accepting the Court of Appeal ruling and 
would decide as the situation presented itself. What was the cause of the 
retraction by Bainimarama?
The case of Navy Pay Clerk William Biu provides an insight into Finer’s second 
mode of intervention where collusion is sought by the military to provide a 
favourable political outcome. On 30 December 2000 a former Navy pay clerk, 
William Biu, was released after serving only two months of a six year sentence. 
He was convicted of theft of more than $80,000 from the military pay office. 
Biu was an extramural prisoner on Compulsory Supervisory Order to report to 
Central Police Station every month when he was freed. Commissioner of 
Prisons Aisea Taoka said it was a ministerial decision. Remissions of prison 
time, however, were something earned after one normally has served half the 
sentence. In Biu’s case, the Prisons had reduced his sentence by 2 years and the 
high Court by another 2 years. What spurred such a questionable decision? 
Biu’s abnormally early release had political undertones. One that stands out is 
that it was a deal in exchange for Bainimarama producing affidavits that 
reinforced the interim government’s upcoming appeal case against the Gates 
ruling. In addition, after the mutiny and the death of the five rebel soldiers at the
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hands of loyalist soldiers, a Military Amnesty Bill for immunity from 
prosecution for this and other misdeeds was mooted. Consequently it is believed 
these two ‘deals’ became the quid pro quo for Bainimarama submitting three 
affidavits that supported the interim government’s case and simultaneously 
standing up for his ‘loyal’ soldiers or in this case sailor.
Speculation was rife about the various political options to take the country 
forward. That crucial decision resided with the acting President, Ratu Iloilo, 
taking into account the views of major political stakeholders and the all- 
important advice of the military and the Great Council of Chiefs. After the court 
ruling, Adi Kuini Speed, the Deputy Prime Minister in the deposed Labour 
Coalition government, publically backed Labour party deputy leader Tupeni 
Baba for Prime Minister in a Government of National Unity. She emphatically
23declared, “The situation in Fiji would worsen if Chaudhry returned.” 
Meanwhile Chaudhry had called on the President and advised him that Fiji 
could go to the polls in eight weeks and to reconvene parliament only for one 
day to dissolve the House and have fresh elections with a first- past-the- post 
voting system in place of the alternative system.24 New Zealand Foreign Affairs 
Minister Phil Goff also supported the move, he said, “We feel a Government of 
National Unity will heal the wounds created by last year’s coup and that the 
change of having elections will highlight divisions. A Government of National
7 SUnity is more useful to address problems facing Fiji.
Bainimarama had, however, warned the National Security Council in a meeting 
after the Appeal Court ruling that Chaudhry posed the highest threat to national 
security.“ His view was that the return of Chaudhry as Prime Minister was 
politically untenable and would be disastrous for the country. In a deft move 
coined by Rabuka as ‘Mara’s kind of Constitutionality’, Iloilo dismissed 
Chaudhry and appointed Tevita Momoedonu as Prime Minister.27 The former 
Labour Minister and chief from Iloilo’s village of Veiseisei Vuda then advised 
the ailing President to dissolve parliament and tendered his resignation. Why 
the change of heart by the military? It can only be surmised that either the
military was not confident in providing national security should the interim
28government lose its court case or else Bainimarama was playing politics.
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Bainimarama may have also realised that a Government of National Unity with 
Chaudhry in it would have difficulty in passing a Military Amnesty Bill for the 
obvious reason that he had been a victim himself along with his FLP colleagues. 
The military, which had held to the position of ‘upholding the rule of law’ after 
the Appeals’ court ruling, had changed tune. By backing the President’s decision 
for fresh elections, the military had colluded with Iloilo and Qarase’s power 
manoeuvring rather than restore Chaudhry and his deposed FLP government. 
This collusion of personal and traditional factors in Fiji politics are the unique 
features that underpin Finer’s modes of intervention.
Intimidation of government
After the mutiny in November 2000, Bainimarama’s animosity towards 
politicians and chiefs became pronounced. Military indignation was directed at 
Speight and nationalist co-conspirators and the errant Meridian Squadron. 
Given Fiji’s interlinked political elite, these co-conspirators were suspected of 
including nationalist chiefs and politicians wanting to topple Bainimarama and 
change the makeup of the military interim government. This harrowing event, in 
which Bainimarama just escaped with his life, affected him psychologically. It 
influenced his irrational view of Fiji’s politicians and chiefs as corrupt and a 
menace to society. Until November 2002, when Shane Stevens, the mutiny 
leader, was jailed for life and the other fourteen soldiers were jailed from 
eighteen months to eight years, the court martial was fraught with legal and 
police issues. During the court martial the police had been accused of tampering 
with evidence.“ This only strengthened military suspicion of a SDL/CAMV 
government conspiracy. Hence the military increased its watchdog role in the 
news media, cautioning and intimidating government. The SDL/CAMV 
Coalition was openly regarded by its political opponents, now supported by the 
military, to be sympathetic towards an iTaukei nationalist political agenda.
Military displeasure with Qarase’s government had begun after the August 2001 
elections with the formation of the SDL/CAMV Coalition government. To the 
dismay of the military the ultra-nationalists’ political arm CAMV won six seats
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-  five Vanua Levu communal seats and Speight’s Tailevu seat, which he won 
even though he was incarcerated on Nukulau Island.
From the initial announcement of the SDL/CAMV merger, it was obvious 
that old wounds would not heal given the antagonism between Speight’s 
group and the military during the 2000 crisis. Here was a government, after 
all, consisting not only of the SDL but also of the CAMV, the party that gave 
expression to the political aspirations of Speight and the indigenous Fijian 
nationalists that included key figures who supported Speight’s coup such as 
the Tui Cakau Ratu Naiqama Lalabalavu and Ratu Rakuita Vakalalabure. 
Samisoni Tokainavo, brother of convicted coup leader George Speight and a 
member of the CAMV, countered Bainimarama’s disdain towards his party 
by reminding all that, “Bainimarama himself committed a series of 
treasonous acts in removing the then president, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, and 
assuming authority unlawfully when he declared martial law after the 
coup”.30
Speight’s CAMV party, with six seats, was vital to Qarase for the formation of 
government since his SDL party had won only thirty two out of the seventy one 
seats parliament. Qarase, who was always predisposed towards iTaukei 
affirmative action and indigenous rights, was now driven to adopt a selective 
ethno-nationalist agenda. It is plausible that had the SDL possessed the numbers 
to form government alone, this would have probably been more to the liking of 
Bainimarama and the military. What riled Bainimarama was Qarase’s stalling 
over the Military Amnesty Bill which he had promised the military. Qarase had 
bowed to pressure from CAMV members who were obviously not pleased with 
the imprisonment of George Speight and his supporters. In fact according to 
Tokainavo, who replaced his imprisoned brother George Speight in parliament, 
relations between Qarase and Bainimarama were cordial leading into the August 
elections. The deterioration of relations between the two protagonists was 
mainly due to Bainimarama’s brazen demand for military amnesty that became 
unacceptable to the SDL coalition for legal and political reasons. Bainimarama 
had often labelled Qarase a ‘liar’, once to Qarase’s face in the presence of the
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President Ratu Iloilo at a special meeting at government house in March 2004,
T 1
because of this ‘false promise’ to the military.
By mid-2005, the government’s attempt to enact a Promotion of Reconciliation 
Tolerance and Unity Bill, customary fishing rights or Qoliqoli Bill and the Land 
Tribunal Bills had drawn stiff opposition from a wide cross-section of Fiji’s 
community led by the military. Officers in uniform were ordered to sit en masse 
in the gallery of parliament to intimidate SDL parliamentary members during 
the debate on these controversial bills. Many NGOs and businesspersons came 
together in opposition to such legislation. The military used this cross- section of 
society to agitate against government. A major bone of contention which 
infuriated the military from 2002 was the suspicion that the government was 
reneging on its promise to bring those involved in the 2000 coup and mutiny to 
justice. Ironically, after Qarase and his SDL government were elected, they 
promised that the military would be granted immunity for all acts during the 
crisis through an immunity bill. The military believed that government was 
trying to turn a blind eye to those chiefs and politicians who were implicated in 
destabilising the nation and ignoring the military for its own political survival.
Threats to government
In 2002, the emerging antagonism began to appear as tit-for-tat public rhetorical 
showdowns in the media. Both sides were urged by the President to refrain from 
public slanging matches as they only heightened on-going instability. But the 
public rhetorical duel continued with the military beginning to claim a guardian 
role in the public interest. A persistent issue was the substantive appointment of 
Ratu Jope Seniloli as Vice President with Ratu Iloilo as President. There was 
much regional traditional politicking before the Great Council of Chiefs, the 
Electoral College for both the high offices, endorsed the appointments on the 
14th of March 2001.32 Seniloli’s complicity in the sham Speight government 
swearing-in ceremony was under police investigation. His appointment drew 
criticism from the military. The appointment was seen by the military as a coup 
maker holding high office. Ratu Jope was later jailed for his role in that 
ceremony but released on a Compulsory Supervisory Order for health reasons. 
Also later jailed was Ratu Naiqama Lalabalavu, the Tui Cakau and cabinet
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minister. Ratu Naiqama was charged for consorting with rebel soldiers in the 
takeover of the Sukanaivalu VC military barrack at Labasa, Vanua Levu. He 
was convicted and granted a Compulsory Supervision Order as an extramural
”5 'i
prisoner. The sentencing of these two high chiefs appeared to satisfy the call 
for justice, but was criticised by the military for its leniency. One tactic that was 
used in threatening government was the pulling out of the President and Prime 
Minister’s military body guards and security at their residences.34
Commander’s Contract Compounds Antagonism
The Commander’s five year contract was to expire in February 2004. From early 
2003, this became a contentious issue that embroiled the SDL government and 
the military in public controversy.3^  A tru ce  brokered by the  Vice 
President, R atu  Jo n i Madraiwiwi, betw een Q arase  and 
B ain im aram a lasted  only a few m onths. B ain im aram a continued  
to accuse the  governm ent of trying to get rid of him  so th a t it 
would be free to p u rsu e  co rrup t p rac tices.36 According to section 
112(2) of the 1997 Fiji Constitution and the Fiji Military Forces Act Cap 81, 
section 3(3), the commander of the RFMF is appointed by the President on the 
advice of the Minister for Home Affairs. According to CCF’s Jone Dakuvula, 
the government agenda since winning the 2001 elections was to remove 
Bainimarama as Commander as his stand in wanting to uphold the rule of law
37was inconsistent with government intentions of fostering Fijian reconciliation.
In early April 2003 the Commander announced in a senior officers meeting that 
he was informed that government had no intention of renewing his
• 38appointment.
In June 2003 it was revealed by retired Colonel and CEO of Home Affairs 
Jeremaia Waqanisau that an official committee was considering who to 
recommend to Home Affairs Minister Joketani Cokanasiga to replace 
Bainimarama. Government was also considering a Cabinet Minister, two 
senior civil servants and two government backbenchers, all former military 
officers, as possible replacements.40 Waqanisau, being one of the senior civil 
servants, it seemed, was also a candidate for the appointment. In August of
202
2003, the military called for the removal as CEO Home Affairs of Waqanisau, 
who had refuted claims by the military on a radio talk back show that it had put 
the SDL government in power. Waqanisau, as official secretary in the 
President’s office, also played a key role in the decisions emanating from the 
President’s office in late 2000-2001. Dakuvula argues that Waqanisau was 
‘without a doubt a political civil servant.’41 It may be argued that Waqanisau as 
a civil servant was towing the elected government line.
Suspension of Five Senior Officers
In 2003, one of the more controversial issues was the suspending of five senior 
officers.42 The whole drama arose after Bainimarama had physically confronted 
Waqanisau for allegedly being part of a government conspiracy to not renew his 
contract as Commander due in February 2004. A police complaint was 
subsequently filed against Bainimarama. In August 2003, at the height of his 
much publicised contract extension issue, these officers alleged the Commander 
also committed sedition at a military conference. As a result, Colonel George 
Kadavulevu, the Chief of Staff at Strategic Headquarters, Colonel Alfred 
Tuatoko, the Director Strategic Command, Lt Col Samuela Raduva, the Chief of 
Staff at Land Forces Headquarters, Lieutenant Colonel Akuila Buadromo, a 
Chief Staff Officer at Strategic Headquarters and Commander Timoci Koroi 
also a Chief Staff Officer at Strategic Headquarters, were suspended pending 
investigations in January of 2004. The purging of these senior officers in 2004 
set the scene for the final takeover of government in December 2006.
I was away studying at Defence College Australia that year but on a trip to Asia 
and the Pacific I visited Fiji and, therefore, was able to catch up with 
Commodore Bainimarama and other peer officers. At Denarau Resort, Nadi, I 
had personal informal talks with the Commodore who informed me of various 
military issues bothering him, most of which was the expiry of his contract in 
February 2004. It seemed at that time, forces within government and some 
senior officers were keen to see the replacement of Commodore Bainimarama as 
Commander. By August of 2003 this issue was emblazoned in the news media. 
What further captivated the nation in December of that year 2003 were the 
circumstances surrounding the suspending of the five senior military officers.
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In mid-March of 2004, the five officers, in a statement released on TV, alleged 
sedition by the Commander at a 2004 budget conference held at Strategic 
Headquarters, Berkeley Crescent on Tuesday the 16th of December 2003.
The original statement was also hand delivered to me in my office by Lt Col 
Samuela Raduva on the 11th of March 2004. Reproduced below is a copy of the 
statement co-signed by Colonel Tuatoko, Lt Col Raduva and Comd Koroi.
Interlude
STATEMENT BY 21683 COLONEL ALFRED TUATOKO, CM, MSD, Grad Dip 
Mnmgt Studies; Grad Dip Strai Studiesvjssc, psc, Fiji Infantry Corps
rJ- ■
%A .2004 budget briefing by DMR (Capt Teleni) was scheduled for Tuesday 16 December,, 
2003. Present in this briefing were CLF, DMR, DSC&FD, CO ENGR, CO 3FIR, Maß 
Balawa, CO FTG, Comdr T Koroi, Maj S Vatu and WOl Leweni. During the course of;' 
the briefing, Comd RFMF rang DMR and .advised him to have all members in the! 
briefing await him and also have COL Kadavulevu present.-•
When Comd RFMF arrived he took over the meeting and advised us of his intent to 
remove the current Government except for the MFA&ET and the GCC. Commanded: 
RFMF also indicated that some NGO’s and Diplomatic Corp are behind him. The Comd';: 
instructed that we draw up plans for the removal of the Government and to provide äpy 
back briefing to him on his return on the 21 December 2003 from , his visit to 
LTCOL Pita Drift then said in the conference “..io, vinaka me caka ni sa rui levu ra^,.'] 
b u ta k o \ Commander RFMF then rang the Ministry of Home Affairs and asked to sp.da|||$ 
to the Minister. When he was told that the Minister was not available, he asked fo r $ | | | :|  
Parliamentary sitting schedule for 2004! He ended the conference by saving 
cakava vaka totolo na plan de dou qai kidacala p  sa liu sobu i ra.”
After the Comd left the meeting wa. decided that we would not draw up plans for th e |p i  
military takeover as this was a criminal and treasonable act. However the staff of H Q fl |  
RFMF would draw up an advice for Comd RFMF advising him against his intention 
remove the Government.
On Thursday 18 December during Comds scheduled conference he reiterated his intent to; 
remove the Government of the day save HE the President and that we were to continue Jp;ä§|3 
draw up plans for the takeover of government, He added that he did not want anybody; 4 ; 
sitting on lufc fence and if anyone does not agre-.i with his intention, is to leave. At 
of this meeting Comd personally interviewed several officers. These officers'are 
Kadavulevu, Col Tuatoko, Capt(N) Teleni, LTCOL Radtiva and Comdrs Koroi audm';;i 
Natuva.
In my interview with Comd he stated that he would forcefully remove the present |  
government if his term as Comd RFMF was not renewed. I advised him that such an ac|;^L 'l 
was illegal and amounted to treason. I advised him that there are legal ways to settle his - 
disagreement with government and that he must follow that legal path. Comd said th f^. ' ||J  
doing so would take too much time. He said that removing the government may be C . | : |  
legally wrong but was morally correct. He also said that he must remain as Comd because 
there was no one who could be Comd and pursue the May 2000 prosecutions as he is 
doing.
I told him that the issue regarding the renewal of his term was a matter between him and - J |  
government. He should not use the institution as a means of renewing his term. Comd did :■ |^ | 
not accept this and asked where I stood regarding his intention to remove government. I
204
told him that I could not support him on such an illegal and treasonable act. Comd than'f 
directed that I keep out of the planning activities. My interview thus ended.
Following the individual interviews we spoke amongst ourselves and accept for Comdr 
Natuva whom I did not speak to, we all had advised Comd that his intention was illegal f  
and treasonable and that each of us did not support tbe Comd in such an activity. Col GK 
than advised us that we must provide Comd with a written advise in order to convince 
, him not to carry out his. intent. The advice should be ready for Comd before 31 Dec. The 
advice was actually tendered to the Comd in early Jan 04.
On T9 December 2003 at the W Os& SGTs M ess, in his address to the officers and senior 
non-commissioned officers, he said that 2004 will be a difficult year and our individual 
loyalty to him (Commander RFMF} will be put to the test.
On the afternoon of Monday 12 January, COS HQ RFMF called a meeting of the HQ 
RFMF $taff and advised that he had been relieved of his appointment and told to go leave 
because \>f the advice that was tendered to Comd advising him against his intent to 
remove the government. Comd also advised him that all officers who formed or 
contributed to the advice are to also go on leave.
Comd RFMF called a conference on Tuesday 13 January 04 and amongst other things 
advised the conference that we should not be shaken by the ongoing saga over the 
renewal or otherwise of his term as Comd RFMF. He also advised the conference that K£ M 
had relieved Col Kadavulevu of the COS HQ RFMF appointment and has nominated 
LTCOL Baleidrokadroka as COS because he watfGisappclrucd w ith  the wriltcu adviceVfie ‘ 
received. He also directed that all the officers who formed the advice and all officers at "C 
both SHQ and LFC who did not support him on the path he was taking the RFMF,' to $4« 
stick to their principles, take all outstanding leave and when their leave was finished, that 
they do the honourable thing and resign from the RFMF. He also mentioned that he was 
only testing us in the interviews and that he would not force anyone to resign.
On Thurs 15 Jan I received a posting order showing amongst other changes that LTCOL 
J Pickering had assumed my appointment of DSC&FD.
/ /  March 2004
Witness: _
S.V.
Lieutenant Colonel 
// March 2004
'■ ’ •4
T. X  KOROI
Commander (N) ' Tt
i(  March 2004
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On the 21st of December of 2003, I arrived from Australia with my family. My 
wife and I were invited to attend the marriage ceremony and wedding function 
of the Commodore’s daughter on the 29lh December. I was told during the 
course of the function by the Commodore of his plans to appoint me as Chief of 
Staff of Strategic Headquarters in place of Colonel Kadavulevu. My 
appointment as the acting chief of staff was publicised in the Fiji Sun 
subsequently as, “Lt-Col Baledrokadroka was Commodore Bainimarama’s 
right-hand man during the May 19, 2000, attempted coup and the November 
mutiny. He was in charge of several military operations, which included the 
storming of Kalabu District School, hunting down of rebel supporters in Vanua 
Levu and the Counter Revolutionary Warfare soldiers.”43
On Tuesday the 13th of January 2004 at a conference chaired by the 
Commander, I therefore began the new appointment at Strategic Headquarters 
surrounded by the suspension controversy of my colleagues. There were other 
junior officers and senior non- commissioned officers who were purged at 
Strategic Headquarters. New staff such as Commander Lesi Natuva, the former 
Commanding Officer of Logistic Support Unit, was appointed the Director 
Military Resources to replace Captain Esala Teleni who was selected for 
Defence College Australia to replace me that year. Lt Colonel John Pickering 
was appointed Director Strategic Command to replace the suspended Colonel 
Tuatoko in the overhaul at Strategic Headquarters.
Colonel Alfred Tuatoko had been acting Land Force Commander during the 
2000 crisis in the absence of Colonel Naivalurua on course at Defence College 
in 2000. He was intimately knowledgeable about the twists and turns of the 
military stances during that crisis. On Naivalurua’s return he was posted as 
Director Strategic Command and Force Development at Strategic Headquarters 
in January of 2001. As a Rotuman he would have been pressured by Fijian 
ethno-nationalist politics.
Tuatoko states in his statement that on the 18th of December 2003 at an 
interview with Commodore Bainimarama, the Commander said, “He 
[Bainimarama] would forcefully remove the present government if his term as 
Commander RFMF was not renewed”. In addition Colonel George Kadavulevu
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was reported to have told the Commander before being told to go on leave in his 
interview with him the same day “It is your personal agenda with the Ministry 
of Home Affairs and you should settle it with the Minister and the CEO. You 
should not drag the military into it.”44
The ensuing suspension of the five officers is mired in the issue of the 
Commodore’s renewal of contract which is inextricably bound to lingering 
issues emanating from the May 2000 takeover. In an editorial the Fiji Sun 
backed the extension of Bainimarama’s contract by stating, “What Commodore 
Bainimarama wants is that all the people who were behind and supporting the 
May 2000 political crisis and mutiny, be brought to justice.”45 In the event, the 
government renewed Bainimarama’s contract under pressure.
Fijian Blueprint- Affirmative Action Programme
Another major issue that irked the military was the corrupt implementation of 
the Affirmative Action programme. Robertson and Sutherland had asserted that, 
“economic affirmative action has brought some improvement, but the Fijian 
elite have benefited much more that the ordinary Fijian.”46 The military was not 
against the indigenous affirmative action programme per se, but its manipulation 
by the iTaukei elite. This social justice policy, however, according to Fiji’s 
Human Rights Commissioner, Shaista Shameem, ‘violated provisions of the 
Constitution and compromised Fiji's international obligations.’47 Qarase 
replying to criticism explained
The affirmative action program was an integral part of the Government's policy of 
providing access to equal opportunities for all disadvantaged communities as prescribed 
in the 1997 Constitution.48
In fact the affirmative action program had also been the mainstay of the
approach of the ousted FLP Coalition government. In June of 1999 at the
opening of parliament, the President Ratu Mara had stated
Government will implement affirmative action and social justice programs to secure for 
all citizens and communities equal and equitable access to opportunities, amenities and 
services to better their lives.49
Qarase explained that the programs were in three-sub categories: education and 
training, land and housing and participation in commerce and in all levels and
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branches of State services. He said there were 29 programs implemented since 
2002, which involved a budget of more than $250million.M] He said the 
programs were administered by 16 different ministries and departments and that 
each program had specific goals and target beneficiaries, means of assistance, 
performance indicators to measure success and criteria for selecting members of 
the target group. One of these schemes was the agriculture assistance for rural 
dwellers scam which was to dog the SDL throughout its rule.
A ploy used to threaten government to withdraw its ‘racially biased’ policies 
was to get sympathisers such as Mahendra Chaudhry to announce the threat of a 
coup as he did in January of 2002.51 Chaudhry was also making political 
mileage out of the failure of the SDL side to apologize for comments by the 
Minister for Women and Culture, Asenaca Caucau, who had been perceived by 
many as grossly racist. In a Parliament sitting, she compared Indo-Fijians to 
“wild weeds”, just one of the several racially loaded comments made in the 
House by ethnic Fijian parliamentarians in 2002. This racial slanging by the 
SDL parliamentary members did not endear them to Indo-Fijians and also to 
many citizens and NGOs who sided with Bainimarama because of such 
insensitive public utterances.
Agriculture Scam
On the 11th of January 2002, a scam was discovered by the Ministry of Finance 
at the Agriculture Ministry under the Fijian and Rotuman Affirmative Action 
Agriculture Assistance Scheme initiated after the 2000 coup. It was revealed 
that unethical procedures were employed by civil servants in the purchase and 
distribution of fanning implements to mainly Fijian fanners and villagers. From 
June 2000 to October 2001 the scam continued unabated allegedly as an 
appeasement and vote buying ploy during Qarase’s interim government. Prime 
Minister Qarase accepted responsibility for the $25 million scam but denied that 
funds had been abused and refused to step down.53 The purchase of these 
implements and the authorisation by senior civil servants who purportedly were 
acting on behalf of the interim government minister was later exposed in various 
court trials.54 The Permanent Secretary Agriculture Peniasi Kunatuba, three 
other Ministry of Agriculture staff and a businessman were imprisoned for their
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roles in the scam. The opposition led by Chaudhry were quick to exploit the 
scam by casting doubt on the legitimacy of the 2001 elections. The agriculture 
scam was one of the first issues that apparently drew Bainimarama and 
Chaudhry together and hardened military opposition against the iTaukei political 
elites. Chaudhry, obviously in cahoots with the military, predicted that another 
coup would take place in February 2002 just months after his defeat in the 2001 
election. To this veiled threat backbencher Mick Beddoes called for the FLP 
leader to be investigated. 55
Withdrawal of support to government
One of the early major issues that saw the military withdraw its support for 
government was the failure of Qarase to invite the FLP into cabinet in a 
government of national unity as stipulated in the Constitution. In a thinly veiled 
threat Bainimarama opined in the media that the government might have to 
resign as a result of the upcoming Supreme Court ruling on a government of 
national unity.56 After the court ruling against the government, Qarase did offer 
to share power with Chaudhry. But when Chaudhry’s response was less than 
enthusiastic, Qarase promptly dropped the issue. Josaia Daini, the SDL General 
Secretary, reiterated that after the 2001 elections, adhering to the government of 
national unity entitlement with the opposition Fiji Labour Party as stipulated in 
the 1997 Constitution was blind legalism that overlooked Fiji’s political 
reality.57 It seems Qarase and Chaudhry were not about to commit political 
suicide as experienced by former Prime Minister Rabuka and NFP leader Jai 
Ram Reddy in taking a centrist approach. This hard-nosed realist approach, 
which undermined the provisions of the constitution that called for a 
government of national unity, was interpreted as racialism by the military. The 
military saw this as the fault of Qarase and his nationalist coalition partners, the 
CAMV. 58
Withdrawal of support for government continued into the policy making arena 
of the military. After the 2000 coup there were also internal and public calls for 
vital military reforms. In line with government’s strategic development plan 
2003-2005 that put priority on security and stability, a Commission consisting of 
Bob Lowry, Stewart Firth and Jesoni Vitusaqavulu produced the National
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Security White Paper : A Safe and Prosperous Fiji 2005. The last White Paper 
for Fiji, Defending Fiji was produced in 1997 by Rabuka’s SVT government. It 
was never implemented in full mainly because of lingering suspicion towards 
the military by Chaudbry’s incoming FLP coalition government.
This time with the continuing antagonism brewing between the government and 
the military, the 2005 White Paper became a bone of contention that further 
strained the already tenuous relationship. The military all throughout the 
compiling of the Paper was uncooperative and suspicious that it was an attempt 
to weaken the military. The White Paper ‘strongly recommended’ that the 
position of Commander be selected through a Constitutional Office Commission 
similar to the Police59. This was to avoid nepotism and to promote a professional 
military ethos that ensures that promotion to the highest rank is based on 
merit.’60 The paper also called for more government oversight of the military in 
‘subjecting it to the control of the minister’ and the means this control is to be 
exercised.61 What infuriated Bainimarama was the Paper’s criticism that the 
military was top heavy and that it should also be downsized to half its strength 
for the sake of stability. I argue that the recommendations of the Paper spurred 
the Commander to do the opposite and initiate a new policy of Military for Life 
Concept in 2004 where the military extended its role into commerce, nation 
building and finally politics. Even though prior to elections the government then 
shelved the National Security White Paper along with a Draft Defence White 
Paper done by government consultant Nelson Delailomaloma, the damage had 
been done.
In early January of 2006, FLP President Jokapeci Koroi in a public interview on 
Fiji TV One encouraged the military to conduct a coup. She said the coup was 
necessary to reinstall her overthrown FLP government to take care of unfinished 
business. This spat triggered my suspension as Land Force Commander. I was 
against the politicization of the military. Furthermore the unprecedented anti- 
SDL party ‘Truth and Justice’ campaign carried out by the military’s public 
relations teams prior to the 2006 elections signified the total withdrawal of 
Bainimarama and his cohorts’ support for Qarase and the SDL’s policies. 
Ironically eighty per cent of soldiers voted for the SDL party, signifying the
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strong communal bond between the military and the nationalist SDL party. This 
ensured Qarase’s second tenure of power where he went on to form the first 
multi- party cabinet government.
Bainimarama’s final withdrawal of support for government came with his call 
for the early termination of Police chief Andrew Hughes’s contract as 
Commissioner. What had triggered the Commander’s call? Bainimarama 
through his contact at the Director of Public Prosecution Office learnt that the 
Police were close to arresting him. As Commissioner Hughes later revealed “I 
had earlier taken a brief of evidence to the DPP and it was agreed that there was 
a case to answer on a sedition charge.”63
On the 10th of November 2006 Home Affairs Minister, Josefa Vosanibola, 
while refusing to terminate Hughes’s contract as demanded by Bainimarama, 
had sent the Commander his reply. The letter had stressed under the heading, 
‘Stop all criminal police investigations against the military officers and 
investigations against the CRMF’:
Your request to government is a total contradiction of your widely acknowledged 
principle that “no one is above the law”. It would undermine the general public’s 
respect for the future of law if special dissipation or selective justice is accorded to 
military personnel who may have broken the law. Government is in full agreement with 
your commonly held view that, “justice must not only be done but seen to be done.64
On the 17th of November 2006, the Fiji police invited Bainimarama by a letter to 
attend an interview at 11am on Wednesday the 22nd of November 2006. They 
were advised late that day that he was scheduled to travel to New Zealand for a 
personal visit at 8.40 am out of Nadi on Tuesday the 21st of November.65 On 
his return, after the failed attempt by New Zealand’s Foreign Affairs Minister 
Winston Peters to broker an eleventh hour agreement between Bainimarama and 
Qarase at Wellington, the military Commander had burnt his ships.
Military Coup d’etat
Finer’s final mode of intervention, the military coup, like the previous modes, 
obviously applies to Fiji. How has this phenomenon unfolded? The core 
argument of this thesis is the reversal of the Turagci-bciti relationship with the 
rise of a political military typified by the 2006 coup. We need to revisit this neo-
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traditional relationship to examine the final phase of Finer’s modes. After 
Rabuka’s coup in 1987, a major actor in Fiji’s contemporary politics, Ratu 
Mara, still loomed large. In fact, it could be said that he was the beneficiary of 
the coup as the interim Prime Minister from 1987-1992 and later as President 
from 1993-2000. Mara was a nephew and protege of Fijian high chief and 
colonial era statesman Ratu Sir Lala Sukuna. The Tui Nayau was the last 
surviving of the leading chiefs amongst the so called ‘big four’ from the colonial 
administration and post-Independence era.66 It is well documented that the 
chiefly elite were reticent in embracing Independence for fear of being 
undermined by democratic rule. After the fall of the Mara-led Alliance Party 
which was backed by the Eastern chiefly elite, the GCC-sponsored Soqosoqo ni 
Vakavulewa ni Taukei (SVT) Party was conceived in July 1990 and was 
launched in October 1991, again, on behalf of the chiefs and the iTaukei 
community. In Ratuva’s words, the party was seen as another “attempt to 
preserve and perpetuate chiefly hegemony and communalism.”67 According to 
its constitution it aimed to “Promote the interests of indigenous Fijians, their 
advancement, protection of their rights and interests and provide means of 
social, economic and political development in association with other ethnic 
communities in Fiji.”68
As previously mentioned, commoner Sitiveni Rabuka edged out Mara’s wife 
and high chief Adi Lady Lala for the presidency of the SVT. The choice of 
Rabuka exacerbated the schism between the doyen of modem Fiji politics and 
the ‘young Turk’. Ratu Mara later revealed his relationship with Rabuka had 
“Never been good. Never has.”69 The elderly statesman was also critical of 
Rabuka’s leadership, saying “He showed in the seven years of his... he couldn't 
run a government.” As a close diplomatic observer put it, “In an earlier era, 
Ratu Mara would have been an ideal king, a benevolent dictator; he became an
71anachronism when the forces of change swept through the islands.”
Mara was not to be outdone though. Going into the 1999 elections, the newly 
formed Veitokani Lewenivanua Vakarisito (VLV) or Christian Democratic 
Alliance party was widely known to have Mara as its patron. According to 
Fraenkel et al, “the VLV was a chrysalis for Fijians aggrieved at Rabuka having
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usurped the leadership of the chiefs party and having compromised with the 
Indians.” The dynastic political ambition of Mara continued into the twenty- 
first century with the formation of the VLV party. Fraenkel stated, “Many 
suspected that Ratu Mara’s dynastic ambitions included both gaining control 
over the top Fijian chiefly title and maintaining a firm grip over the senior 
command of the Fiji military forces”. In a twist of high irony, though, Ratu 
Mara was ousted from office on 29 May 2000 by the military citing the doctrine 
of necessity. At the time some saw the Military Commander’s actions as an 
attempt to appease George Speight and his coup supporters who were calling for 
the abrogation of the Constitution and the removal of Mara as President, and 
Opposition leader Mick Beddoes even called on the Army to answer for its 
failure to protect the President Mara. Beddoes called it a ‘fundamental failure’ 
on the part of the Army.74 Beddoes’s call epitomized the low point in the 
Turaga-Bati relationship. For four more years after his removal Ratu Mara 
endured, a broken man in retirement. He passed on after a short illness at the age 
of 83 years. His dynastic ambitions, however, are alive in the present military 
regime with his two sons-in-law Ratu Epeli Ganilau, the former Minister of 
Defence, and Ratu Epeli Nailatikau, the President of Fiji. Ironically the much 
publicized falling out of Ganilau and of Lt Col Tevita Mara with Bainimarama 
in October 2010 is the continuation of this dynastic ambition.
Where do Commodore Bainimarama and Qarase fit into the Mara dynastic 
agenda? Bainimarama had a seemingly unambitious military career amongst his 
peers prior to being thrust to power. Qarase, on the other hand, was a capable, 
diligent technocrat with strong nationalist views. Both became proteges of Mara 
and his brand of elitist Fijian political paramountcy by accident. Fraenkel et al, 
in tracing the link of Bainimarama to the Mara dynasty explained “His name 
was suggested by Brigadier General Ratu Epeli Ganilau, who was resigning as 
commander in order to contest -  unsuccessfully as it turned out -  as a candidate 
of the newly formed VLV.” Bainimarama had had a military career restricted 
to the RFMF Naval Squadron. The leading contender for the post of military 
commander was Colonel Ratu George Kadavulevu, a capable, senior army staff 
officer with senior UN peacekeeping command experience. Being of the chiefly 
Cakobau family of Bau, however, Kadavulevu was seen as an arch rival to
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Mara’s dynastic ambitions.77 Bainimarama’s choice at the time was hailed by 
insiders as an attempt to re-professionalize the military and render it apolitical 
once again. Others, however, saw the appointment was more to do with Ganilau 
and his backers having a pliant protege in charge of the military.
An administrative incident that was played up by Bainimarama showed his 
political skills and probably clinched him the Commander position. In 1998 as 
the raw incoming Colonel General Staff Operations, Bainimarama brought to 
the Commander Brigadier Ganilau’s notice, on his return from his final visit to 
Fiji’s peacekeeping troops overseas, a senior officer posting order 
memorandum. This memo was signed by Colonel Kadavulevu as Colonel 
Administration Quartermaster and a rival contender for the Commander 
position. This posting order, it seems, was not done in consultation with the 
Commander. The implication was that Kadavulevu was jumping the gun in 
assuming that he was the next to be Commander. After this incident 
Bainimarama became Chief of Staff and a step away from the post of 
Commander. Among the senior officers of the military it was known the choice 
of Bainimarama for Commander was because the Navy man would be more 
malleable to the Mara-Ganilau political agenda. As Bainimarama tasted power, 
however, he began to plot a political career divorced of the Mara influence 
cultivated through his mentor, former military commander and the son- in- law 
of the high chief, Ratu Epeli Ganilau.
Laisenia Qarase began a career in the civil service with a bachelor in commerce 
from Auckland University in the 1960s. By 1982 he had reached permanent 
secretary level in the Alliance government administration. He was one of the 
Lauan islander bureaucrats in the 1970s that had enjoyed the patronage of Mara, 
as his high chief. In the 1990s he was the business and financial advisor to the 
Fijian Affairs Board and the Great Council of Chiefs and the main advocate 
behind the Fijian Holdings Limited indigenous enterprise. He then headed the 
Fiji Development Bank (FDB) from 1983-98 and Merchant Finance (a 
subsidiary of Fijian Holdings Ltd) in 1998-2000. His principled stand for 
indigenous affirmative action had brought about his resignation from the FDB as 
the architect of the ill-fated Equity Investment Management Company Limited
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(EMICOL). This super market venture for Indigenous business people ended 
in financial failure during the mid-1990s. In 1992 Qarase used his privileged 
position to controversially secure a loan from the FDB to buy shares in the 
newly established $20 million government granted Fijian Holdings Limited in 
which he was a board member. In 1999 as a GCC nominee, Qarase became a 
Senator in the upper house. Qarase was also known as a staunch Methodist and 
traditionalist who by 2006 was himself installed as chief of his clan on Vanua 
Balavu Island. He had affirmed his strong support for the chiefly system, as 
quoted:
79
I believe that the chiefs of Fiji have relevance for all our citizens not just the Fijians; 
they still represent stability, order and continuity. ... If the chiefs were diminished, the 
entire nation would be weakened and be vulnerable.80
Qarase was a well-known financial technocrat. He was certainly not a novice in 
elite iTaukei politics. Reflecting on the first days after George Speight’s 
civilian coup, Qarase writing in 2002 in the UK Parliamentarian journal said:
I followed the drama of the insurrection closely, as a citizen very much concerned for 
his country. Fiji was experiencing an unprecedented ordeal and when the army moved I 
felt it had an opportunity to bring back order and help people to feel safe in their homes 
again. But at no stage did I think I would be called on to play a part in the saving of the 
country.81
According to Qarase, in early June of 2000, Commodore Bainimarama had 
approached him and other Fijian bureaucrats to act as advisors to the military 
administration. Qarase wrote:
I did not hesitate. In my view-and that of many others-the army was motivated out of 
concern for the country. It gave hope when all was darkness. It was not long after this 
that I was asked by Commodore Bainimarama to head an interim civilian cabinet with 
freedom to appoint Ministers of my choice. There was a more difficult decision to make 
here. Acceptance meant giving up a well-paying and secure post as Managing Director 
of Merchant Bank. I would be moving into an extremely volatile and possibly 
dangerous political environment. I had my wife, children, and grandchildren to think 
about. They were central to my life.82
Qarase said some of the issues that led to the coup included the controversy over 
the extension of Commodore Bainimarama's contract and the deteriorating 
relationship between the army and his government. This ‘deteriorating 
relationship’ was marked by the ongoing police investigation into Bainimarama 
and the military. The Police Commissioner Hughes had confirmed that police
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had files of seven ongoing investigations against Commodore Bainimarama. 
The ongoing investigations involving the military commander, included: 1) the 
abrogation of the 1997 Constitution 2) the removal of the President Ratu Mara 
3) the death of 5 CRW soldiers during the mutiny 4) military overspending 
2000-2005 5) the seditious circumstances surrounding the dismissal of five 
senior officers in 2003 6) the threat by Bainimarama against CEO Home Affairs 
Jeremaia Waqanisau’s life 7) the illegal removal of a shipping container of 
ammunitions from customs.
Qarase’s politics, according to Robertson and Sutherland, is the continuation of 
the ideology of iT’aukei paramountcy as also perpetrated by Mara and Rabu'ka. 
Lawson in her examination of Mara’s ‘Pacific Way’ best describes this political 
ideology as, “ In terms of local politics, it has been closely associated with
conservative chiefly leadership where ‘consensus’ may mean little more than
86conformity with the wishes of that leadership.”
Indeed, this politics of patronage is symbolized in the GCC through the Fijian 
Affairs Board’s creation of Fijian Holdings Limited (FHL), where Fijian 
institutions and Fijian elites have held shares in what Ratuva describes as the 
‘politics of communal capitalism’. The former Director of FHL Sitiveni 
Weleilakeba made the following revelation in the 2012 trial of Qarase, who 
was charged with nine counts of alleged insider trading in FHL:
The FHL was incorporated in November 1984; its purpose was to accelerate indigenous 
Fijians participation in commercial ventures. The concept of FHL was borrowed from 
Malaysia and that Qarase was the officer who did research on the concept. And that to 
the best of his knowledge, Qarase’s research led to the formation of FHL.88
Bainimarama and his military regime on the other hand were determined to keep 
iTaukei elites from using the mantra of ‘Fijian paramountcy’ to further their 
political and financial agendas. His escalation of the antagonism inevitably led 
to the final mode of intervention which was to invert the Turaga-bati 
relationship by a coup.
Conclusion
The emerging antagonism between Commodore Bainimarama and Prime 
Minister Qarase followed Finer’s escalating modes of military intervention.
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Indeed, the 2006 Fiji coup was the culmination of this intervention process. The 
initial concordance between Bainimarama and the elected SDL government 
headed by Qarase became so strained that the coup was inevitable and came as 
no surprise to many. In 2000-2001, though, Bainimarama had no intention of 
relinquishing power and restoring Chaudhry’s elected government to office. The 
military had tried to uphold the rule of law in keeping with its institutional 
virtues of discipline and order. After the Queen Elizabeth Barracks mutiny of 
2000 when Bainimarama escaped with his life, an obvious deep seated distrust 
of iTaukei political and communal leaders was left to fester in the military 
leader.
The Chandrika Prasad case appeal judgment that showed Bainimarama wanted 
to abrogate the constitution poses a distressing question as to the Commander’s 
intentions. He wanted to take the military outside the rule of law by not 
supporting a return of the Chaudhry government after the hostage crisis and the 
incarceration of Speight. In retrospect his taste for absolute power had been 
piqued as he was egged on by opportunist political minders.
The only obvious one who could have influenced Bainimarama at this stage was 
his predecessor Ratu Epeli Ganilau, who had recommended him for 
Commander. Ratu Epeli had used his position in the military to launch his 
political career with the Ratu Mara backed VLV party in the 1999 elections 
without success. Bainimarama as his chief of staff from 1997-99 was implicitly 
in collusion with Ganilau, who saw this crisis as an opportunity to reassert his 
political ambitions.
After the November 2000 mutiny, Bainimarama was intent on bringing rebel 
soldiers to justice to restore institutional credibility. On the other hand, in 
protecting its ‘corporate interests’ the military explored the possibility of an 
immunity decree and amnesty bill for its own loyalist soldiers with Qarase’s 
interim government and later the SDL coalition government. The CAMV party 
of the Qarase coalition government had opposed a military amnesty bill. They 
stalled such a bill for obvious reasons. George Speight and his coup supporters 
were being prosecuted whilst the military were trying to escape prosecution for
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coup misdeeds. Amnesty was denied the military by government that henceforth 
came under military pressure. As we have seen, one tactic that was used in 
intimidating government was the pulling out of the President and Prime 
Minister’s body guards and security around their residence. Another ploy used 
was to get sympathisers such as FLP’s Mahendra Chaudhry and Jokapeci Koroi 
to announce threats of a coup as they did in January of 2002 and January 2006 
respectively. Qarase’s failure to invite the FLP into cabinet in a government of 
national unity as stipulated in the constitution had riled the military. 
Bainimarama showed his displeasure by stating publically that Qarase’s 
government might have to resign.
Bainimarama became convinced that Qarase was not acting in the national 
interest and that he was peddling an ethnic agenda spearheaded by the iTaukei 
and Rotuman Affirmative Action Programme, especially in the agriculture scam 
to buy votes in the lead up to the August 2001 elections. Bainimarama, it 
seemed, began to rue relinquishing power and suspected SDL/CAMV 
corruption and cronyism was at play in running government. As time went on, 
Bainimarama and his military spokesman Major Neumi Leweni became more 
virulent publically in criticising government. To the alarm of many senior 
officers, Bainimarama started upstaging in public a government it had initially 
put in place. Bainimarama’s support of government had worn thin by June of 
2003 after the Supreme Court ruling on a multi-party cabinet went against 
government. After his contract was renewed in March of 2004, Bainimarama 
embarked on a series of public slanging matches that even escalated to the point 
of conducting an anti-government Truth and Justice campaign prior to the 
May 2006 elections. The chasm between Commodore Bainimarama and Prime 
Minister Laisenia Qarase was left unbridged till too late.
In addition Police Commissioner Hughes had confirmed that police had files of 
seven ongoing investigations against Commodore Bainimarama. There are 
skeptics who insist that, it was the criminal charges that was about to be served 
on Bainimarama, that triggered the coup. Qarase in the end was willing to 
compromise by shelving the controversial Bills. Bainimarama, however, was 
driven by his misperception and by stakeholders spurring him on to carry out the
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2006 coup. In retrospect, a combination of government policies such as the 
affirmative action programme for the itaukei, and the formation of a military 
interventionist coalition with politicians encouraged the military leader into 
politics. The argument that Bainimarama was protecting the national interest and 
in so doing the corporate interest of the military still persists. In the final 
analysis the cause of the emerging antagonism and coup was the iTaukei power 
play that necessitated the inversion of the Turaga-Bati political relationship by 
the military, and brought about the political supremacy of the bati, the military 
commander.
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Chapter 8
The Acceleration of Military Power
Introduction
The high profile disputes between Bainimarama and Qarase over 2000-2006 
served as the backdrop to the subtle acquisition of power by the military over 
the office of the President. Each public falling out generated extensive media 
coverage and a heightening of tension across the country whilst at the same time 
the military tightened its hold on the senile President. Within the military, those 
public quarrels served to test loyalty, for rooting out opponents and for the 
promotion of more loyal officers. Through this process, Commodore 
Bainimarama cemented his grip both on the officer corps and the rank and file. 
Of particular importance were the growing RFMF influence on the President’s 
office, the re-location of the Strategic Headquarters and the activities of the 
Directorate of Army Legal Service. In Chapter 2, we discussed the changing 
organization of the RFMF in the run up to the 1987 and 2000 coup. Here, we 
pick up that story and examine how the military prepared itself to undertake the 
2006 coup. Why did the military need to accelerate institutional reforms that put 
it offside government? We argue that this is the consequence of a process of 
insidious military politicization where government is inevitably superseded in 
authority.
The move to de-politicize the military in the 1990s, which we discussed in 
Chapter 2, was reversed by the politicization of the military after the 2000 coup. 
In many a post-coup standoff, Bainimarama reminded the nation that it was the 
military that gave the Qarase government the mandate to rule, irrespective of 
elections. As early as April 2003, Bainimarama had called for the government to 
resign and let the law take its course, as some within the Qarase government had 
sided with 2000 coup leader Speight.1
By mid-2005, the military was publically signaling that it was operating 
independently of government. In addressing infantrymen at the Infantry Day
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celebrations at Mount Nakobalevu, Bainimarama said he should be the only one 
whose orders they should obey if there was a new political upheaval.~ Land 
Force Commander Colonel Naivalurua, in backing Bainimarama's call, said the 
Commodore’s decisions helped maintain stability. Naivalurua warned; “It’s not 
about anti-Govemment or anti-Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua, it's about 
national interest. We are not playing politics.” 3 Yet, in fact, the military had 
consolidated its political role.
In this chapter we will examine the military’s institutional changes that 
accelerated and facilitated military political power. We discuss the military’s 
hold on the office of the Presidency and the role of the President at crucial 
junctures of national crisis. We examine the establishing of Strategic 
Headquarters in 1999 and the purging of senior officers. We also examine the 
‘Military for Life Concept’ policy document, the illegal logistic build up to the 
2006 coup and Government’s Job Evaluation Review of the military. We then 
examine the influence of the Military Chaplaincy Department. Lastly, we 
examine the establishing of the Directorate of Legal Services and its influence 
on politicizing the military.
Military hold over President Ratu Iloilo
There has been much public speculation about the hold of the Fiji Military over 
Ratu Josefa Iloilo since his ascent to the Presidency after the removal of Ratu 
Sir Kamisese Mara in May of 2000. Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi, the former Vice 
President, in acting as a character witness for former Prime Minister 
Qarase prior to his sentencing later revealed in August 2012, “There was a lot of 
hostile exchanges between the government and the military prior to 2006 and it 
made it more difficult for the then government as the then President was 
sympathetic towards the military’s concerns.” 4
Iloilo was being criticized for his inaction in disciplining Bainimarama in his 
outbursts against the Qarase government. The secretariat of the Great Council of 
Chiefs, however, defended the office of the President stating government 
officials should respect the high office. The comment followed a report in the 
Fiji Times of the 20th of June 2005 quoting a government source as blaming
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Iloilo for failing to resolve government's standoff with the army.5 The 
newspaper quoted the source which was most probably the CEO at the Prime 
Minister’s Office saying requests by the government to the President to 
discipline Army commander Voreqe Bainimarama in order to maintain national 
stability were knocked back. Furthermore, the statement questioned Ratu 
Josefa's capability in performing his functions as head of state.6 Given the 
respect for the aging President, the Police Commissioner Andrew Hughes was 
the first to alert all to what was known by insiders, when he was interviewed 
after the coup. Hughes publically revealed, “He [Bainimarama] has essentially 
control on the President’s office through the CEO or the official secretary of the
n
President, who’s been colluding with the military for some time now.”
Where did it all start? Since the coup of 1987, the neo-traditional links between 
Government House and the military were further strengthened with Colonel 
Rabuka’s personal relationship with Ratu Penaia Ganilau as President. The 
former ‘Malaya Battalion’ commander ensured regular officers and soldiers 
served as aides-de-camp, cooks, drivers, butlers and security details at 
Government House. With the President’s son Ratu Epeli, who replaced Rabuka 
in becoming Commander of the RFMF in 1991, the line between the office of 
President, his family and the military profession became blurred, for the 
President was also the Commander- in- Chief of the Fiji Military Forces which 
his son commanded. Military personnel attached to government house became 
part of the President’s traditional family retinue, and had insight into palace or 
vanua politics. They often alerted the military commander about government or 
state matters of military or the Commander’s interest. On the demise of Ratu 
Penaia in December of 1993, Caretaker Prime Minister and high chief of Lau 
Ratu Mara took up the presidency. Mara was the father- in- law of the 
Commander Ratu Epeli and the military’s close relationship with Government 
House continued until December of 2000 when he resigned as President. Even 
after Mara had resigned from office, the military assisted the former President 
with military personnel as household servants, drivers and security guards and 
nurse aides until his death in 2004.
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After the 2000 political crisis, it was only natural, according to vanua politics, 
that the appointing body, the GCC, should endorse Ratu Iloilo, then Vice 
President, and Burebasaga Confederacy chief, to assume office after Mara. 
However, with George Speight and his supporters’ opposition to Mara and 
insisting that their candidate, the Kubuna chief Ratu Jope Seniloli be appointed, 
a stalemate developed. The GCC was split between the chiefs supporting 
Speight and his appointment, Ratu Jope, led by Adi Litia Cakobau versus the 
chiefs in the Ratu Josefa Iloilo camp. Ratu Jope, the Komai Naua of Bau, was a 
retired civil servant and highly regarded chief of the Tui Kaba clan of Bau. 
Bainimarama suspected the Bauan chiefly clan, including the Cakobau family, 
of complicity in Speight’s illegal takeover of the Chaudhry government. The 
Cakobaus had also long held political aspirations in competition with the 
Mara/Ganilau political dynasty. Ratu Josefa, who held the western Viti Levu 
chiefly title of Tui Vuda, was also a former teacher, provincial administrator, ex- 
Senator and former Vice President of the Methodist Church. He was also well 
into his seventies at the time of the crisis and was known to suffer from senile 
dementia. What made matters more threatening to the military was that the 
chainnan of the GCC was none other than fonner coup leader Sitiveni Rabuka. 
The fonner Prime Minister was smarting from his SVT 1999 elections loss and 
regaining his political popularity amongst the iTaukei was certainly on his mind.
The Ratu mai Verata, Ratu Ilisoni Ravoka, swayed the decision for Ratu Josefa 
Iloilo over Ratu Jope as President, although he may have been angling to get 
Mara reinstated as President. Ratu Ilisoni, an ex-naval rating with close 
traditional links to Commodore Bainimarama, was a known advisor of the 
military commander and favoured the ‘stick’ approach as in traditional chiefly 
authority over subjects. On the unwritten agenda it was circulated that 
Nailatikau, Ganilau and Adi Lala were still trying their utmost to reinstall Ratu 
Mara as President with personal approaches to sitting chiefs from other 
provinces.8
Thus, along with the choice of banker Laisenia Qarase as interim Prime 
Minister, Ratu Epeli Ganilau as chainnan of the GCC and Ratu Iloilo as 
President, Bainimarama had had a hand in all these nationally important
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appointments. With his choices for high office entrenched, Bainimarama started 
claiming a role for the RFMF as guardians of the national security interest. Ratu 
Iloilo became totally reliant on the Military. Like a pliant sacred chief or Tui of 
the traditional hierarchy, he was now beholden to his warlord or Vunivalu, the 
Commander of the RFMF Commodore Bainimarama, who held coercive powers 
over the people.
During his whole time in office from 2000 to 2009, Iloilo was cleverly shielded 
from Qarase and his government’s influence by a swarming staff of military 
minders. These soldiers, who included security guards, drivers, cooks and 
butlers all came under the Aide de Camp, an army officer. In a military 
orchestrated routine directed by the Commander, they channeled advice to the 
President through his wife and had access to all state and cabinet decisions 
needing presidential concurrence. In addition, the President’s position as 
Commander-in-Chief of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces allowed 
Commodore Bainimarama unchecked access to the senile chief. In 2011 in a 
revealing memorandum leaked out of the President’s Office, written by former 
permanent secretary Nacanieli Goneyali, an insight is gained into 
Bainimarama’s control over the President. Goneyali, who had lodged a 
complaint against Bainimarama, goes on to describe the disrespect and sheer 
audacity with which Bainimarama treated the senile and sickly president:
The Commander has no respect at all o f the office of the President. He was sitting with 
his right leg flexed over his left knee and both of his arms were fully extended laterally 
over the sofa at ninety degrees. There is obviously something wrong with this man, as 
no respectable Fijian will ever behave in this manner in the President’s Office .9
The relocation of the Commander’s office from QEB to the RFMF Strategic 
Command at Berkeley Crescent in November of 2000 close to Government 
House aided this close relationship and manipulation of the President on a 
routine basis. An example was the deliberate manipulation by the Commander 
to convince the President not to allow an investigation requested by five senior 
officers suspended for advising the Commander against his treasonous outburst 
at a conference in late 2003. This case also involved the forging of a 
Presidential letter and signature on official stationery to the Prime Minister
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Qarase outlining the President’s decision not to grant a redress of wrong for the 
five officers’ on the advice of Bainimarama. The case of these senior military 
officers’ suspension was highlighted on TV and the local papers and was the 
precursor to the next major issue involving Bainimarama and the SDL 
government in late 2003. This was the extension of his position as Commander. 
The five year contract was to expire in February 2004. It was finally granted, 
though, through controversial handling by an inept Minister of Home Affairs 
and a blundering government only too quick to appease an insolent Commander.
As the rift between Bainimarama and Qarase’s government grew, other 
contentious political issues brought Bainimarama out into the national media 
spotlight. All the time the Commodore ensured that the President was shielded 
from all government influences including advice from the Prime Minister, Vice 
President and Attorney General in particular. Ratu Iloilo was totally reliant on 
the Military in the person of Commodore Bainimarama during the power plays 
of the 2000 crisis. His military- induced resignation in August of 2009 was 
because at age eighty-eight years he had served his purpose as a ‘lackey’ for the 
military. Furthermore working in collusion with the Commander from mid-2004 
till his resignation with Ratu Iloilo in August 2009 was Rupeni Nacewa, the 
official secretary at Government House and close school friend of Bainimarama. 
Documents have come to light showing his pliant facilitation of the 
Bainimarama’s salary as commander RFMF and interim prime minister as 
‘approved’ by the President.10 Prior to the coup of December 2006 the Official 
Secretary to the President often frequented the office of the Commander at 
Berkeley Crescent to discuss state matters informally.11
Within this web of ‘palace staff the Commander was able to control the aged 
President and shield him from the more constitutionally correct advice and 
counsel of the Vice President Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi. Ratu Joni had become a 
threat to Bainimarama’s machinations since becoming Vice President in late 
2004. Bainimarama had hoped that Ratu Joni would side with the military 
against the Qarase government given the Commander’s close traditional links to 
the Roko Tui Bau. Ratu Joni’s legal integrity and long-held commitment to 
democracy was steadfast and this irked Bainimarama. Ratu Joni was used as the
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go-between by the government to persuade Iloilo and Bainimarama to side with 
government state policies and decisions to the disdain of Commodore 
Bainimarama. Ratu Joni, who was also surrounded by military minders, led by 
his aide- de- camp, was eventually hounded out of office and forced to resign in 
the wake of the December coup.
Establishing of Strategic Headquarters
With his appointment as Commander in 1999, Bainimarama began 
implementing some of the 1997 Defence White Paper recommendations. The 
bulk of the White Paper recommendations were not catered for in the 1998-99 
national budget as military expenditure was a contentious public issue in the 
lead-up to elections in 1999. The incoming Chaudhry government practically 
snubbed the White Paper as commissioned by the deposed Rabuka government. 
Obviously Chaudhry had no wish to reward the military which had toppled his 
coalition government in 1987. One major reform that went ahead, though, was 
the restructure of RFMF headquarters into two entities. A Strategic 
Headquarters was established which was upward and outward-focussed and a 
Land Forces Command Headquarters which was operationally downward 
focussed. The White Paper also recommended the Commander be co-located 
with the Minister of Home Affairs to strengthen civilian control of the military. 
This was not to be. Bainimarama thought otherwise and ran the military from 
two offices at these headquarters, one situated at Berkeley Crescent and the 
other at Queen Elizabeth Barracks. This arrangement only compounded the rift 
that had opened between government and the military in 2002.
Once Bainimarama’s contract was renewed for another five years in March of 
2004, however, a sense of relief was felt that the antagonism was diffused at 
least for the while. That year, a new team of officers set about upgrading and 
renovating the wooden colonial building which had been Strategic Command 
Headquarters since November of 2000. The major reason for the renovation was 
to entice the Commander to function from the one office at Strategic 
Headquarters, Berkeley Crescent instead of also working from Queen Elizabeth 
Barracks as was the case. It also ensured the Commander was in close proximity
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to the minister of Home Affairs at the New Government Buildings complex in 
down town Suva.
In an officer posting order memorandum of August 1999, it was obvious that
those senior officers who were perceived by Bainimarama to be unwelcoming of
his appointment as Commander were posted to higher Strategic Headquarters at
Berkeley Crescent within the compound of the President’s residence,
Government House. These were the officers described in the media in the
following terms: “Some senior army officers could not gulp [sic] the news but
12vowed to serve and support their new commander.”
In this way, Bainimarama denied these ‘unreceptive’ staff officers access to the 
rank and file at Land Force Command under the unit commanders. The 
arrangement kept these mostly senior officers separated from his chosen officers 
at Land Forces Headquarters who he perceived to be loyal to him. Bainimarama, 
then operating from his Commander’s office at Land Forces Command in Queen 
Elizabeth Office, was able to have direct access to the unit commanders in 
charge of troops. This personally ‘customized’ organizational reform worked 
splendidly for a now politicized Commander who ingratiated himself with the 
troops. One of the more effective methods Bainimarama used as reward or 
punishment of officers was his personal oversight of overseas military courses 
and training. In addition, cronyism was rife within the force as officers and men 
in the Bainimarama clique were given multiple peacekeeping tours of duty.
Military for Life Concept
One of the controversial initiatives by the Commander in early 2004 that made 
senior officers suspicious of Bainimarama’s long term career intent was the 
Military for Life concept paper which he signed as Administration Instruction 70 
of 29 March 2004. I had drafted the paper and had modeled the concept on 
Alfred Stepan’s military role expansion model coined ‘new professionalism.’ 
As the title suggests, the concept called for military personnel, active and 
reservists to engage in commercial and government enterprise, an expansion of 
the military’s role into national development for life. In simple terms, a military
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career involved civilian roles spanning the whole lifetime of a serviceperson. 
The first major project that was undertaken under this concept was with 
Telecom Fiji Ltd, the construction of its Tele-communications Satellite (Telsat) 
bases nation wide. Both the Fiji Navy and the Army Engineers reservists were 
employed.
Telsat Funds13
Between 2004 and 2005, Telecom paid RFMF $1,515,219 for the installation of 
modem high quality telephone satellite stations in 87 villages around Fiji. Out of 
this amount, $1.2 million was receipted in 2004. However, a government audit 
could not substantiate this from the ledgers as the records were not made 
available. The government auditor noted that the fund was used for purchases of 
goods and services that were not related to the Telesat project. These include:
a) The payment of rugby gear and travel expenses of the RFMF rugby team;
b) Expenses for the Truth and Justice Campaign of which details of only 
$55,467 was provided;
c) Per Diem allowances and advances that were approved by the Commander 
instead of the chief accountant as required under Finance Instructions 207.
The auditors also noted that the RFMF used an inactive trust account and re­
titled it to Telesat RFMF/Telecom Project thus not complying with finance 
circular 14/03.The auditor’s recommendations were as follows:
a) Expenditure relating to the Telesat project should be met from the Trust Fund.
b) Necessary action should be taken against officers who abused the fund.
The Audit Department’s further comments were:
Prior to the Telesat arrangement there were no specific instructions covering the 
movement of Telesat funds. Soldiers involved have been duly paid what was entitled to 
them. Utilising the balance of fund in this aspect is at the discretion of the Commander.
The Auditor General has noted that the funds generated were for the direct benefit of 
troops. 14
The Telsat project was a direct deal between Winston Thompson, the chairman 
of Telecom board (a coup beneficiary), and Commodore Bainimarama. The 
coining of the phrase ‘Military for Life Concept’ was Bainimarama’s idea. 
Three years before the December 2006 coup, the Commander most probably 
had envisioned a life long political leadership role, in addition to generating 
funds that monetary-wise benefitted his constituency of soldiers and sailors.
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Logistics build up to 2006 coup
The acceleration of military power inevitably had a logistics dimension. From
2000 to 2005, the Fiji military had major issues with the accountability of its
budget. As far back as June 2006, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) had
been expressing alarm over the RFMF Budget 2006. In an article, ‘Unpublished
RFMF Budget 2006 and Coup Nexus’ by investigative journalist Victor Lai,
government documents surfaced in 2010 showing Bainimarama and his staff
officers had carried out a cover-up to suppress fraud and police investigation
into falsification of local purchase orders (LPO) and invoices. A MHA
memorandum to cabinet on the military overspending read:
The Auditor General’s Report of 2004 highlighted a surcharge of $1,612,630 for 
unauthorized purchase from Lotus Garments Company. Given the above it is indeed 
unethical for RFMF to continue to do business with Lotus Garments until the surcharge 
action is finalized ... No further dealing should be made with Lotus Garments 
forthwith.15
It emerged that the military had overspent over $45 million since the 2006 coup, 
as highlighted in the 2007 Budget. However, the highly confidential MHA 
documents were being leaked to the Military High Command from inside the 
MHA by one of their former own, a military man. In other words, Bainimarama 
and his coup conspirators were acutely aware of what might befall them, so they 
began a cover-up campaign prior to the overthrow of the Qarase government. A 
memorandum prepared for the then Minister for Home Affairs highlighted some 
of the irregularities that were surfacing in the RFMF Budget 2006. The 
memorandum read:
The Auditor-General’s report highlighted the falsification of documents. The brief will 
show that RFMF is yet again committing the same mistake incurring expenses of 
$6,179,000. Another local purchase of $6,136,578.00 is yet to be signed. RFMF is also 
making purchases without Major Tender Board approval and is stock piling on its 
protection and winter issues.16
In hindsight this over expenditure was done with an obviously sinister motive in 
anticipation of the December 2006 coup and in blatant disregard of financial 
regulations.
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Job Evaluation Review (JER)
With Qarase and his installed SDL government in power in 2001, the military 
senior officers pressed for a commissioning of a White Paper on Defence and a Job 
Evaluation Review (JER). By 2003 both these military-backed initiatives were 
well underway. In 2005 a draft National Security White Paper was completed 
though grave reservations by Bainimarama as to its recommendations stalled its 
implementation. Military pay increases according to the JER came into effect in 
2006. As shown by the Minister of Home Affairs budget parliamentary speech:
There is a welcome increase in the overall budget o f the Royal [sic] Fiji Military Forces 
(RFMF). O f significance is the allocation for the job evaluation exercise. The adoption of  
the "people first" approach is particularly appropriate in looking after our Military and 
building for longer-term stability in the Force, as well as professionalism.17
There was also allocation for the re-location of the Military base in Nadi. The new 
Nadi base was to provide opportunities for enhanced training and overall 
development of the military that complemented Fiji’s efforts at international peace 
operations. The SDL government went to great lengths to appease the military by 
granting new capital works and handsome increases in salaries as evidenced with 
pay and allowance rises for soldiers from 2003 to 2010.19
The obvious rationale was that these increases were seen as part of government’s 
affirmative actions for the indigenous Fijians. However it was also seen by critics 
as necessary to stave off a coup given the persistent public antagonism of the 
Commander towards government. Ironically Bainimarama manipulated these 
salary increases to curry loyalty amongst his officers and men prior to executing 
the coup.
Influence of Military Chaplaincy.
The bond between the Fiji Military and the Methodist Church and Chiefs has 
been covered in parts in chapters 1, 2 and 3. As a result o f the coups of 1987, 
2000 and 2006 the bond was further institutionalized as the military’s corporate 
interest also took in the all important religious dimension. In 1989 during 
Rabuka’s tenure as military Commander a full-time Methodist chaplain was 
posted to the military. Reverend Major Apenisa Naigulevu, the first appointee,
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had been the chaplain of the Fiji Battalion in Sinai in 1988. The trappings of 
being a commissioned officer with successive tours on peacekeeping duties saw 
the degeneration of relationship between Naigulevu and the church 
administration. Major Naigulevu ended up being a logistics staff office at 
military headquarters though later resumed pastoral duties with the Methodist 
Church.
In 1996, Brigadier Ratu Epeli Ganilau, as Commander, established with the 
approval of the Methodist Conference a church circuit within the military with a 
resident chaplain at Queen Elizabeth Barracks. The first posted military pastor 
was Reverend Major Mesake Tuima, followed by Reverend Major Marika 
Tuvasu (both deceased).20 Since 2006 the incumbent military chaplain, 
Reverend Major Joseva Tikonatabua, in conjunction with the military 
intelligence unit, has been used extensively to further the military’s political 
agenda and to rein in Methodist pastors who question military rule. For example 
at a military parade Major Tikonatabua reminded soldiers that “they could only 
carry out the directive given by their Commanding Officer if they let God lead 
them.” As former chaplains with Fiji’s overseas peacekeeping units, these 
padres have had strong religious influence with the majority Methodist military.
Since Fiji military’s involvement in overseas peacekeeping, chaplains such as 
Reverend Josateki Koroi, Reverend Tomasi Kanailagi and Reverend Ilaiasi 
Ratabacaca, have risen to become President of the Church. Other former 
chaplains have held important executive positions in the church. The tension 
between the church and the state embodied by the military has been fuelled to a 
large measure by their Christian liberation and fundamentalist theology. Much 
as it was wrong, it was the quest for a ‘Christian State’ that in part spurred 
Rabuka’s supremacist coup, and drove Reverend Lasaro and followers to take 
matters into their hands in the 1989 Sunday Ban protests. This led to them 
infringing on public and church law, which led to the unlawful ousting of 
Reverend Josateki Koroi the Methodist President, and the damaging court case 
that ruled for the ejected President.
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Again during the ‘Truth and Justice Campaign’ prior to the 2006 elections, the 
military had openly used its chaplain and former chaplains network within Fijian 
society to foster its ‘guardian’ role of the state. With their lead and ‘Christian 
spiritual guidance’, the 2006 coup was morally accepted by the predominantly 
Methodist military. Ultimately the military chaplaincy was manipulated by the 
Commander to shore up his political agenda which often was coated in biblical 
analogy. On the other hand the Reconciliation, Tolerance and Unity Bill that the 
military opposed, was called a ‘gimmick’ for the release of Speight by the 
Commander. The Bill, however, was fully supported by the Methodist Church 
which had a former President as a serving Senator. Simmering tension was 
increased to a new level of hostility when Bainimarama told his troops to change 
churches should their Methodist pastors use the pulpit to preach support for the 
Bill. The use of the military chaplaincy network by Bainimarama no doubt 
accelerated the military to intervene in December 2006. The military has in 
conjunction with its intelligence unit made good use of this network to keep 
dissenting Methodist ministers silenced and entrench its political power.
Influence of Directorate of Army Legal Service on Military Politicization
Along with the Counter-Revolutionary Warfare Unit (CRWU), the other 
controversial establishment post-Rabuka coup within the Republic of Fiji 
Military Forces was the Directorate of Army Legal Services (DALS). Prior to 
this establishment all the military’s legal work was handled by the Attorney 
General’s chambers. Rabuka’s coup for the first time necessitated the military 
grappling with the legal gymnastics of the constitutional laws of Fiji and 
military law. In addition the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and the treatment 
of civilians in conflict was a contentious issue for soldiers on Fiji’s 
peacekeeping operations. It was thus necessary to establish a directorate in light 
of the military’s growing commitment to international peacekeeping and to also 
facilitate its soldier disciplinary cases in such foreign theatre.
After the 1987 coup several government lawyers notable among whom were 
Isikeli Mataitoga, Josaia Naigulevu and Ratu Finau Mara gained military 
territorial force commissions as officers and legal advisors at Headquarters
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RFMF. The political links of these three lawyers to the nationalist iTaukei 
Movement - the key indigenous political group in the planning of the May 1987
23coup- were no secret at the time according to coup authors such as Victor Lai. 
Isikeli Mataitoga through his links to the inner circle of Rabuka’s SVT 
government scored postings such as Director of Public Prosecution (DPP) and 
diplomatic postings as Fiji’s High Commissioner to Brussels and Canberra. 
Josaia Naigulevu, a reservist Fiji naval officer, who held the appointment of 
DPP in the years after the 2000 coup, was an SDL supporter. He was, however, 
also known to be a close colleague of Commodore Bainimarama who pursued 
the prosecution of the 2000 nationalist coup supporters.
In the wake of the 1987 Rabuka takeover and Ratu Mara’s caretaker government 
being installed by the coup leader, a pronounced policy of indigenous 
affirmative action was instituted. The scarcity of iTaukei professionals, 
especially lawyers, was a major bone of indigenous contention and grievance for 
the coup. Hence initially in 1988, Ministry of Fijian Affairs scholarships were 
offered to young military officers such as Captains Tevita Bukarau, Penijamini 
Lomaloma, Etueni Caucau, Samuela Vadei and Kini Keteca to study law at 
Bond University, Queensland, Australia. Other noted government legal officers 
such as Ana Rokomakoti, William Calachini, Davina Chang, Pacolo Luveni and 
Aca Rayawa were once with the directorate. For most of these officers, DALS 
became a career enhancer into other government legal jobs. The office of 
DALS was instrumental prior to the 2000 and 2006 military coups in affording 
the RFMF Commander legal advice that spurred him towards extra­
constitutional considerations. DALS strayed outside its professional military law 
role and aided the political agenda of the Commander rather than providing 
purely professional military law advice as contained in the Constitution of Fiji 
1997, RFMF CAP 81 Laws of Fiji 1970 and the British Manual of Military Law 
1955.
In addition, DALS, in upholding the institution of the military, corrupted the 
subordination of military law to the laws of the land and indeed the constitution 
of 1997. This is evident with the DALS erroneous interpretation of the 1990 
constitution as to the role of the military being extant and alive in the 1997
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Constitution. This legal argument was a device used by Bainimarama to justify 
his 2006 coup and thus DALS became the defender of the Commander RFMF’s 
personal political agenda. The Director or a military lawyer after 2000 began 
having a pennanent seat at the Commander Conference amongst other senior 
headquarters staff and unit commanders.
DALS was also guilty of politicizing the military. Prior to the May 1999 
elections, its Director, Lieutenant Colonel Tevita Bukarau, had colluded with the 
Commander Ratu Epeli Ganilau by resigning from the military and standing in 
the elections for the VLV Party. This newly formed party was known to have 
been quietly supported by Ratu Mara and his wife Adi Lala and senior ministers 
in the Methodist church such as Reverends Manasa Lasaro and Tomasi 
Kanailagi.
The formation of the VLV was said to have taken shape in the office of DALS, 
which included other officers and VLV candidates such as Lieutenant Colonel 
Inoke Luveni and Major Aminiasi Turaga, both unsuccessful candidates in the 
1999 elections. Major Mesake Tuima, the Force chaplain, was very much 
involved in the VLV fonnation and was the link to the Methodist church 
hierarchy to and from the Commander. The replacement for Colonel Bukarau 
was Colonel Etueni Caucau. Fie was known to have strong sympathies with 
nationalists during the coup of 2000. He was thought to have colluded with 
Bukarau who during the Speight coup was roped in as legal advisor to the coup 
front man, George Speight. Again in the 2006 coup its present military director, 
Brigadier Aziz Mohamed, has done irreparable damage to the ethics and 
integrity of the Fiji Military and to the country as a whole for being the illegal 
architect of the military intervention.
This officer, along with Aiyaz Saiyad-Khaiyum, the Attorney General, is now 
the chief legal and political advisor for the Bainimarama regime. He gained 
prominence through the media and within the RFMF as prosecutor in the court 
martial of the mutinous Meridian Squadron soldiers’ case of 2000 that dragged 
on for some four years. His successful recruitment of Justice Sidal and Fiji Law 
Society President Graham Leung was a legal coup for the military and ensured
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the credibility of the court martial. The mutineers’ court martial case which was 
widely covered in the national media brought respect and admiration for the way 
in which the military administered law and justice. The court martial process 
strengthened the Commander’s public rhetoric and depiction of the military as 
the defender of law and order and national security. DALS became a military 
weapon in response to an increasingly litigious society after the 2000 coup. It 
also became the link to the office of the DPP and the legal fraternity and 
business houses at large.
DALS continue to play a political role in the articulation of quasi civil -military 
relations roles and concepts such as ‘human security’ ‘national security’ and the 
drawing up of the RFMF military’s strategic plan. But more concerning has 
been its contribution to some of the regime’s security decrees. Indeed DALS has 
been guilty of straying away from its British and Commonwealth military law 
role including the adherence to Westminster liberal democratic civil supremacy 
laws.
Conclusion
Several military institutional reforms and strategic initiatives have accelerated 
the military’s role in politics. The purpose of the acceleration process was to 
expand military executive and corporate powers and effectively aid the 
inevitable execution of the 2006 coup. The influence the military had exerted on 
the role of the President at crucial junctures of national crisis has been of 
strategic design. The establishing of Strategic Headquarters in close proximity 
of Government House enabled the military to monitor and control state business, 
through military minders and hand picked pliant civil servants. Bainimarama’s 
Military for Life policy and the illegal logistic build up prior to the 2006 coup 
masked both a personal and a political agenda. In early 2004, the military 
established this ideology which expanded its societal role at large in disregard of 
the national security paper that recommended a halving of troop numbers.
The use of the Chaplaincy department to mobilize iTaukei Methodist population 
support for the military has been effective though it has alienated Methodist 
Church elites. The Directorate of Army Legal Service since its establishment 
has become a lightning rod for the military’s political involvement. Through the
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intimate collusion of DALS with prominent legal entities, advice for the 
takeover of government and the promulgation of the regimes decrees have been 
facilitated. The military’s effective takeover of government in 2006 was artfully 
preceded by an internal accelerated reform process to control the Executive, 
Judiciary and Legislative arms of government.
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Chapter 9
4Go Drink Home Brew under the Mango Tree’: An Analysis of 
Military-Chiefly relations during the 2006 Fiji Coup
Introduction
After a long campaign of opposition to the elected government, Commodore 
Bainimarama and the military seized power. On the morning of the 5th of 
December, President Iloilo signed a legal order dissolving Parliament, citing the 
doctrine of necessity, paving the way for the formation of an interim 
administration. Simultaneously the military had moved into Suva in strategic 
locations on roads and government premises also seizing minister’s vehicles and 
disconnecting their mobile phones. Soldiers also entered the Parliament and 
disbanded the meeting of Senators discussing a motion to condemn the coup. In 
his takeover of government speech on the evening of the 6th of Dec, 
Bainimarama explained the rationale for his coup, accusing Qarase of corruption 
and of having inflamed tensions between ethnic communities through “divisive” 
and “controversial” policies. Over the coming days, hapless Prime Minister 
Qarase and most of his cabinet gathered at his residence, detained by armed 
soldiers in the glare of international media.
The coup constituted a striking reversal in the pattern of Fiji’s post­
independence politics. The principal contrast with the justification of earlier 
coups was the claim that a coup was needed to finally end the politics of ethno- 
nationalism and make Fiji a multiracial society. The reversal was typified by 
Commodore Bainimarama’s criticism that the Great Council of Chiefs (GCC) to 
“meet under a mango tree and enjoy home brew.”1 Council Chairman Ratu 
Ovini Bokini like many was alarmed at the flagrant hostility towards the 
assembly of high chiefs as an institution of traditional wisdom. Bainimarama 
had made the remark in disparagement of the Council for siding with Qarase's 
government against the military’s demands. He had made no secret of his 
contempt for certain chiefly figures. Military spokesman, Major Neumi Leweni, 
reiterated his leader’s stance stating, “We will not accept any proposals by the 
Council,” adding, “We do not recognise the chiefly body during this crisis.”3 
Deposed Opposition Leader Mick Beddoes expressed this breach with past
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certainties when he said, “all of the theories about the military always being on 
the side of Fijian governments were now well and truly out the window.”4 
Beddoes was obviously alluding to the patron-client Turaga-Bati relationship, 
where the warrior was always supposed to follow the political direction of the 
chief. Why was there open animosity between the military and the chiefly elite, 
symbolized by the GCC?
Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase had requested a special Council meeting in a 
desperate attempt to resolve the ongoing row with the military. Commodore 
Voreqe Bainimarama and his senior officers had condemned the Prime Minister 
for, “running to the Great Council of Chiefs to resolve its problems.”5 Ironically 
former Commander Rabuka and Bainimarama were guilty of the same move in 
attempting to solve the 1987 and 2000 political crisis respectively. The military 
did not heed the efforts of the GCC to resolve the 2006 political impasse, and 
eventually prohibited the chiefs from meeting or deliberating on the affairs of 
the nation. As the constitutional appointing authority for the President and Vice- 
President, the GCC was considered the apex of the ‘old order’. The nation’s 
third coup was aimed at destroying this old order- the influence of Prime 
Minister Qarase’s SDL Party, and Fijian elites associated with that government, 
including the key leaders of Fiji’s three traditional confederacies, supposedly in 
the interest o f ‘good governance’.
This was in sharp contrast to previous coups. The 1987 coup did not simply oust 
a largely Indian-backed government. It also reinstated the authority of the 
paramount chiefs, most importantly and directly Ratu Mara, but also 
institutionally because the 1990 constitution galvanized chiefly authority, and 
because the Rabuka governments of 1992-94 and 1994-99 were accompanied by 
programmes and policies that strengthened (at least one section of) the Fijian 
elite. During the 2000 coup, the military was ambivalent towards Fijian political 
elite pressures: although Ratu Mara was ousted by military action, the GCC was 
encouraged to deliberate at the military’s Queen Elizabeth Barracks as it sought 
to establish a way out of the crisis. That ambivalence had vanished by 2006, and 
Ratu Mara and other paramount chiefs were no longer on the political stage.6 
Bainimarama’s disdainful comment toward the GCC, therefore, signaled that
. 7breach with the politics of the earlier post-colonial years. It came as no surprise 
that the intervention was targeted at the Fijian political elite in the form of the
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SDL Party and its cohorts in government and statutory bodies. Bainimarama had 
often berated indigenous politics as controlled by chiefly patronage and 
evocative of pre-Christian tribal mores. This view was reinforced by Fijians’ 
supposed political inability to rise above intra-ethnic political struggles as 
witnessed during and after the 1987 and 2000 coups.
This chapter is an analysis of military-chiefly relations during the Fiji coup of 
2006 from the perspective of a former Fiji senior military officer and former 
member of the GCC. It will examine the core theme as unfinished business 
from 2000 typified by the Bainimarama-Qarase antagonism, the case for the 
coup, the attempts to avert the coup, the seizure of power, the coalition that 
backed the coup and the opponents of the coup respectively.
The Case for the Coup
The 2006 coup’s raison d ’etre was to clean up corruption brought about by the 
Qarase government’s ethno-nationalist policies. Ironically, the orientation was 
the reverse of that given for mounting the 1987 coup -  ‘Fijian paramountcy’ had 
become the villain rather than the objective.9 ‘Ethno-nationalism’ was also 
deemed by the military to have been the political motive that underpinned 
Speight’s failed coup of 2000. But what had concerned Bainimarama and his 
military most were the allegations of the politicization of the GCC by Qarase 
and his SDL party. Like Rabuka and his SVT Party in the 1990s, Qarase’s SDL 
party in the 2000s had become the main Fijian political party which by inference 
was backed by the GCC. Previously, the performance of the GCC during the 
1990s showed how it had deviated from its original role as an advisory body on 
native affairs. Rabuka and the SVT party that became the government in 1992, 
were supposed to have united all Fijians under one political organization in the 
pursuit of the coup’s original aim — Fijian political paramountcy. Intra- 
indigenous schisms however plagued this pan-Fijian party from its very start and 
Rabuka’s SVT suffered defeat at the 1999 elections mainly because of Fijian 
disillusionment, and splits in the Fijian vote.
The question of Fijian political supremacy as interpreted by Fijians in the Deed 
o f Cession of 1874 had underpinned the coups of 1987 and 2000. The 2006 
coup in a sense was a counter-balance of this ideology. Newbury makes the 
significant counter-point that ‘Fijian Paramountcy’ was only claimed in the
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1940s by Ratu Sukuna and the GCC backed by Europeans in the Legislative 
Council.10 As the Indo-Fijian population overtook the Fijians in numbers and 
started to agitate for political rights, Fijian and European interests were seen to 
be threatened. The entrenching of a policy of Fijian political paramountcy in 
collusion with the colonial administration was in response to this political 
situation.
Given the history of race-based politics and after the shock of the 1987 coup, the 
1997 Constitution enshrined a power sharing arrangement which potentially 
entailed a government of national unity. The FLP Coalition government that 
came to power invited Rabuka’s SVT party into this arrangement. However, due 
to pre-conditions laid out by Rabuka, that he be deputy Prime Minister and 
others of his party be appointed cabinet ministers, a golden opportunity was lost 
to improve the future of ethnic politics. After the 2001 elections Qarase’s SDL 
party, having formed a coalition with Speight’s CAMV party, refused to include 
Chaudhry’s FLP in cabinet. Only after a succession of court judgments, all of 
which found the Qarase government to be behaving in defiance of the law, did 
the Prime Minister invite Chaudhry’s FLP to participate in cabinet, but only 
through the assumption of specially invented minor portfolios. This proved that 
Qarase was not genuine and these minor portfolios were subsequently refused 
by the FLP.1’Another golden opportunity for multi-party and multi-racial 
promotion was lost.
The May 2006 election, however, did entail the formation of a power-sharing 
government, with nine members of the FLP joining cabinet and assuming 
powerful portfolios such as labour, agriculture and sugar. In this sense, the 2006 
coup was a profound blow to the promotion of multiracialism. What had 
triggered the military takeover given this momentous power sharing 
breakthrough? One of the motives for the takeover was the criticism by the 
military and its supporters of a “manipulated political system”. As pointed out 
by Fraenkel and Firth, “scandals over affirmative action distributions from the 
Ministry of Agriculture were sufficient to strengthen familiar FLP objections 
that Fijian leaders were rorting the system.” Bainimarama even dismissed 
liberal democracy as a mere “numbers game.” According to Bainimarama, 
Chaudhry and his previously deposed FLP governments were victims of this 
manipulated “numbers game.” Bainimarama later expounded:
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Fijians live in a democracy with a mentality that belongs to the Fijian chiefly system.
They decide for us who to vote for, our church talatalas [church ministers] decide for us 
who to vote for. These are the Fijians living in the villages and rural areas. The 
provincial [chiefly] councils dictate for us who to vote for and we go along with that. 14
Bainimarama’s putsch was initially intended as a temporary imposition of 
authoritarian rule to rectify institutional arrangements that had generated 
corruption, coups and bad governance, and in the process victimized Indo- 
Fijians.
In early November 2006, whilst Bainimarama was away visiting troops in the 
Middle East, Captain Esala Teleni, the acting Commander, released a list of 
military demands to government. The demands became Bainimarama’s motive 
for the coup. Returning from the Middle East, Bainimarama then scheduled a 
trip to visit family in New Zealand. Foreign Minister Winston Peters took this 
opportunity to broker talks in Wellington in an effort to resolve the disputes 
between Prime Minister Qarase and the military Commander.
The first military demand was that government publically declare that the 2000 
coup and the 2000 military mutiny were wrong and remove all those associated 
with them from office. In addition government was to educate the public that the 
events of 2000 were illegal. In response to this demand, government reaffirmed 
that the coup events of 2000 were illegal. Government had undertaken to 
develop a fully resourced public education programme to take to the public. 
Government also undertook to continue to bring to account those found by due 
process to have been illegally associated with the events of 2000. The military 
was invited to provide to government the names of people whom it believed 
should face legal process. The government of New Zealand indicated its 
willingness to assist in the resourcing of the public education programme.
The second military demand was that government withdraw the three 
contentious pieces of legislation, the Qoliqoli, Reconciliation, Tolerance and 
Unity and Indigenous Land Claims Tribunal bills. In response, government 
insisted that the Reconciliation, Tolerance and Unity Bill had been suspended. 
An agreement was reached that a current independent review of the 
constitutionality and legality of the Qoliqoli and Land Claims Tribunal Bill
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with resource assistance from New Zealand be accelerated and brought to a 
rapid conclusion. The review was to be completed by 1st January 2007 with a 
progress report by mid-December 2006. Should the review find that the Bills 
were legally or constitutionally unsound then deliberations on these would be 
automatically suspended. If the review found otherwise, then the government 
would enter into renewed consultations with the military and other interested 
parties on the areas concerned.
The third demand was that police investigations into Bainimarama and the 
RFMF be dropped. The government response was that should it receive advice 
from the appropriate authorities -  i.e., the Solicitor General, Director Public 
Prosecutions or Police Commissioner — that the investigations in dispute should 
be suspended, it would be prepared to follow that advice and to confirm publicly 
that it had done so.
The fourth demand was for Police Commissioner Hughes’s contract to be 
tenninated. In reply, government stated that the current situation was that 
Commissioner Hughes was nearing the end of his term and had been granted 
leave. The fifth demand was that there be no foreign military/police 
intervention. Qarase on behalf of the government agreed that there should be no 
foreign police or military intervention in the domestic affairs of Fiji. The sixth 
demand was that the Police Tactical Response Division be disbanded. Qarase 
agreed to undertake a review of the role of the Police Tactical Response Unit. 
The seventh demand was to investigate the Native Lands Trust Board’s 
commercial arm, Vanua Development Cooperation. It was acknowledged that 
the NLTB was a statutory organisation and the government of Fiji could not 
interfere in its operations. However, NLTB would be requested to review its 
commercial arm with New Zealand government offering to provide resourcing 
and international expertise to assist. The RFMF also had concerns about its force 
structure allowances and promotions (the eighth demand) and these were to be 
immediately addressed. Finally, the ninth demand was for government to 
address and improve the quality of governance. Qarase agreed to work with the 
military and other Fiji groups to develop higher standards of governance within 
Fiji. It was quite evident that Qarase in attempting to stave off a coup had agreed 
to most of the military’s demands.
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The military’s effort to dislodge the police commissioner suggested that 
personal motivations were in some competition with the broader ideological 
goals of anti-corruption and good governance. In the run up to the 2006 coup, an 
uncompromising and professional police commissioner, Andrew Hughes was 
pursuing charges against Bainimarama. Bainimarama had seven charges 
pending when he executed the coup.15 Before the coup, Hughes said that he 
knew of more than 10 shadowy people acting as advisers to Commodore 
Bainimarama. He warned all those involved would be dragged into the spotlight 
and their identities made known. This group included senior military officers, 
former military officers, senior civil servants as well as former and current 
politicians.16 The military elite retaliated against this police pressure with their 
nine demands on government. Prime Minister Qarase was given an ultimatum to 
accede to all, or resign.
Qarase was adamant (though in hindsight) that, Bainimarama was determined to 
take over government by force for ulterior motives. The Police were closing in 
to arrest and charge the military commander for serious crimes. The reasons he 
gave for carrying out the coup were “a cover up” for his crimes, said the 
deposed Prime Minister. He added, “Bainimarama was not prepared or did not 
have the courage to face up to the full brunt of the law.”19 It can be deduced, 
then, that the coup was a pre-emptive strike against the police’s sedition charges 
against Bainimarama. By late November 2006, Bainimarama had created an 
environment of political uncertainty by his anti-government rhetoric. He 
condemned contentious government policies as an ethno-nationalist conspiracy 
and called for the immediate expulsion of Hughes. During November, the 
credibility of Qarase’s Prime Ministership was deliberately undermined. The 
government and its supporters retaliated, at least through press announcements. 
An editorial in the Fiji Daily Post newspaper echoed what many were thinking, 
“To accede to their demands would be to abrogate the honour of one’s office
9 1and only a weak and watery government would respond to these demands.”
In a press conference on the 4th January 2007, Bainimarama gave a further long
99litany of twenty five justifications for the military takeover. The reasons were
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as follows: 1) the persistent and deliberate involvement of persons supporting 
the unlawful takeover of government in 2000 in the Qarase government; 2) the 
SDL saying it supported law and order but then freeing coup convicts on 
extramural or compulsory orders; 3) the continued appointment by those tainted 
by the 2000 events to diplomatic and senior government positions; 4) the failure 
of the police to investigate all the shadowy figures behind the 2000 coup; 5) the 
politicization of the prison services; 6) the regular visits by government officials 
to Korovou Prison to meet prisoners who supported the coup; 7) the racist and 
inciteful speeches made by SDL MPs which were never checked by Qarase; 8) 
repeated acts of government and civil service corruption including SDL 
politicians; 9) growing cycle of corruption, clientelism and cronyism involving 
unhealthy influence of certain businessmen and women; 10) failure of the 
Qarase government to pass any anti-corruption legislation in past five years; 11) 
determination of the Qarase government to pass the Public Reconciliation Truth 
and Unity, Qoliqoli and Land Claims Tribunal Bills; 12) exclusion of the 
military from the national Security Council; 13) manipulation of the criminal 
justice system for political reasons; 14) threat of the use of regional forces to 
influence the resolution of internal problems; 15) threat of an Australian 
invasion shown by the hostile remarks of Alexander Downer; 16) PM’s failure 
to keep the President informed of issues relating to state affairs; 17) failure to 
follow agreed principles under the Biketawa Declaration; 18) repeated attempts 
to change the command structure of the RFMF since 2000; 19) poor economic 
policies; 20) May 2006 elections characterized by discrepancies; 21) fleeing 
from Suva of the PM and Cabinet negating that they were still in charge; 22) 
untimely absence of the Police Commissioner; 23) Qarase seeking to incite 
certain people to rebel against the RFMF; 24) Qarase’s failure to meet the 
President on the morning of 5th December; 25) Ratu Josefa being prevented by 
the Vice-President and others from exercising his constitutional powers.
Lawyer Dorsami Naidu of Fiji’s other major Indo-Fijian political party, the 
National Federation Party, was critical of these military allegations: “Whatever 
the accusation of the Qarase government of which the FLP was a partner is not 
justification for the coup”. Indeed these accusations by the military shows their 
politicization and intimate acquaintance of the political scene that may have
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heightened alarm and made it seem less inappropriate for them to intervene 
directly albeit illegally.
Attempts to Avert the Coup
The 2006 coup was unique because of the ultimatum issued by the military prior 
to its execution. Consequently the Pacific Islands Forums Foreign Ministerial 
Group meeting in Sydney Australia on Friday the 1st of December agreed to 
send an Eminent Persons Group (EPG) to Fiji to help prevent a coup after 
Bainimarama’s target date was postponed to Monday.24 In addition, immediately 
on his return from the Wellington talks brokered by New Zealand’s Foreign 
Minister Winston Peters, Qarase in a newspaper advertisement, tried to de- 
escalate the crisis by revealing the outcomes of the talks. Bainimarama however 
refuted any such outcomes calling Qarase a liar in a press release on Thursday 
afternoon the 30lh of November 2006. According to Brij Lai, however, “Qarase 
had conceded virtually to all of Bainimarama’s demands, going as far as he 
could, although his critics argued that Qarase was merely buying time by 
attempting to give the impression that action would follow when he had no such 
intentions. In any event, he had acknowledged his weakness and starkly 
demonstrated the relative power of elected office versus the military.”
After the Wellington talks which the New Zealand Foreign minister had labelled 
as “fruitful”, ominously Bainimarama on return, set a dead-line for midday 
Friday 1st December for government to accede to the demands or be toppled. 
Bainimarama had visited the President on the morning of Friday the 1st of 
December with his ultimatum for a takeover at noon that day. The deadline was 
moved to noon Monday the 4lh of December with the diplomatic persuasion of 
Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi the Vice President. On Monday morning, in a statement 
taken to be pro-government emanated from Government House stating, “His 
Excellency the President Ratu Josefa Iloilo neither condoned nor supported the 
actions of the military which were clearly outside the Constitution.” This 
statement no doubt would have been inspired by Vice President Madraiwiwi.
That Monday, I was attending the Naitasiri Provincial Council annual meeting 
at Viria village where the Prime Minister was the chief guest. At about midday 
after the traditional opening ceremonies, I was approached by the Prime
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Minister’s private secretary and a former military officer Major Sakeasi Ditoka, 
to meet Qarase in private. We were then briefed by the Prime Minister’s police 
escort officer that the military had set up a check point at Sawani Bridge to 
arrest the Prime Minister. A quick arrangement was then made to evacuate the 
Prime Minister by helicopter to the capital Suva. Upon invitation, I then 
accompanied the Prime Minister to the Public Works Department Roads Depot 
at Naqali to await the helicopter for evacuation to Suva. The Prime Minister, his 
wife and I then were airlifted to Albert Park Suva.
A national security meeting was convened at the Ministry of Home Affairs 
conference room. Assistant Commisioner Kepueli Bulamainavalu then briefed 
us on the situation at hand. It was evident that the military had started to erect 
checkpoints at key road junctions and had mobile patrols mounted throughout 
the city area. At the meeting, after all options were considered, it was decided a 
policy of non-confrontation and non-escalation was to be adopted by the Police 
towards the Military.
That night till early dawn Tuesday the 5lh December I remained with the Special 
Police Task Force operations cell at Nasova Police Compound as security 
advisor to the team monitoring the military activities. The military by then were 
in full deployment mode nationwide, taking up key vulnerable points and 
premises and rounding up known opponents.
The Seizure of Power
After months of ‘saber rattling’ the much signaled breach finally dawned. In the 
presence of international and local media, on the morning of Tuesday the 5th of 
December the military locked in Qarase at his residence and seized all 
ministerial vehicles. SDL Ministers and members of the multi-party cabinet 
started to congregate at Qarase’s residence on Richards Road as the military 
takeover unfolded. Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi, known to be on the side of 
constitutionality and who was behind the issuing of the initial Government 
House statement was immediately forced by his own Aide- de- Camp, to vacate 
his Vice- Presidential residence. Ratu Joni, later finding his position untenable, 
resigned from office." This unprecedented turn of events prompted Fijian 
academic Ropate Qalo to point out that “Bainimarama has usurped government 
authority to the extent of expelling his own chief. He is from Nayatena of the
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Rokotui Kiuva of the Yavusa Ratu of Kubuna, headed by the Rokotui Bau and 
Vice President Ratu Joni his paramount chief.” This incident best symbolized 
the unprecedented breach in chief-military traditional protocol.
At a press conference at the Queen Elizabeth Barracks that afternoon, 
Bainimarama declared, “As of six o clock this evening the military has taken 
over the government as executive authority in the running of this country.”29 He 
said the Republic of Fiji Military Forces had no choice but to take control 
because “the Government and all those empowered to make decisions in 
constitutional democracy are unable to make decisions to save people from 
destruction”. Commodore Bainimarama continued, as his caretaker Prime 
Minister Dr Jona Senilagakali stood beside him, “having stepped into the shoes 
of the President, I shall now in his capacity under section 109 (1) of our 
Constitution, dismiss the Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase." Qarase that same 
fateful day had in full-page advertisements in the three daily newspapers, tried 
to re-assure the public of the “ever changing demands that made it hard for 
them to reach an understanding.” Backing Qarase’s revelation was the 
Commissioner of Police. After being threatened and forced out of Fiji only days 
earlier, Andrew Hughes also revealed from Australia, “He’s a front man as 
Rabuka was in 1987 and Speight was in 2000. Bainimarama is a front man for 
power seeking people in Fiji that failed at the last election who are not able to 
gain power legitimately, so they are using him as a means to obtain that 
power.” The last word however remained w'ith the President. Ratu Iloilo 
always closely shielded by his military minders headed by the Aide-de-Camp, 
Captain Lepani Damuni. In spite of his statement that morning by evening the 
octogenarian head of state had capitulated and sided with the coup leader. Ratu 
Iloilo signed the decree dissolving Parliament, and paving the way for the 
formation of an interim administration.
Reactions to Bainimarama’s televised proclamations were swift from both 
supporters and opponents alike. Ratu Epeli Ganilau, the leader of the National 
Alliance Party, and close confidant of Bainimarama, in explaining the takeover 
said, “The long impasse has propelled the military to act. It is an illegal act but 
the less of two evils when you think about the endemic corruption and bad
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practices that have carried on during the reign of the former administration” .34 
Ratu Epeli also announced without consulting the Chairman of the GCC, Ratu 
Ovini Bokini, that the chiefs “will come in the next day or two to discuss the
“5 c
situation with the military”. The former ousted Chairman of the GCC and 
Commander of the military was obviously eager to accept the military takeover. 
He further stated, “The real situation is that the military is in power and whether 
Ratu Ovini likes it or not, he will have to convene the meeting.” It was obvious 
whose side Ganilau was on. He later accepted a ministerial appointment in the 
military regime.
Coup Coalition.
The coup would not have been possible without substantial support for the 
RFMF agenda. As Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi observed, “When the Commander 
finally mounted the coup, he had a ready constituency, beyond the command 
structure of his officers and foot soldiers.” Although many who were 
sympathetic to the coup objectives dissociated themselves from the act of 
overthrowing the elected government, they were soon to join the interim 
administration. It became quite obvious to locals that an implicit pre-coup 
networking of elites had fueled the takeover. Bainimarama had become their 
front man for “moderate politics” as opposed to Qarase’s ethnic outbidding 
often apocalyptically described as the “ethno-nationalism abyss”. This explains 
why significant sections of civil society flocked to support the reformist 
objectives of the coup leader. As affirmed by the director of the Citizens’ 
Constitutional Forum, Akuila Yabaki, “I think the clean-up was a much bigger
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calling.” Social justice and religious organizations opposed to Qarase’s 
indigenous affirmative actions policies wanned to the takeover.
Mahendra Chaudhry, in staking his claim to the political high moral ground and 
maximizing political mileage for his FLP party, emphatically, declared, “I will 
not accept anything that is not constitutional or legal, let me make that 
clear.” Chaudhry proclaimed, “FLP’s record remains untarnished. Despite 
being victims of illegal takeover twice, we have remained steadfast in our 
commitment to democracy”40. This was in response to SDL’s director Peceli 
Kinivuwafs claim that Chaudhry was part of the pro-coup interventionist 
coalition. Chaudhry however later joined the regime and in defending his
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decision said, “Fiji’s destruction was inevitable, had the army not intervened. 
This explains why there was ready support for the army’s objectives following 
the takeover.” 41
Chaudhry’s rhetoric in essence garnered widespread support from the Indo- 
Fijian community. He did not hide his disdain for the ruling SDL party given 
that he had been ousted by nationalists through two previous coups. A later 
statement by Chaudhry said, ‘the coup was warranted’.42 He explained, “One 
cannot forget the current constitutional crisis had its roots in a growing 
discontent and frustration with six years of bad governance characterized by 
pervasive corruption, ethno-nationalism and defiance of the rule of law.”43 
Dorsami Naidu of the Indo- Fijian National Federation Party, however, 
countered the FLP leader by claiming, “Chaudhry’s desire for political power 
instead of working with opponents in light of the nature of Fiji’s society and 
problems faced, caused Indians to meet political paralysis”.44 FLP President 
Jokapeci Koroi following the coup in a speech to delegates of the National 
Council declared her support for the interim administration and the need for the 
‘cleanup.’45
Months prior to the coup, Koroi had astounded the nation by brazenly 
announcing on national television news that “she would have no qualms about 
the military overthrowing the Qarase government and putting Labour back in 
power to continue its unfinished business.”46 Chaudhry on invitation from 
Bainimarama, (inspite of all his verbose rhetoric but more so being a victim of 
the military coup in 1987) became Minister of Finance for the interim regime. 
His Fiji Labour Party colleague and Chaudhry stalwart, Lekh Ram Veyeshnoi, 
also joined the regime as a cabinet minister, as did Tom Ricketts.
Chaudhry’s abandoning of the high moral ground probably stemmed from a 
desire to push for political power denied by two previous coups. This 
Machiavellian switch gave credence to Bainimarama’s ‘cleanup campaign’ and 
lent the image to Bainimarama’s coup as a multi-racial takeover of government. 
Before the coup the FLP along with certain NGO’s such as the Citizens 
Constitutional Forum’s attacks of Qarase’s controversial indigenous policies had 
converged with the military’s hard line stance. In fact, as early as January 2006 
several FLP members had formed an interventionist coalition with the military
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and had publically stated that it would support a military coup against the SDL 
ruling government.47
Other pro-Bainimarama supporters initially played it safe in gauging coup 
support. Ratu Epeli Ganilau said, “It is illegal and we all know it is illegal” 
when solicited his views on the coup. Asked if he would join the regime if 
approached, Ratu Epeli replied, “I would like to think about it because this 
would be the way forward for the country.”49 In what many saw as an 
affirmation of his protege Bainimarama’s takeover, he further explained, “The 
politics in Fiji is very difficult to follow. Our politics is very traditional and 
sophisticated at the same time. We have the politics of the Vanua and the 
politics of the Confederacies.”50 Ratu Epeli though, in explaining the nuances of 
traditional politics was also a close advisor to Bainimarama51 He became the 
regime’s interim Minister for Fijian Affairs, Home Affairs and Defence. It is 
thought that the initial delay in Ratu Epeli joining Bainimarama’s cabinet was 
that he was disappointed that the interim Prime Ministership post he was angling 
for was taken up by his protege. According to Military Council member and 
defector Lieutenant Colonel Tevita Mara, Bainimarama was not scripted to be 
Prime Minister.
On 4th January 2007, Bainimarama returned executive authority to the 
President. In accepting his position ‘Ratu Iloilo endorsed the military’s 5lh of 
December takeover as necessary’. The President said, “He would have done 
exactly what the army commander did and that it [the coup] was valid under the 
law.53 In the same national address installing Bainimarama as interim Prime 
Minister, the President said, “I fully endorse the actions of the Commander and 
the Republic of Fiji Military Forces in acting in the interest of the nation and in 
upholding the constitution.”54 A flabbergasted Prime Minister Qarase retorted, 
“I did not agree to his [President’s] proposition to me . . .  I could not do either of 
those.”55 He later confirmed President Ratu Josefa Iloilo wanted him to accede 
to all the military's demands or resign.
Qarase, again in dismay, pointed out that Ratu Josefa's statement was 
contradictory: “If you recall about 24 hours before the coup there was a 
statement from Government House saying that they did not condone the actions 
of the military and its illegal activities. They even recalled the military.”56Qarase 
further disputed, “The statement from the President is the direct opposite of the
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one made on the 4th of December. More surprising is the statement supporting 
the illegal takeover of the democratically elected government. I think the 
President did not get an independent advice.”
Well articulated and sustained political acrimony with a deliberate purge of the 
SDL ruling elite and Fiji’s chiefly system, however, came from an unlikely 
source. When Bainimarama’s interim cabinet ministers were announced the 
position of Attorney General was given to an unknown Aiyaz Sayed-
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Khaiyum . The commercial bank lawyer and one-time pro-democracy 
advocate during the 1987 coup, for all intents and purposes became the 
powerbroker behind the regime.54 He was linked to Ratu Epeli Ganilau’s 
National Alliance Party as its legal advisor during its failed 2006 elections 
campaign. In 2002 Khaiyum did a masters thesis that questioned Fijian 
cultural autonomy through its Fijian administration.60 Now as a key member 
of Bainimarama’s cabinet it became apparent that he was well poised to put in 
place his thoughts based on myopic research. In his thesis he noted:
Ratu Sukuna’s interpretation of culture and his solution through a (re) structured 
separate administration were biased by his half-conscious vested interest in a society in 
which chiefs were chiefs.61
Khaiyum went on to observe:
European contact in Fiji was primarily in the East/North which consequently led to the 
confirmation of new chiefly elite from those regions. This led to the establishment of a 
cartel of hereditary leadership families and their cliental network.Madraiwiwi (Sukuna’s 
father), Sukuna, Cakobau, Mara, Ganilau and lately Qarase have all been beneficiaries 
of this bias forged through the perpetuation of the separate administration. On the other 
hand, those such as Bavadra and Gavidi, westerners were not accepted and were 
outsiders-did not represent indigenous Fijian culture-since they encroached upon the 
territory of the establishment clique.62
Khaiyum in criticizing the GCC as a separate and autonomous chiefly body said 
it had worked against the state, as was evident in the coups of 1987 and 2000. 
What according to Khaiyum was needed was for Fijian institutions like the Bose 
Levu Vakaturaga (Great Council of Chiefs) and the Fijian Affairs Board to have 
evolved or be dissolved over time if they were to keep abreast with the changing 
needs of indigenous Fijians. He suggested that the perpetual existence of these 
creatures of British rule could only put such Fijian institutions in a ‘time warp’ 
and give rise to the consolidation of power to and “self-preservation” of an elite
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few. It became evident that immediately after his appointment; Khaiyum had 
provided Bainimarama a rationale for reformist ideas involving the Fijian 
administration and its political elite that was at loggerhead with his political 
view. The Great Council of Chiefs was suspended in April 2007 and abolished 
in February of 2008 by decree.
The irony was that firstly the method that was to bring about these changes was 
by absolute decrees organised at best by a narrow group of new elites to 
perpetuate Bainimarama’s authoritarian rule. This recurring pattern of 
authoritarian exploitation is what constitutes the centrepiece of Professors Daron 
Acemoglu and James Robinson’s argument that the most common reason why 
nations fail today is because they have perpetrated extractive institutions much 
similar to the colonial era.64 The example of Zimbabwe is given to illustrate a 
comparative analysis with present day Fiji. Acemoglu and Robinson argue that 
the roots of many economic and political institutions in Zimbabwe, as in the 
case for much of sub-Saharan Africa, can be traced back to the Colonial 
period.6^  However after Independence Mugabe quickly established his personal 
control, rewrote the Constitution, he inherited as part of the Independence 
negotiations making himself President (he had started as Prime Minister). He 
also abolished white voter rolls and in 1990 and got rid of the senate altogether 
introducing positions in the legislature he could nominate. A defacto one- party 
state headed by Mugabe was the result.66 Given the way that the Bainimarama 
regime is tracking in promising inclusive though creating extractive political and 
economic institutions the purging of the Fijian administration and its associates 
is seriously flawed. Indeed Fraenkel criticizes the Bainimarama regimes rather 
culturally myopic view, “The utopian goal of seeking to transcend those social 
forces by destroying them is tantamount to aspiring to leave indigenous Fijians
z 7
rudderless, inarticulate and estranged.”
Secondly, even though British colonialism had integrated the social structures of 
the Chiefly System, Christianity and Common Law to legitimize what was 
accepted as the right way to govern, by Independence and as stipulated in the 
1970 Constitution, Christianity was not a state religion and chiefly power could 
only be exercised through a nominated senate in a narrow capacity to do with 
Indigenous Bills. Condemned by some modem day critics as exploitative, the 
Fijian chiefly system was the medium of native social interdependence and a
63
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cultural contract shared by the indigenous clans of a bygone era , which was 
justly utilized for colonial rule. Since Independence the chiefly system has had 
to adapt to the demands of modernity and urbanization called for by the Spate 
and Bums reports on native reforms in the late 1950s and early 1960s. By the 
1980s a sizable urban Fijian working class had been established divorced from 
village chiefs and communal constraints. Similarly chiefly political authority in 
both urban and rural communities has considerably diminished. For instance in 
comparing the 1999, 2001 and 2006 general elections the number of chiefly 
candidates declined to just 11% of total candidates by 2006 and only an average
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of 4% was elected in these three polls. Judging from these figures the role of 
chiefs in modem political leadership has drastically declined to insignificance. 
Rather than blaming chiefs, nations fail today because their extractive economic 
institutions (which are similarly being perpetrated by Bainimarama’s regime) do 
not create the incentives needed for people to save, invest, and innovate.69 
One who purported to be saddened by the purge of the Fijian administration via 
the suspension of its premier body the Great Council of Chiefs was Sitiveni 
Rabuka. The former chairman of the Great Council of Chiefs argued that the 
body was a political stabilizing force for Fiji and still had a role to play in 
modem Fiji. He wrote:
By publishing that suspension regulations, the interim Government had, for only the 
second time in the history of this nation, suspended the operations, offices and 
membership codified or not, of the body that engineered the Deed of Cession in 1874, 
accepted the move toward Independence from 1965 to 1970, calmed the nation after the 
coups of 1987, approved the 1990 Constitution which enabled Fiji to return to 
parliamentary democracy and general elections in 1992, agreed with the proposed 
changes to that Constitution which resulted in the enactment of the 1997 Constitution 
Amendment Act, again provided the calming influence after the 2000 coup and the 
move toward a military-backed interim Government in 2001 and elected all our 
presidents since 1987 except for the first part of the first President, Ratu Sir Penaia 
Ganilau, who was appointed by the then Brigadier-General Sitiveni Ligamamada 
Rabuka in his military government decree No. 25 of December 1987.71
Rabuka was of the view that traditional hierarchy had a place in Fijian politics. 
He cautioned, “There were those who gleefully accepted the [suspension] move 
for they had always opposed the perpetuation of traditional hierarchy and 
advocated merit-based leadership in all aspects of national leadership. Even 
some diehard nationalists, with their views on the trusteeship of native land,
79unconsciously supported this move.”
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The leaders of Religious organizations ( not necessarily the rank and file) such 
as the Catholic Church, the Hindu reformist Arya Pratinidhi Sabha (Arya Samaj) 
and the more conservative Sanatan Dharam Pratinidhi Sabha, on the other hand 
warmed to the multiracial reformist agenda and aligned with the military 
regime. Archbishop Petero Mataca, in a thinly veiled newspaper opinion piece, 
obviously referring to SDL ministers and in support of the military takeover 
said, “In hindsight we should have protested strongly against allowing convicted 
persons to stand for elections or accept cabinet, senate or ambassadorial 
positions.” He went so far as pleading with the international community in an 
opinion editorial that, “There is no real purpose in imposing sanctions on Fiji.”74 
Fathers Kevin Barr and David Arms, following the Archbishop’s lead, joined up 
and were key players in Bainimarama reforms. These religious organizations 
then went a step further in collaboration by consulting with the regime on the 
National Council for Building a Better Fiji (NCBBF). With Bainimarama, the 
Archbishop, co-chaired, the NCBBF which produced the 2008 Peoples Charter 
for Peace and Progress. The Peoples Charter initially upheld the legitimacy of 
the Constitution though the document lost much credibility after the abrogation 
of the same Constitution in April 2009.
Other prominent NGO’s indirectly voiced support for the putsch. On the 4th of 
January 2007 Shaista Shameem as Director Fiji Human Rights Commission 
(FHRC) released a thirty two page report defending the December 2006 military 
coup, alleging that the previous government of Laisenia Qarase had committed 
human rights violations and crimes against humanity. She maintained that the 
2006 elections were unlawful, and supported claims that Australia had intended 
to invade Fiji. FHRC Commissioner Shamima Ali, however, dissociated herself 
from the report. Prominent Fiji constitutional lawyer Richard Naidu dismissed 
the report as ‘mostly laughable’77. Naidu explained, “to use Ms Shameem’s 
logic would mean all laws after the 1987 coup is illegal including the Chaudhry 
government after the SVT government and including the law that set up the Fiji 
Human Rights Commission”. Naidu then made the acerbic point that, 
“Shameem’s latest effort illustrates the danger of academic sociology types to
79study serious subjects like law.”
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Adding his criticism Fiji Law Society President Devanesh Sharma alleged that 
some members of the legal profession outside the military were heavily involved 
in giving legal advice, doing research and writing speeches supporting the
on
military. Most prominent of these who threw their weight behind the regime 
were Justice Anthony Gates and Justice Nazat Shameen. Controversially 
Shameem had stood in as illegal Chair of the Judicial Services Commission 
which appointed Justice Gates as Acting Chief Justice. This extra constitutional 
move gave rise to allegations of prior knowledge on the part of these judges. 
As pointed out by former President of the Fiji Law Society Graham Leung, 
“There is a serious rift in the legal profession, which lends every appearance of 
not being independent. Some senior lawyers tacitly support the military coup, 
driven to do so by their dislike of the ousted government and its policies”81. It 
was obvious to local and international observers alike that the unfinished legal 
business of the 2000 coup had come back to also haunt the high judicial 
echelons of the nation.
Coup Opponents
The so-called old elite of the Church and the Great Council of Chiefs rallied 
behind the toppled Qarase government. Traditionally even before the coming of 
Christianity these two institutions had co-existed. Missionary Reverend 
Waterhouse had observed, “The influence of the priest over the common people 
is immense, although he is generally the tool of the chief. Indeed these two 
personages most usually act in concert.” After the coup, the Fiji Council of 
Churches (CCF) and the Assembly of Christian Churches in Fiji (ACCF) 
through its President, the Methodist Minister Reverend Tuikilakila Waqairatu, 
had condemned the military takeover, calling the coup a manifestation of 
“darkness and evil.”83 Pentecostal Christian Mission Fellowship President 
Suliasi Kurulo, a pillar of the ACCF, even described Ratu Josefa Iloilo’s public 
address of the 4th January as “shocking” and said Ratu Josefa was a “puppet of 
the military”. Ratu Iloilo had acted contrary to the traditional political norm it 
seemed. To some, like Catholic Archbishop Petero Mataca, now a military 
regime supporter, Reverend Tuikilakila’s language rang hollow. Mataca in 
another thinly veiled reference to some senior Methodist ministers said, “We
261
can no longer turn a blind eye to the biased political stances that some of our
o c
churches have taken.”
As mentioned the Great Council of Chiefs was vigorously and unambiguously 
opposed to the takeover. Chairman of the GCC, Ratu Ovini Bokini, who before 
the coup described as “disgusting” comments made in spite of the GCC by 
military commander Bainimarama, condemned the coup d'etat outright. He 
clearly stated that the Council would refuse to recognize the interim government 
appointed by the military. The military’s actions to return executive authority 
to Iloilo may have however ‘thrown the GCC off-guard’ as it would have been 
pleased to see its resolution to recognize him as President fulfilled. As events 
unfolded Chairman Ratu Ovini became wary of the military’s hold over the 
President, saying, “the GCC could reconsider its support for the President Ratu 
Iloilo if comments he made yesterday were illegal.” Ratu Iloilo had supported 
the military takeover as “necessary at that time”. Bokini had earlier denounced 
his predecessor, Ratu Epeli Ganilau, who was apparently claiming to be
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mediating between the Great Council of Chiefs and the Military. Ganilau 
sympathized with the motives though not the method of the coup. Ratu Epeli 
then became interim Minister of Fijian Affairs. For his stance against the 
military, Ratu Ovini was hounded out as chairman by the military in the wake of 
the coup. He was finally removed and the Council suspended in August of 2007 
after it did not back Ratu Epeli Nailatikau, President Iloilo’s and the military 
regime’s nominee for Vice- President.
Consequently in what became the extensive purging of the Fijian administration 
under the previous Qarase government, Chief Executive Officer of the Ministry 
of Fijian Affairs Adi Litia Qionibaravi responsible for the GCC secretariat was 
dismissed for ‘non co-operation’ on the 13th of December by the regime. The 
majority of Government CEO’s of the Qarase administration were to follow and 
had their contracts terminated as well. Meli Bainimarama the older brother of 
the Commander took over the CEO Fijian Affairs post. Adi Litia, like many 
other indigenous Fijian government and statutory body executives was also 
accused of alleged corruption by Bainimarama and detained by the military.90
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Conclusion
This thesis has sought to analyse the role of the military in Fijian politics as 
defined by the three coups of 1987, 2000 and 2006. The concept of the 
usurpation and supplanting of the traditional Bauan sacred king by the warrior 
chief as symbolizing and inspiring military intervention in politics is the crux of 
the thesis. This event in history is emblematic of the role of the military in Fijian 
politics. The sacred king-warrior chief thesis shows that there is a political 
strategic culture that links the past to the present in explaining Fiji’s coups. The 
usurpation of power by the young from the old has been a recurring theme in 
Fijian culture that stretches back to the Nakauvadra mythology. The rise of the 
pre-eminent Bauan kingdom with the displacement of the Roko Tui Bau by the 
Vunivalu resonates with contemporary politics.
Commodore Bainimarama’s relationship to Ratu Josefa Iloilo and the incumbent 
President Ratu Epeli Nailatikau in many ways echoes that of a traditional 
Vunivalu, mimicking that of the warrior chief to the sacred king. Emblematic of 
the old order, military and political power, however, resides with Bainimarama 
as Commander of the military and Prime Minister. The manipulation of the 
President’s office has been a feature of the military’s rise to power. The 
Government’s Draft Constitution released on the 21st of March 2013, which 
states that the Prime Minister rather than the President is the Commander-in- 
Chief of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces, strengthens my argument and 
thesis by locating key state power and authority over the military in the figure of 
the bati turned turaga.' These sections of the new constitution do not follow the 
logic of the Westminster tradition, which endows an apolitical Governor- 
General or President with authority over the armed forces, but instead the logic 
of Fijian cultural tradition which, under certain circumstances, places 
overwhelming power in the hands of one man over his people.
The custom of respect for chiefs was codified and buttressed the colonial Fijian 
orthodoxy. The nascent colonial military was imbued with the traditional chief- 
warrior relationship based on customary law. During World Wars I, II and the 
Malayan Anti-Communist Campaign, Ratu Sukuna used these global conflicts
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to showcase this relationship and further the interests of the iTaukei Fijian elite. 
The loyalty and fighting prowess of Fijians forged even stronger political bonds 
with the Europeans at the expense of the Indo- Fijians. The thesis, therefore, 
placed emphasis on the Fijian elite-Fijian military relationship.
The salient characteristic that has underpinned the coups has been the 
tumultuous relationship between the Fijian institution of chiefs and the military 
elite as encapsulated in the Turaga-Bati relationship. Rabuka’s and also 
Bainimarama’s relationship to chiefs has been turbulent. The relationship 
between the Methodist Church and traditional politics has also existed since the 
advent of Christianity in Fiji. Early Missionaries readily saw themselves as 
agents of political and social reforms. This nexus underpinned the coups and 
influenced the thinking of prominent Methodist pastors such as Reverends 
Tomasi Raikivi and Manasa Lasaro, who played leading roles in the 1987 coup. 
Bainimarama, wary of these links, has kept a close watch on church and 
traditional leaders. During the 1987 coup, the military and these two Fijian 
institutions, the chiefs and the Church, seemed to be acting in concert though 
fundamentalist aspirations were to mar relations. Rabuka’s coup was, in part, an 
attempt to return the rule and right of the old chiefly-dominated Fijian order.
What initially activated the coups was the social and neo-traditional bond 
between Rabuka and his group of officers with the political pressure group, the 
iTaukei Movement. This hastily assembled political front embodied a new 
political force of urban mass-based Fijians from all social strata. They were a 
challenge to the dominance of the chiefs, even while claiming to defend inherent 
traditional structures. Given Rabuka’s commoner background and at times 
impulsive military demeanour, his relationship with the traditional power- 
brokers of Fijian politics steadily became strained. Rabuka's asserting control in 
September of 1987 was an affront to the compromise formulated by the 
traditional Fijian leadership of Ratu Penaia and Ratu Mara in the stillborn Deuba 
Accord. Rabuka, however, was granted a life membership in the Council 
signifying an acknowledgement of and silent assent to his actions. This was an 
unprecedented political compromise undertaken by what was basically a chiefly 
institution for chiefly deliberation.
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Rabuka’s coup was often explained as the result of inter-ethnic political tensions 
where indigenous Fijians having lost political power were claiming what was 
theirs perpetually. The ethnic conflict hypothesis, however, as a generator of 
coups in general is arguable. Instead the prevalence of ethnic outbidding by 
political elites has made the instrumentalist conflict view for the 1987 coup 
compelling. It is argued that Ratu Mara and elements from within his Alliance 
Party were the benefactors of Rabuka’s coup. Brij Lai is adamant that the 
takeover was manipulated by politicians with personal interests at stake, a 
substantiation of the instrumentalist view. Rabuka’s 1987 coup therefore 
reflected the protection of the neo-traditional Turaga-Bati relationship, where 
the modem bati was protecting Fijian political supremacy and the authority of 
the chiefs. This is evidenced in the adoption of the ethnically skewed 1990 
Constitution under the influence of the Great Council of Chiefs.
The unintended consequence of Fiji’s involvement in international peacekeeping 
has been debated. It is argued that peacekeeping has led to the military’s 
adoption of a political mediator self- image. Peacekeeping as a role has allowed 
the military to keep a large standing force that is pre-disposed to political 
intervention.
The 2000 coup profoundly re-shaped the thinking of senior officers and one that 
entailed a reorientation of the RFMF as a whole. Initially, there was 
considerable ambivalence and RFMF backing for a full-scale military coup was 
by no means out of the question. The RFMF might have chosen to support its 
IMS colleagues inside parliament. Provincial loyalties might have led people 
from the core rebel provinces like Naitasiri, Rewa and Tailevu to break ranks 
with those from other parts of the country. Regional loyalties also surfaced with 
the Yasayasa vaka Ra calling for autonomy for the West from the three 
traditional confederacies. When Major Jo Savua and the Engineers regiment 
marched into parliament, there might have been a broader RFMF rallying to the 
George Speight cause. What the senior ranking officers could all agree on was 
that the crisis had to be handled patiently and carefully due to the hostage 
situation. The military in 2000, from being seen as ambivalent, came to be 
applauded for saving the nation. However, its actions had more to do with
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institutional defence rather then the squashing of ethno-nationalism. In the 
immediate aftermath of the coup the issue of ethno-nationalism had to be treated 
sensitively within a predominantly Fijian institution. The military’s ambivalence 
stemmed from the military’s seeming accession to Speight’s changing demands.
Ultimately, the military held out against the hostage-takers and arrested and 
imprisoned George Speight and his supporters. In 2000, the military had 
increasingly assumed a ‘guardian role’ and came to (i) see itself as protecting 
the nation from Speight’s ethno-nationalism, (ii) when the Qarase led 
government was installed, deem his ‘mandate’ to be that of the military as 
Qarase was part of the Fijian technocratic elite which Bainimarama often has 
reiterated ‘was to do what it was told to do’. This thinking resurrects Rabuka’s 
military-imposed conditions when handing back government to Ratu Mara in 
December 1987. This included regular consultations with senior army officers 
on government policy, and the exclusion of the Fiji Labour Party/NFP coalition 
members from Cabinet. Claims of a multi-racialist orientation, and the historical 
appeal to the 2000 events as evidence of that preparedness to quash the forces of 
ethno-nationalism, were propaganda devised in the later context of growing 
frictions with the Qarase government, to appeal to Indo-Fijians, domestic elites 
and overseas sympathisers. During the hectic and rapidly shifting events of 
May-June 2000, institutional survival was the uppermost consideration for the 
majority of serving senior officers in the Land Force Command.
After the military mutiny of 2000, when Bainimarama escaped with his life, an 
obvious deep seated distrust of Fijian political and communal leaders was left to 
fester in the military leader. In retrospect a combination of government policies 
such as the affirmative action programme for indigenous Fijians, and the 
formation of a military interventionist coalition with politicians encouraged the 
military leader into engaging in politics.
Bainimarama became convinced that Qarase was not acting in the national 
interest and was peddling an ethnic agenda (in particular via the agriculture 
scam to buy votes in the lead up to the August 2001 elections). Bainimarama 
began to rue relinquishing power and suspected SDL/CAMV corruption and
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cronyism were at play in running government. As time went on, Bainimarama 
and his military spokesman Major Leweni became more critical of government 
publically. The chasm between Bainimarama and Qarase was left unbridged 
until it was too late. It allowed room for the argument to take hold, among a 
broader coalition beyond the military, that Bainimarama was protecting the 
national interest.
The cause of the emerging antagonism between Bainimarama and Qarase was 
mainly political misperceptions that led to wrong policy choices. Qarase in the 
end was willing to compromise by shelving the controversial Bills. 
Bainimarama however was driven by his misperception and by opportunist 
stakeholders spurring him into escalating his antagonism with Qarase and finally 
into executing the 2006 coup.
Since the 2006 coup the military has filled the void left by the decline of the 
paramount chiefs. The military in many ways has seemingly reproduced the 
long lost order and discipline of Fijian village life, which has been heavily 
eroded by urbanization and other pressures. Over the last decade, the military 
has publically challenged and inverted the neo-traditional order of the prominent 
paramount chiefs of the three confederacies at the apex of political power. In a 
sense the military, in emasculating the GCC, is superimposing a fourth 
confederacy of its own with the military as a national constituent sitting above 
traditional Vanua politics. The military still remains 99% ethnic Fijian despite 
the regime’s espoused multiracialism, casting doubt on Bainimarama’s claims to 
be transforming Fiji in a multiracial direction. By 2006, the senior military 
command had become estranged from the paramount chiefs, although a pliant 
president was retained as a figurehead and a few officers close to the old chiefly 
order stood alongside Bainimarama hoping to cash in on an authoritarian future.
The 2006 coup, again to recapitulate the core theme, typified the power 
inversion of the sacred king by the warrior chief. The neo-traditional chiefly 
elite-military relationship had previously functioned in a symbiotic patron-client 
political relationship post-Independence. As epitomized by the removal of 
President and high chief Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, the 2000 coup figuratively
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was the fulcrum of this relational shift, which was under way at that time but not 
complete. The political antagonism from 2001-2006 reflected this power swing 
in the making as the military began rhetorically countermanding and confronting 
the ruling SDL government and its associated elite. The origin of the 2006 
military takeover of the elected SDL-FLP government is, therefore, argued to be 
rooted in the unfinished business of the 2000 coup. Bainimarama on numerous 
occasions has referred to the ‘events of 2000’ and the ‘ethno-nationalist threat’, 
to warn his opponents or justify his coup of 2006." Coup sympathizers such as 
Mahendra Chaudhry and Dr Shaista Shameem also belaboured the ‘events of 
2000’ to legitimize the 2006 coup.
We have analyzed the case for military intervention in the 1987, 2000 and 2006 
coups. After the 1987 coup, the military reinstalled high chiefs Mara and 
Ganilau and adhered to the doctrine of Fijian paramountcy. In 2000, the military 
began a process of asserting its control over the chiefly elite and its associates. 
Through the 2006 coup the military has inverted the traditional Turaga-Bati 
relationship, and assumed control in its own right — though still behind the 
figurehead of a chiefly president, as indeed was true of ancient Bau, where, 
despite the revolution, the post of Roko Tui Bau (‘sacred king’) remained despite 
the new ascendancy of the Vunivalu (‘warrior chief). We described the 
emergence of the pre-coup coalition between the military, civil society groups 
and political stakeholders and how the coups of 2006 like those of 2000 and 
1987 was supported by irrational political fears.
Even though the government tried to reduce the risk of a coup by acceding to all 
military demands including suspending controversial Bills and increasing pay 
and allowances for the military, the coup nevertheless took place. Bainimarama 
exaggerated the threat of ethno-nationalism, depicting the nation as being at the 
political mercy of its corrupt adherents. Allegations of manipulation of the 
democratic process as inherent in the SDL political agenda were rife though 
they proved baseless. Today, the human security dimension of defence is 
underpinned by the mediator role of Fiji’s military. This argument has led to the 
militarization of government and the re-defining of the traditional chief-warrior 
relationship. The bati has replaced the turaga as the ruling elite, and the
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inclusive institutions vital for a prosperous democracy have also been 
supplanted rather than promoted.
1 Fiji Government, 2013 Draft Constitution, Chapter 4, Part B, Sect 91(2) p.46, 21 Mar 2013.
2 Fiji Sun, ‘Warning to the Great Council of Chiefs’, 9 Mar 2006.
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Epilogue
Introduction
In April 2009 the Fiji Court of Appeal, ruled the 2006 coup illegal. This time the 
coup regime had no intention of accepting the judgment of the courts on its legal 
authority, and no intention of returning to the voters, at least for a number of 
years. On the day after the judgment, the coup leader Bainimarama set in train a 
military revolution and ‘New Legal Order’ that far superseded anything seen in 
Fiji before. Acting through an ailing and compliant President, he dismissed the 
entire judiciary, abrogated the constitution and handed the country over to 
himself and his military forces for the next five years. He declared a state of 
emergency, muzzled the media, expelled foreign journalists, blocked the FM 
transmission of Radio Australia, detained the highly respected Governor of the 
Reserve Bank, Savenaca Narube, and, in an effort to avert a foreign exchange 
crisis, devalued the Fiji dollar by 20 per cent. He also turned decisively against 
the GCC, the Methodist Church and the Labour Unions.
Militarization of Government
In the days after the takeover of the Qarase government, Commodore 
Bainimarama in announcing his ‘clean up campaign’ made it explicitly clear 
that, ‘no one in the military would benefit from the coup.’1 Over five years after 
the coup, having occupied the position of Prime Minister himself, along with 
seven other ministerial portfolios, Bainimarama and more than fifty other 
officers are entrenched in senior government appointments in support of this 
anti-corruption campaign. Indeed since the coup, military officers have become 
beneficiaries of the takeover in a nation where, economic growth has been poor 
and human rights abuses common: Claims of massive political corruption were 
critical to the justification of the coup, but with the passage of time concrete 
evidence has been lacking, convictions have been few and those show trials that 
have been conducted have largely targeted the regime’s enemies. In August 
2012, Qarase was finally jailed for a year on dubious charges, allegedly 
committed two decades ago unrelated to his time as Prime Minister. Serious 
charges against fonner Chief Justice Daniel Fatiaki were dropped after he 
accepted a payoff, and thus made less likely any challenge to the government’s
279
new appointee in that post. The emphasis for the regime though has shifted to 
‘long overdue’ economic development and electoral constitutional reforms to 
create a stable political order. The military elite now see themselves as more 
than mediators; they see themselves as rulers supplanting the chiefs and their 
associated elites, whom they blame for Fiji’s political instability.
What is apposite is Morris Janowitz’s definition of this ‘professional self image’ 
and even more so the ‘politics of wanting to be above politics’ now being 
cultivated by Commodore Bainimarama and his military elite. A photo that 
appeared in the Fiji Sun after the swearing-in ceremony of the Constitution 
Commissioners captures this pervasive political oversight by the military 
regime.
Photo 6. Constitution Commission Members after swearing-in at Suva High Court. 
Sitting from left, Penelope Moore, Taufa Vakatale, Professor Yash Ghai Dr Satendra 
Nandan, and Professor Christina Murray.
DPP Christopher Pryde (standing second from left and Attorney General Aiyaz Sayed 
Khaiyum (standing third from left), Col Mosese Tikoitoga (standing far right), Image:
Fiji Sun.
To further illustrate the point, in July 2012 even before the five member 
Constitution Commission began soliciting public submissions, the regime had 
promulgated a decree requiring immunity for those involved in the 2006 and 
earlier coups to be entrenched in the new constitution. In a press statement 
intended for the regime and the military, the Commissioners stated ‘This type of 
prospective immunity is most unusual, perhaps unique, and, we believe,
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undesirable.’4 The Ghai Draft Constitution was subsequently discarded in 
December 2012 with the aid of the compliant President, Nailatikau.
Karawan had described this self image of the Egyptian Free Officers 
Organization that gave rise to the recently deposed regime of Egyptian President 
Hosni Mubarak:
The army officers perceived themselves as efficient nation builders, as members of a 
meritorious and not-ascriptive institution, as possessing highly needed organizational 
and administrative skills such as discipline, planning, and familiarity with modem 
technology. They compared these self images with their images of the politicians of the 
old order: social decadence, endemic corruption, privileges for the few, and lack of 
effectiveness in meeting the national challenges. These challenges the leaders of the 
new order argued, could be met only by getting rid of the divisive features of 
competitive systems and building one organization to mobilize the public in pursuit of 
superior objectives for the nation.5
This description is pertinent to the present Fiji military elite’s political epoch 
that has emerged. The military started out, after independence, as the instrument 
of a parallel state staffed by paramount chiefs and their associates. The Great 
Council of Chiefs, the Fijian Affairs Board, the Native Land Trust Board and the 
provincial councils gave the state a dualistic aspect, and coexisted alongside the 
formal edifice of Westminster democracy, multi-ethnic municipal councils in 
the towns, and a multi-ethnic if largely Indo-Fijian -led labour movement. Even 
as it seized power in 1987, some tension was apparent in military relations with 
that ruling hierarchy of Fijian chiefs. That friction was magnified by the 2000 
crisis, and in the years that followed the military increasingly broke away from 
its former controls. Given the historical Turaga-Bati relationship and the 
military’s overwhelming ethnic Fijian makeup, many had assumed that the 
corporate interests of the ruling elite and the military would always converge. 
This premise has been overturned. Since the 2006 coup, the military has staked 
out its own interpretation of national interests and ‘good governance’ at the 
expense of the chiefly elite and its associates.
Contrary to Bainimarama’s assurances about the coup-makers not benefitting 
from their action in overthrowing the government, there has been a deliberate 
staffing of the upper echelons of government with military officers. Reversing 
his previous position, Bainimarama claimed in 2010 that ‘only the military can 
bring about change.’6 It became apparent to Bainimarama that in order to bring
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about the revolutionary changes he wanted in society; he would have to rely on 
his military officers and military autocratic rule.
Since the 2006 coup, the militarization of senior government posts has 
continued unabated. Regular, reservist and retired military officers now hold or 
have held senior positions as President, Prime Minister, Cabinet ministers, 
Permanent Secretaries, Directors and as board members of various statutory 
bodies in the military interim government (see Table below). Furthermore, 
families of military officers have also conspicuously been elevated to various 
statutory bodies. It became quite apparent that in order to enforce and sustain his 
authoritarian regime, Bainimarama co-opted fellow senior officers to run 
government. By appointing senior serving military officers as Commissioners of 
the four Divisions, Bainimarama was able to ensure a high military profile in 
national development. The most significant aspect of the militarization of the 
top echelons of government however were the appointments to cabinet of the 
two high chiefs and former Commanders of the military -  Brigadiers Nailatikau 
and Ganilau -  and the subsequent elevation of Nailatikau first as Vice-President 
and then as President. This inclusion, within the military at least, served to 
reinforce the Turaga-Bati relationship. The militarization process has also seen 
officers in multiple positions or switching appointments with regularity at the 
whim of Bainimarama.
Table 4; Military Officers in Cabinet and the Civil Service since December 
2006.
A. Cabinet
Commodore Voreqe Bainimarama Prime Minister, Minister of Finance and
National Planning and Sugar, Public Service, 
People's Charter for Change, Information, 
Provincial Development,
Indigenous and Multi-Ethnic Affairs.
Captain Timoci Lesi Natuva Minister for Public Utilities, Works
and Transport.
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Colonel Samuela Saumatua
Commander Viliame Naupoto
B. Ambassadors/Diplomatic Corp
Commodore Esala Teleni 
Lt Col Neumi Leweni 
Lt Col Pita Alifereti
C. Civil Service
Commodore Esala Teleni 
Brigadier Ioane Naivalurua 
Lt Col Ifereimi Vasu
Permanent Secretaries
Lt Col Pio Tikoduadua 
Lt Col Mason Smith 
Cmdr Francis Kean 
Lt Col Inia Seruiratu 
Lt Col Neumi Leweni 
Lt Col Manasa Vanigi 
Cmd Viliame Naupoto
Deputy Permanent Secretaries
Colonel Apakuki Kurusiga 
Lt Col Serevi Vananalagi 
Utilities.
Divisional Commissioners
Lt Col Mosese Tikoitoga 
Lt Col Inia Seruirtu
Minister for Local Government, 
Urban Development, Housing and 
Environment.
Minister of Youth and Sports.
Ambassador -China.
First Secretary -China.
First Secretary- China.
Commissioner of Police. 
Commissioner of Prisons/Police. 
Commissioner Prisons.
Fijian Affairs Board.
Min of Works, Transport and Public
Divisional Commissioner Central. 
Divisional Commissioner Northern.
Prime Minister’s Office.
Ministry of Agriculture.
Public Utilities, Works.
Provincial Development and Multi-Ethnic. 
Lands.
Sugar.
Fisheries and Forestry.
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Lt C ol Ilai M oceica D iv isional C o m m issio n er N orthern .
Lt C m dr Jo C aw aki D iv isional C o m m issioner W estern .
Lt C ol Ifereim i V asu D ivisional C o m m issio n er Eastern.
Lt C ol B ale  T u itubou D iv isional C o m m issio n er C entral.
Lt C ol N etan i R ika D iv isional C o m m issio n er E astern .
Others
M aj N em ani V u n iw aqa D irecto r Im m igration .
Lt C ol Jonasio  M ara D irec to r G overnm en t P h an n aceu tica ls .
C ap ta in  A ca R ayaw a D irecto r P ub lic  P rosecu tions.
Lt C o m m an d er S N aqali D irec to r F isheries.
Lt C m dr E S alusalu D irec to r G o v ernm en t IT Services.
Lt C ol G eorge  L angm an D epu ty  C o m m issio n er FIC A C .
Lt Pajili D obui D irecto r D ISM A C .
C apt Sanaila  Seru C h ie f  In v estiga to r F IC A C .
C o m m an d er F rancis  K ean
2
Fiji G ovt S h ipp ing  Head.
C ap t I R atu rala D irecto r N ational P lanning.
M ajo r T ukana L ogistic  o fficer P risons D ept.
M ajo r K aurasi T ra in ing  o fficer P risons D ept.
M aj A seri R okoura P rivate  S ecre tary  to PM .
M aj P enioni N a liv a P rivate  S ecre tary  to PM .
D. Military Officers on Boards of State-Owned Enterprises and
Government or Quasi-Government Authorities
Fiji Post B rig  Ioane N aivalu rua.
A irpo rts  Fiji Ltd Lt Col Pio T ikoduadua.
Fiji R ugby  U nion C ol M oses T iko itoga.
F ijian  H old ings Ltd B rig  A ziz  M oham ed.
Fiji TV Lt Col N eum i L ew eni.
Fiji Ports C o rp oration  Ltd C m dr Joeli C aw aki, F rancis K ean.
T ro p ik  W ood Industries Ltd Lt Col R atu  T ev ita  M ara.
Fiji B ro ad castin g  C om m issio n C apt I R aturala.
H o using  A u th o rity C m d M osese  Sem i.
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E. Former Senior Military Officers in key Government Positions
Brigadier Epeli Nailatikau President.
Brigadier Epeli Ganilau Minister Defence, National Security ai
n
Immigration.
Commander Netani Sukanaivalu Minister for Lands and Mineral
Resources.
Major Ana Rokomakoti Registrar Ministry of Justice.
Maj Timoci Tuisawau CEO Airport Fiji Ltd.
Colonel Dr. Jona Senilagakali Director RFMF Medical Scheme.
Major Isikeli Mataitoga Ambassador Brussels/Japan.
Major Sila Balawa Ministry o f Foreign Affairs Chief
Protocol.
Major Laifone Osborne Principal Officer Immigration.
Major L V Seruiratu Principal Officer Immigration.
Maj Jo Vucago Special Administrator Lautoka City
Council.
Major Pacolo Luveni Principal Legal Officer Police Force.
Sgt SoroToutou Deputy Elections Supervisor.
Notes;
1 Panels A-C include serving military officers at the time of the coup of 5th December 2006 who 
were subsequently given civil service appointments, entailing salaried public service positions, 
or on various boards and held these as of 1.4.2010. Panel D includes top-ranking government 
officials who are reservists or with close family links to the RFMF.
2 In April 2010, it was announced that the Fiji Navy, under the direction of Commander Francis 
Kean, were to take over the running of Government Shipping Services Ltd .{Fiji Sun 5,h April 
2010)
The Future of the Turaga-Bati Relationship
In its haste to create an equitable society, the military regime dismantled Itaukei 
institutions and purged its associated political and business elites it blamed as 
the root causes of political instability and backwardness. Perhaps we need to 
take stock of recent literature to understand what has really happened globally 
and what is happening as in the case o f Fiji. In Why Nations Fail: The Origins o f
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Power, Prosperity and Poverty, authors Professors Daron Acemoglu and James 
Robinson brilliantly make the case that inclusive political institutions in support 
of inclusive economic institutions are key to sustained prosperity and political
o
stability. Acemoglu and Robinson argue through numerous historical examples 
right up to the Arab Spring in Egypt and Syria, that a nation’s economic fate is 
not determined by geography or culture but by its man made institutions. 
Powerful people always and everywhere seek to grab complete control over 
government, be they crony capitalists, communist Politbüros or despotic 
dictators. Powerful elites rig the rules to benefit themselves at the expense of the 
many.
In many post colonial and post cold war states, polities that are characterized by 
extractive institutions reproduce themselves overtime in recurring patterns. 
These institutions controlled by elites ossify or fail to adapt undermining 
broader social progress. Fiji’s Great Council of Chiefs and its associated elite’s 
controlled Fijian Holdings Ltd have been singled out as such by the military 
regime. Unfortunately many despotic rulers in promising inclusive political and 
economic institutions and empowerment of the people have reneged on those 
assurances and instead delivered more extractive and repressive institutions in 
collusion with new elites often constitutionally sanctified by law.
Father Kevin Barr, a coup apologist turned whistleblower, who was the chair of 
the Fiji Wages Council, provides an insight into the repressive Bainimarama 
regime. In an article titled, ‘2011 Was Not a Good Year for the Workers of Fiji’ 
on an anti-regime website, Barr said the regime introduced the controversial 
Essential National Industries Decree without consulting the Employment 
Relations Board. The priest mentions a strong lobby of employers who have the 
ear of Aiyaz Sayed Khaiyum and who were operating outside due process. 9 He 
described it as ‘crony capitalism’. He also said the 2012 Budget did not put 
money in workers’ pockets as claimed by the regime.10 Father Barr further 
contested a statement made by Attorney General, Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum that 
said, ‘The Bainimarama Government, as you can see from our track record, has 
been on the forefront of improving wages for those workers who have been on 
the margin of poverty.’11 Barr revealed, T wish to take a brief review of 2011
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from the viewpoint of the workers of Fiji. It may have been a great year for
12employers and investors but not for the ordinary workers of the country.’ 
Startling revelations also came from former Fiji Court of Appeal judge William 
Marshall QC who claimed that ‘there was no longer judicial independence in 
the country and that Attorney General Aiyaz Sayed Khaiyum should be 
dismissed.’ These are classic examples of ‘new cronyism’ where in an attempt 
to eradicate extractive institutions and ‘old cronyism,’ the incoming military 
regime has in fact set up its own elites to shore up its authoritarian rule and 
continue its own extractive institutions.
The supplantment of Fiji’s indigenous institutions such as the GCC and its 
political associates the SDL Party and their illegal removal from power have 
only served to recreate the extractive institutions in other forms with new elites. 
The bati have replaced the turaga as ruling elites, but the inclusive institutions 
vital for a prosperous democracy have also been supplanted with politically 
extractive ones and the bati, despite the promises of 2006, have failed to 
revolutionize society by any measure. Furthermore, five years after the much 
promised clean up coup, economist Biman Prasad echoing fellow economist 
Wadan Narsey, has claimed Bainimarama has not delivered economic 
prosperity.14 The disillusionment of coup supporters such as Father Barr, 
Ganilau and Chaudhry reflects this shift. Nevertheless, ‘crony capitalism’ 
continues to flourish. Acemoglu and Robinson stated that many nations that fail 
to produce prosperity and perpetuate poverty fall into the coup trap by 
promising inclusive political and economic institutions. They in fact perpetuate 
extractive institutional patterns as a result of this vicious cycle of repressive 
regimes. The supplantment of the turaga and their associates by the bati has led 
to the reincarnation of extractive rather than inclusive political and economic 
institutions. The military that had intervened to protect a ruling class had 
eventually become a political class itself, an inversion of the status quo. Coups 
have been the critical turning points in this military self re-definition. The Fiji 
military has ‘become a homus politicus in its own right’.15
Further still, there is conjecture as to Bainimarama’s potential usurping of the 
presidential role in the future. This would entail a further shift away from Fiji’s
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neo-traditional politics based on the Westminster Parliamentary model. In 
March of 2013 the Government’s Draft Constitution was unveiled in place of 
the discarded Ghai Draft Constitution. The Government’s Draft assigned to the 
Prime Minister, (amongst other powers) the office of Commander- in- Chief of 
the military, previously held by the President. The role inversion emblematic of 
the Vunivalu over the Roko Tui Bau and the bati over the turaga, finally I 
suggest, has become a political reality. Not only in actual deed but formerly 
constitutionalized.
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1 Fiji Times, ‘All About Good Governance’ , 17 Nov 2007
2 See International Monetary Fund, Republic o f Fiji, IMF Countiy Report 12/44, at 
www.imf.org.
3 Morris Janowitz, Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations, University of 
Chicago Press, 1977, p. 141.
4 Fiji Constitution Commission Press Statement, 19Jul 2012.
5 Ibrahim A .Karawan, ‘Egypt’ in C P. Demopoulos and Cynthia Watson, eds, The Political Role 
of the Military: An International Handbook, Greenwood Publishing Group, London, 1996, p.109.
6 Fiji Village.com, ‘Political Upheavals Won’t Happen Again’, 11 Mar 2010.
7
Ratu Epeli resigned in Nov 2010 as Minister after being asked to expel the American chief 
executive of Fiji Water's local bottling operation, David Roth.
8 Acemoglu and Robinson, Why Nations Fail.
9 See http://crosbiew.blogspot.co.nz/2012/03/2011 -was-not-good-year-for-workersof.html
accessed 14 Aug 2012.
10 Coupfourandahalf.com, ‘2011 Was Not a Good Year for the Workers of Fiji,’ 31 Mar 2012.
11 Fiji Times, 8 August 2011.
12 Coupfourandahalf.com, ‘2011 Was Not a Good Year for the Workers of Fiji,’ 31 Mar 2012.
13 Radio New Zealand, ‘Former Court of Appeal judge in Fiji calls for AG’s dismissal’, 18 Sep 
2012 .
14 Biman Prasad, Pacific Update Fiji Presentation at ANU Crawford School, 6 Sep 2012.
15 Stephanie Lawson, ‘The Military Versus Democracy in Fiji: Problems For Contemporary 
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